

Development and Family in Saudi Arabia :

**AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE VIEWS OF
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN RIYADH**

BY

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In the Name of Allah "God"
Most Gracious, Most Merciful

To my Parents

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by

Ibrahim Ibn Mubarak Al-Juwayer

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The impact of development and social change on traditional societies has received increasing scrutiny in recent years. Saudi Arabia is in the midst of efforts to create a modern nation without sacrificing Islamic social and religious values. Since social scientific assessment of social change in Saudi Arabia is in its infancy, this dissertation is an exploratory study of some key ideological issues as viewed by Saudi University students.

The study surveyed university students. They were selected because of their vested interest and involvement in the mainstream of development. Thus they were expected to provide a good example of the contrast between traditional and modern ideas, beliefs, and values.

The study did not test specific causal hypotheses; it was exploratory. The research problem was to identify the students' styles of coping with social change. The notion of style is that proposed by Karl Manheim and was operationalized in a series of correlational and factor analyses. A pre-tested, self-administered 107-item questionnaire was administered to a sample of 404 students in several colleges and universities in Riyadh.

The exploration of this study included demographic items, family variables, attitudes toward social change, social and family solidarity, and religiosity. It appeared that the styles of coping with change in Saudi Arabia are varied and in many ways specific to the society and its traditions. We found a complementary blend of religious beliefs and modern impulses, e.g., continued high religiosity, but some tempering of tradition rigidity, continued family solidarity, with greater personal freedoms for wives and children. Islam has demonstrated in this study an ability to accommodate change without the elimination or compromise of religious tenets.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

One of the most ambitious and expensive development efforts in history is underway in Saudi Arabia. This effort, led by the Saudi government, attempts to create a powerful, modern, financial-economic power without sacrificing Islamic social and religious values. As noted in the Third Development Plan (1980), the distinguishing mark of the Saudi approach to development is that material and social objectives are drawn directly from the ethical principles of Islam and the cultural values of Saudi Arabia's society.

This study will examine the way in which a particular group--Saudi university students--views the impact of development on the Saudi family. We will examine the expectations, beliefs, attitudes, and values that these students hold concerning the families of their parents, the ones they currently hold or hope to build, and those concerning the families that they perceive their children will have in the future.

By taking this approach, we hope, at least in part, to study the process of social change at one point in time. Our research effort will not seek to measure change itself,

rather, change will be conceptualized as a "structural" feature of the society under observation. We are concerned about what is happening in the "hearts and minds" of a very special segment of the Saudi population, a segment called to be in charge of conducting the development process by virtue of its superior knowledge and special skills.

University students are caught, so to say, in the very mainstream of the process of development. They have higher education, more exposure to foreign methods and have access to travel abroad. We are assuming that the clash of traditional and modern ideas, beliefs, and values will be very much in evidence here. It should be added that education is often seen as the key to a successful future, and university students will naturally have high expectations. We are conceiving university students as agents of change with a vested interest in the development process.

While it might seem that university students are already inclined to accept the benefits of development, it should be added that they are also committed to the society. Saudi Arabia has experienced almost no brain drain since it began sending students abroad and constructing its own universities in earnest. Virtually all return or remain in Saudi Arabia. This unusual phenomenon is due to several factors, including: the availability of desirable employment, strong ties to the family and allied obligations, and government supervision in the case of students at foreign universities.

An important conceptual question needs to be formulated early in this project. A core foundation of Islam is that the religion comes with human nature and that it is not formulated against this nature. This represents an ethic which could serve, and appears to be serving, as a dynamic base for a "developmental spirit." In fact, while Islam can certainly be construed to oppose change, historically Muslims are experienced significant social change within traditional religious boundaries. The principle of going with nature rather than against it can be seen as a principle which encourages adaptation, syncretism and reorganization. In this way, the simplistic generalization that "traditional values" are an obstacle to development needs to be taken with great care in the case of Saudi Arabia. Development has proceeded at an astonishing pace and it appears that the "traditional values" are influencing it. Many of the questions to be included in our survey instrument are concerned with the adaptation of the religious life of Saudi university students to changing conditions of Saudi society. Given the importance of the Saudi family, the view afforded by our perspective of Saudi university students should provide insights into the trends of society at large. It is not meant to provide the definitive perspective, for there are many, and our study is only exploratory. But, overall, the results of this research should help clarify some of the effects of development on the Saudi Arabian family structure.

The Research Problem

This is an exploratory study of the attitudes, beliefs, and values of Saudi Arabian students concerning the impact of development (social, human, economic, etc.) and the family. The study does not have specific causal hypotheses or a precise theoretical framework to submit to test. This does not mean that the research is a totally atheoretical endeavor.

Our research problem will be to identify what we will call "styles of coping with rapid social change." The idea of style is drawn from the writings of Karl Mannheim (1940, 1953). He advanced a theory of stages of history and thought-styles for coping with change. In these works, he conceived society as a network of meaningful acts by individuals, and class-based actions were considered to be the most significant. Mannheim viewed history in a certain order. First was the stage of horde solidarity, second was the stage of individual competition, and third was the stage of super-individual group solidarity. He held a metaphysical, quasi-religious belief in the creative function of history to deal with change. Mannheim specified several connections between perspectives or thought-styles and aspects of social position. He wrote that the upwardly mobile tend to disavow tradition, and quickly recognize and accept the possibility of conflicting values. They tend to develop utopian styles of thought, emphasizing intuition, specificity, and lack of systematic form. From another

perspective, those groups socially-uprooted by change and those with blurred identities tend to have disorganized or vague time-orientations, inconsistent ideas and valuations, and a number of highly impressionistic notions. The most vulnerable are groups or categories without identities; these implicitly encourage self-styled elites to give them identities--an invitation to dictatorship. Groups that are upwardly mobile during social change conceive of the immediate world and past history as isolated and unrelated events, however, with time comes security of identity, and they develop more systematic approaches.

Those groups that perceive themselves as exposed to all other groups' ideas during social change develop a unique style--they aim for synthesis or compromise. Ideological synthesis is common in the middle classes, and they select only those values that justify and conserve their positions.

Also, it should be indicated that the above-mentioned groups are hardly static, and the characteristics of thought-styles are affected as the composition of groups, strata or subpopulations. As groups become more heterogeneous, their perspectives implicitly develop in the direction of greater abstraction, greater formalization, and greater conservatism (at least ideologically).

As we have said in the previous section, Saudi Arabia is undergoing a very rapid process of social change. By analyzing the data collected against this background, we will endeavor to identify "styles of coping with rapid

social change." These are conceptualized as clusters of attitudes and behaviors. It is assumed that the styles identified will constitute holistic characterizations-- multidimensional "types" which have theoretical relevance. Styles may be especially important as we compare how individuals, groups and culture are affected by development, and what aspects continue to distinguish them from other individuals, groups and cultures.

To derive the aforementioned "styles," we intend to use a number of multivariate analytical strategies. The most important of these will be factor analysis.

Plan of This Study

We designed this exploratory study as follows: Following this Introduction is Chapter II, Review of the Literature, which includes general material on Saudi Arabia and its history; Saudi Arabia's Islamic heritage and Islamic development; social, political, and economic aspects of contemporary life and development in Saudi Arabia; family and family in history in Islam and in Saudi Arabia. Chapter III details the methodology, which includes the limitations of the approach, sampling techniques, survey applications, the variables and the data analyses. Chapter IV simply describes the research findings, variable by variable and question by question. Then Chapter V, which deals with the analysis of the findings using correlation

coefficients and/or factor analyses, is followed by Chapter VI, the conclusions and recommendations. In the Appendix, we include the questionnaire that we distributed in our study in the Arabic and English languages.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Before commencing any study, it is imperative to review as much published or unpublished material on the subject as is available. Such a review assists the researcher in gaining background material, and in refining whatever theoretical framework he brings to the study, which in turn suggests the most relevant items to observe. For purposes of organization, our literature review is divided as follows: general material on Saudi Arabia and its history; Saudi Arabia's Islamic heritage and Islamic development; social, political, and economic aspects of contemporary life and development in Saudi Arabia; family and family history in Islam and in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and Its History

Saudi Arabia occupies the major part of the Arabian Peninsula, and is bounded on the north by Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, on the east by the Arabian or Persian Gulf and Qatar, on the southeast by the United Arab Emirates and Oman, on the south by the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and on the west by

the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. Boundaries in the southeast and the south are not precisely defined.

More than half of Saudi Arabia is desert. The Rub al-Khali extends over much of the southeast and beyond the southern frontier. This largely unexplored region has an estimated area of about 300,000 square miles. An extension of the Syrian Desert projects into northern Saudi Arabian, and southeast of this region is the an-Nafud covering an area of about 22,000 square miles. Ad-Dahna, a narrow extension of this desert, links an-Nafud and Rub al-Khali. A central plateau region, broken in the east by several uplifts, extends south from an-Nafud. Several wadis cross the plateau region. The western limits of the plateau are delineated by a mountain range along the east of the al-Hijaz and Asir regions. Between the range and the Red Sea is a narrow coastal plain. In the east along the Arabian Gulf is al-Hasa, a tremendous petroleum area.

Saudi Arabia has been inhabited by nomadic Arabic Semitic tribes for thousands of years. The basis for the country's political status today was set in the 19th century during the Wahhabi movement, and the Kingdom was established in the 20th century.

A number of works provide further information on the history and specifics of Saudi Arabia. Among them (and from which the above information was extracted) are Lipsky (1959); Long (1976); Hitti (1963, 1966); Belling (1980) Nablock (1982); Mansfield (1981); Philby (1968); Smith

(1968); Troeller (1976) Izzeddin (1953) Smalley (1932) and Winder (1965).

Islamic Heritage and Development in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's Islamic heritage and developmental ideas evolving from Islam are crucial to this study. The Islamic heritage will be examined first, then development in Islam.

In recent years there has been a tempering of some rigors of behavior in Saudi Arabia, however, religion permeates all aspects of public and private life. The vast material wealth that came to the country seems to have weakened slightly the religious impulse toward austerity so prominent before, but religion has not lost its control. Change will be slow and within the boundaries of Islam.

The holy places of Mecca and Medina are in Saudi Arabia, and bestow upon it a special position as the protector of these holy places, plus leadership of the Muslim countries. Virtually all of the population of Saudi Arabia is Muslim. Most are Sunni Muslim, which provides for homogeneity in the country. A few are Shiite Muslim.

Several noteworthy studies have appeared which deal with Saudi Arabia's Islamic heritage. The Cambridge History of Islam (1970) volumes I and II, provide a comprehensive survey of the history of the Muslim lands since the seventh century. They examine Islam in its cultural entirety, thus permitting an understanding of the complex historical, theological, philosophical, political, social, economic,

scientific, military, artistic factors related to its rise, expansion and development. The Encyclopedia of Islam (1938) is another excellent overview covering all aspects of the religion.

Levy (1933) wrote a standard text for reviewing the sociological development of Muslim institutions. Margoliouth (1914) demonstrated how Islamic doctrine was formulated. Wensinck (1932) presented a critical study of the rise of the orthodox view. Calverley (1925) set forth a thorough review of the articles of faith.

Hakim (1951) provided some insights into Islamic practices, and noted that the primary aim of a Muslim's life on earth is the betterment of that life by dealing with it practically. He indicated that the Muslim cannot jeopardize the essentials of Islam in his personal life, for while Islam's obligations may not always seem that palatable, they must still be fulfilled.

Farah (1970) traced the history and growth of the religion, and focused upon the fundamentals of Islamic values, beliefs and observances. Swartz (1981) indicated the nomocratic and nomocentric nature of the religion, and showed how in the realm of Islamic religion everything must be legitimized through law.

Other works of note are by Rentz (1969), Smalley (1932), Hopwood (1972), Wolf (1951), Nawwas (1974), Esposito (1980) Rentz (1965), Thompson (1966) and Karpat (1963).

The literature indicates that both in its broad outlines and in many of its details, Islam reflected the social realities of Arabian history. The religion served to provide an ideological basis for the evolution of the area surrounding Mecca from a nomadic and tribal to a more urban and mercantile system of organization. In overview, the above-mentioned sources account for the major aspects of Islam: doctrine, practice and institutions and society, which are summarized below.

Islam is considered as a continuous message of God, which was revealed to all the Prophets of God from Adam through Abraham, Moses, Jesus, to Muhammad, some of its principles and teachings are similar to Judaism and Christianity.

The fundamental sources of Islamic doctrine and practice are the Qur'an and the Sunna. The Qur'an is a revelation from God to Muhammad, a holy scripture, and the basis of the system. In addition, the Qur'an is the canon of ethical and moral life, and the textbook in which the Muslim begins the study of language, science, theology and Jurisprudence. The style of this inimitable work is God's style--"if all men and jinn were to collaborate, they could not produce its like" (Qur'an 17:90).

The Qur'an was revealed to Muhammad during about twenty-three years of his prophetic life, and is divided into one hundred fourteen chapters. The shortest chapter contains three verses; the longest contains three hundred

six. Most scholars affirm the essential integrity of the Qur'an's text during history.

The Sunna (example set by the Prophet Muhammad) is known through Hadith, the set of traditions drawn from what the Prophet said or did during his prophetic life. The Hadith is not considered infallible like the Qur'an. Because it was passed down in verbal form (not memorized), it was admitted that there might be certain errors. However, it is still accepted as a fundamental aspect of the faith.

A belief in only one God is essential to Islam. God created nature through an act of mercy, for otherwise there would be nothing. He provided each element of creation with a proper nature so that characteristic patterns would be followed in a well-ordered, harmonious setting. God presides over this orderly arrangement, and governs it as well. God's four fundamental functions are creation, sustenance, guidance and judgment.

To deal with the traditions of Islam, Muslims distinguish between beliefs and obligations. Beliefs are summarized in six dogmas relating to God, Prophets, the Qur'an and God's Books, the angels, judgment day and predetermination of human beings by God. God pervades Islam; the emphasis is on his essence, attributes and works. He is one, unique, the supreme reality, eternal, preexistent, and self-subsistent (Qur'an 112:2; 2:256, 3:1).

The second dogma designates Muhammad as God's messenger and prophet as well as other prophets and messengers before him. God's oneness and Muhammad's messengership make up the confession of faith--shahadah and belief in all prophets and messengers of God. The third dogma holds the Qur'an as the word of God (the other original books of God are also His word). The fourth dogma arranges Islam's angels in a hierarchy, with Gabriel as the bearer of revelation, holiness and faithful spirit. Other angels have different functions as guardians, writers, recorders and messengers.

The fifth dogma involves the predetermination of human beings by God. This suggests that the faithful's fortune is in God's hands. But since God's hand is unseen, we cannot know what to expect at any point in time, and must thus uphold the values and ethics of our religion.

The sixth dogma concerns the final judgment and life thereafter. On the day of judgment, all humans will be gathered and judged solely on the basis of their lives. This is the day of resurrection, the inevitable, the indubitable.

Beliefs alone are not sufficient, and these must be supplemented with acts of worship called the five pillars of Islam. First is the profession of faith (shahadah). In accordance with Islam's total commitment to monotheism, the first profession is that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet. One should declare openly this

belief; it defines the membership of an individual in the Islamic community.

Prayer stands as the next in importance. Two kinds of prayer exist--the spontaneous (*du'a*), prompted by the situation, and the formal (*salah*), for which ceremonial cleanliness involving absolution is required. The first prayer is given before sunrise, the second is early afternoon, the third in late afternoon, the fourth just after sundown, and the fifth immediately before retiring and before midnight. Muslims face the Kaaba during prayers. All five prayers are congregational and should be given in a mosque. However, it is permissible to offer them individually. Before every congregational prayer, a public call is made from mosques by *muaezzins*.

The third pillar--almsgiving (*zakat*)--also has two categories. One is voluntary, practiced as an act of life and piety (*sadaqah*), and the second is obligatory (*zakah*).

Fasting is the fourth act of worship. ". . . the month of Ramadan, wherein the Qur'an was sent down as a guidance to all men and as evidence of the guidance and as a criterion of right and wrong. So whoever of you is then at home let him fast this month. And whoever of you is sick or on a journey let him fast the same number of other days" (Qur'an 2:181).

Pilgrimage to the Kaaba (the house of God) at Mecca is the fifth pillar; this is the object of the major pilgrimage, to be undertaken collectively at a stated time. Held

during the first ten days of the final month of the lunar year, pilgrims are required to enter into a state of purity, wearing only a white garment and abstaining from all shedding of blood and cutting of hair and nails. The main features of this process are seven circumambulations of the Kaaba. There is also the minor pilgrimage ('umrah), whose timing is left to the convenience of the pilgrim.

In addition to rules governing prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and other religious practices, there are ordinances relating to marriage, usury, food consumption and alcohol usage. This legislation is total in the sense that it covers the entire range of human activity. Regarding marriage, the authorizing passage reads: "Marry such women as seen good to you, two, three, or four; but if ye fear that ye will not be equitable, then only one" (Qur'an 4:3; cf. 70:29-30). The Qur'an also prohibits the taking of interest and usury. Eating the flesh of swine and consumption of alcohol are also forbidden.

Society in the Islamic view is theocratic; the goal of all Muslims is God's rule on earth. Social philosophy is based on the belief that all aspects of life (spiritual, social, political, and economic) form a unity that must be filled with Islamic values.

The basis of Islamic society is the community of the faithful. This community has the mission of encouraging good and reforming society. But it must be moderate in its approach, and avoid extremes.

Islamic law (the Sharia) details moral goals of the community. Islamic law includes both legal and moral imperatives, thus covering a wider range than the term used in the West. Not all Islamic law can be declared formally as a result. There are four sources of Islamic law. Documentary sources include the Qur'an and the Sunna. A third source is responsible individual opinion (ijtihad), which has been used when issues are not covered by the first two sources. Issues may be resolved by analogical reasoning. The fourth source is consensus of the community, a gradual process of accepting some opinions while rejecting others.

Of the five schools of law developed in Islam, four are Sunnite. These emerged early in the religion's history-- Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. All employ systematic reasoning to deal with areas of law not covered by the first two sources. They differ in emphasis, but recognize conclusions of others as legitimate.

One final note regards culture in the Islamic perspective. Yusuf (1978) indicated that the concept in Islam is understood to be an attribute of the mind. It is the entirety of man's outlook in life and his personal place within it. Culture includes goals, emotions, and problems.

Gibb (1947) made a penetrating, critical, and valuable study of change, in the first part of the twentieth century. Hitti (1970) described Islam as a unified system of beliefs and practices that is enshrined in the Qur'an, complemented

by tradition, and modified through the ages in response to changes in time and place. Yusuf (1978) asserted that Islam will assimilate progress in the arts, science, industry, and technology from throughout the world, and will permit no false pride from taking advantage of the potential benefits. Kedourie (1980) attempted to underscore Islam as still the single greatest influence upon Arab culture, and thus the means for and through which development must come.

Ba-Yunus (1977) wrote that Islam rejects a value-free approach to development and scientific inquiry because it is the obligation of the scholarly and scientific community to seek the word of God in His work. Value-free inquiry, he continues, is not possible in science for values of the researcher inevitably influence his work, the concept is itself value-laden, and, in the case of studying humans, value-free approaches are simply impossible. Minai (1981) reviewed the impact of development on women, noting the many areas in which women have advanced, but also keeping in mind just as many areas where tradition constrains.

Qutb (1977) suggested that the purpose of development in Islam should be the advancement of man's growth in a multitude of directions. He continued that all development must commence at the same place, that is, the spiritual stage of total commitment to God. This commitment to God affects, of course, development in all areas. For example, Prophet Muhammad's efforts toward political integration and

reconstruction of society were based on this belief; political development today rests upon the same base. Qutb added that the political ruler obtains authority from the divine source, and is only to be obeyed as long as he follows divine precepts. As far as social development, Qutb wrote that the essential aspects of Islamic life is a concept of mutual security which begins with the extended family and permeates society.

Smith (1957) covered the impact of changing times on the religion, with an emphasis upon controlling features Islam demonstrates in its responses to change. Siddiqi (1974) identified various facets of modernization, and pointed out that it can be given an acceptable form; examined the cultural onslaught experienced by Muslims today; and suggested a number of ways to meet the challenge while keeping the religion intact.

Chapra (1975) discussed the goals of economic development in Islam. Among these are economic well-being within the prescribed morality; universal brotherhood and justice; equitable distribution of income; freedom of the individual regarding social welfare. Abdul-Fauf (1979) agreed with Chapra's findings, and added that basic human rights are essential to the process of development. These include the right of life, the right of liberty, the right of dignity, and the right and obligation of education. He continued with a discussion of conflicts between western economic development and Islamic traditions, and emphasized the need

to praise, for example, the historic Islamic aversion to the taking of interest.

Sayigh (1978) divided these determinants into three categories. Social factors are education, acceptance of technological change, importance of elites as agents of change, motivations and incentives and social mobility. Political factors are a development orientation and commitment of leadership, planning, support of the civil service, political stability, national homogeneity and participation by the population at large. Economic factors are industrialization, agrarian reform and development, availability of capital, physical infrastructure, manpower and entrepreneurship.

Weber's (1930, 1964) work on religion and capitalism should be mentioned because of several discussions on Islam. Weber's (1964) empirical studies of the world's religions were controlled by his focal interest in religious influences upon modern capitalism, and by the question of religious influence upon the evolution of western rationalism in general. Islam, he wrote, accommodated itself to the rest of the world in a unique way. During the first Meccan period, the eschatological religion developed in pietistic urban conventicles displaying a tendency to withdraw from the world. Subsequently, the religion was changed into one with a warrior emphasis. Class distinctions were also apparent because converts to Islam were often from powerful families. Islam contained religious promises pertaining to

this world in the earliest period--wealth, power, glory. It also displayed characteristics of a feudal spirit--slavery, serfdom, polygamy, subjection of women, ritualistic religious obligations and the simplicity of religious requirements. Islam, he continued, lacked the requirements of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured rationalism in other religions. Even though capitalism existed in the religion, there was no development toward modern capitalism, although the Muslim was animated by an equally strong acquisitive drive. At the time of his writing, Weber noted that economic rationalism was being adopted among Muslims, and that their capitalistic development was restrained only by rigid traditions--not by lack of ability or will. The impediments to the development of capitalism, he concluded, must be sought primarily in the domain of religion.

Al-Batriq (1977) wrote that Islam provides a value-oriented and empirical approach to development. This approach is based on social ideals, spiritual values, economic conditions, and natural and human resources. He continued that Islamic development focuses on the role of the state (which is empowered to establish a proper environment within the precepts of Islam). Economic planning is either by direction or by inducement.

Bill (1972) examined the influence of modernization on class structure. Other noteworthy works include Ali (1964),

Al-Nawaihi (1975), Grunebaum (1962), Thompson (1966), and Hodgson (1974).

Social, Political, Economic Aspects--Saudi Arabia

Because of the significant amount of literature on these various social, economic, and political aspects of life and development in Saudi Arabia, we have approached the material with some things in mind: to cover the major recent and more general works on the subject; to examine in detail the several development plans originating in Saudi Arabia and of which the Third Plan is now in progress; to point out other Saudi-specific references, especially statistical material; and to look at major developments unfolding in the current literature.

A host of complex social, political, and economic factors combine to define and redefine the changing character of modern-day Saudi Arabia. Social aspects include religion's meeting with development, the changing role of women, increased education, and rising living conditions. Politically, while the royal family provides a stable and unifying force for the nation, there are a number of destabilizing factors. Economically, the country is seeing a change from a total emphasis on the petroleum sector to diversification, including petrochemicals, metals, agriculture and manufacturing.

Patai (1976) wrote of the impact of technological development on life in the Arab states, and indicated that

where traditionalism is pronounced, change and innovation in every area of culture are inhibited. Foster (1962) wrote that good results can often be obtained by adding religious validation to technical efforts. Ayoob (1981) assessed the interaction of religion and politics, and explained how Islam has come to be politically significant because of its appearance in all socioeconomic and political questions. Lipsky (1959) detailed the importance of the family in all aspects of Saudi life. Thornburg (1964) wrote of the motivations for social change--the value of status, being of service, achievement, innovation, and industriousness.

Sebai (1981) examined the subject through a case study, and demonstrated the expansion of health services at all levels--primary, secondary and tertiary. Socio-economic development in this area has touched family life in many ways. Levels of health have been directly affected through better housing, nutrition and education.

Dessouki (1982) distinguished Islam as a means of elite legitimization from Islam as a tool for challenging the political status quo. He wrote that Islamic resurgence in societies in which Muslims constitute a majority is essentially different from societies where they are in the minority. Cooke (1952) wrote that the social philosophy is strong and coherent in Saudi Arabia. Other authors, including Nadir (1971), Lenczowski (1969) and Vinney (1968) discussed the conflict of traditionalism and progressive forces in gradual evolution.

Anderson (1981) examined the origins of U.S. political and economic involvement in Saudi Arabia, and the roots of Saudi development in the oil industry. Halpern (1963) wrote that the Islamic tradition is seen not so much as a source of directly relevant motivations for or against social change, but rather as a world view likely to rest easily with political instability. The crucial factor is the new middle class. Rush (1973) also supports Halpern's thesis.

Al-Zaid (1982) wrote that education in Saudi Arabia represents a different model in comparison with educational systems applied to other Islamic states. It is bound by a deliberate Islamic policy and is characterized by comprehensiveness and diffusion; this is within a period of time considered to be a record in comparison with the time taken by similar nations. The writer continues that the purpose of education in Saudi Arabia is to understand Islam in a proper and thorough manner; to implement and disseminate the faith; to provide students with Islamic values, teachings and ideals; to pass on knowledge and skills; to promote constructive behavior; to promote the society in all aspects; and to prepare the individual for a useful role in society.

Ibrahim (1982) contended that the Arab world is more closely linked socioeconomically now than at any time in modern history. This linkage is manifested, he continued, in the flow of manpower and money across national boundaries unprecedented in the past. The new social order has led to

a host of alternative and destabilizing forms of political expression among Arab populations. This, he wrote, has become a dominant problem for economic growth and has caused the expansion of the lower middle class and urban workers.

Tachau (1975) continued this line of thought, noting however, that the royal family controls the key agencies in the interest of stability and control. Landau (1972) indicated that in some countries where development is high on the list of priorities, progress has been difficult; education is needed, not simply the importing of expertise.

Several works describe a variety of social services available in Saudi Arabia. These include: Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women, which seeks to raise the standards of the female Saudi citizen in religion by diffusing consciousness of faith among them, in education by organizing studies, socially by offering assistance, and in health by providing clinics; Sayhat Society for Social Services Annual Report 1400-1401 (1981), which seeks to improve health and social standards; Al Halila Society for Social Services Annual Report 1400-1401 (1981), which provides motherhood and childhood care programs, financial aid, seasonal aid, and general services in education and other areas; Al-Safa Society for Charitable Services Annual Report 1399-1400 (1980) which provides training programs, housing aids and health aids; and Al-Battalia Charitable Society for Social Services Annual Report 1981-1982 (1982),

which discusses permanent aid, temporary and emergency aid to the needy, treatments, and house renovations.

In the volumes edited by Esposito (1980), Thompson (1966), and Karpat (1963), various authors have indicated that oil wealth has diminished some of the religious impulse toward austerity, although by no means has it lost control in Saudi Arabia.

Miller (1970) indicted that manifestations of instability are usually linked with foreign policy, which suggests dominance of political aspects, but economic and social factors are of equal importance in the development of Saudi Arabia. Vicker (1974) and Quandt (1981) wrote of the impact of modernization and of social problems caused by oil wealth. Knauerhase (1975) wrote of the conflicts that arise between traditional elements and those seeking change.

Borthwick (1980) told of the stages that Arab society has passed through, from traditional Islamic society to modernizing autocratic society to colonial society to the new bureaucratic polity which is underway at present. Saudi Arabia has features of all but the colonial society at present.

Almond and Coleman (1960) wrote of the demands made on Middle Eastern governments by special interest groups (these groups are growing in Saudi Arabia). Bill and Hardgrave (1973) wrote of the importance of nationalist elites for modernization, which are very much evident in the homogeneous Saudi society. Nieuwenhuijze (1981) suggested that the

political system (such as in Saudi Arabia) has a primacy and autonomy that permits the introduction of change. Bill and Leiden (1979) underscored the importance of political participation, and designated Saudi Arabia as an authoritarian-technocratic-traditional polity.

Tachauau (1975) discussed, in the book edited by him, the traditional elites in Saudi Arabia, and noted that they remain a single, politico-religious unit, but that changes are in evidence, including new elites. Tahtiten (1978) wrote of Saudi concern over instability in surrounding states, and of the need to improve internal security. Quandt (1981) wrote that the rapid pace of development may be causing destabilization in Saudi society. In Rim of Prosperity (1980), it is suggested that Saudi rulers need to bring themselves closer to the people they rule. Wells (1976) wrote that in Saudi Arabia governmental policies arise from the mixture of diverse interests and thus give a high degree of stability to policy goals. The dominance of the Saudi family, he continued, imparts political stability, and whole system is bolstered by economic stability.

Authors such as Askari (1975), Waterbury (1978), Cooper (1972), and Sayigh (1978) pointed out the current problems in economic development, including widespread shortcoming in planning and performance, large defense expenditures, too rapid growth, and neglect of agriculture. Sayigh (1978) noted that Saudi Arabia's reforms have been piecemeal, and little effort was made toward development until the 1960s.

Also, the Saudi commitment to the country's development must be understood within certain constraints, he continued. The accumulation of financial reserves and high growth in national product should not lead one to conclude that the country is achieving the development it deserves and is capable of.

Cooke (1952), Mansfield (1981), Niblock (1980), Well (1976), Eden (1970), Eannen (1964, 1978), Knauerhase (1975), Cleron (1978), and Crane (1978) discussed the current and potential achievements of the country, including a discussion of the production of oil, non-oil production, and capital accumulation, plus long-term strategies for development.

An interesting work by Mourad (1969) delved into the impact of development on a particular village in Saudi Arabia.

Other works discuss the performance of the Saudi economy over the past decade (U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission of Economic Development Summary of Saudi Arabia's Five Year Development Plan, 1975-1980 (1980); Main Outlines of the Development Plan of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1972); and Long, 1976). We will examine in detail Saudi development plans which are key to the assessment of the effect of the nation upon the rest of the world.

Planned development within specific frameworks has been carried out in Saudi Arabia since 1970, with a five-year

plan designated for the periods 1970-1975, 1975-1980, and 1980-1985.

According to the Third Development Plan 1400-1405 A.H.-1980-1985 A.D. (1980), the primary role of planning is to provide an appropriate conceptual and organizational arrangement for the process of development. The three dimensions of development--social, economic, and institutional--must each have specified objectives and methods for success. The ultimate responsibility of planning is to permit consistency within the process of development, both in direction and in function.

A balance between Saudi Arabia's resource base and related absorptive capacity and its global purchasing power must be maintained. However, the report continues, a larger growth rate based on significant involvement by foreign manpower (an effort to expand the resource base) is only desirable when it enhances development of infrastructure. With the infrastructure complete, labor-intensive growth will be less important, thus a new emphasis is required. The Third Development Plan accordingly emphasizes productive resources, and employs foreign labor for capital and skill-intensive positions.

Three principal features distinguished the period before the First Development Plan--a continuous expansion and improvement of administration; serious financial constraints to internal development from outside factors; and steady growth in the economy as well as general development.

The First Development Plan 1390-1395 A.D.-1970-1975

B.C. (1970) identifies the key structural characteristics of the Saudi economy. First, there were plenty of resources for future energy production, and for exports of hydrocarbon products to bring in financial capital; but also there was an increasing shortage of indigenous skilled manpower for development. Then, trends in the economy demonstrated that the primary determining factor of output and growth was infrastructure development. The inadequacy of manpower plus infrastructure shortcoming combined with financial constraints suggested a cautious approach to growth.

The significant feature of the First Plan was the total change in the rate of obtaining revenues from petroleum, and also influence over the Kingdom's oil resources was exerted. The government's proportion of oil revenues was raised through (in part) increasing the share in oil sector ownership. Another development was the action of OPEC and OAPEC to increase prices for oil and to change the system of determining prices. There was in addition almost a doubling of Saudi Arabia's oil production over the period.

The increase in oil's price internationally changed the value relationships in the Saudi economy. Oil's influence in gross domestic product rose almost twice over in value terms, but in volume terms the increase was only 4.5% because of growth in non-oil sectors.

Although there was a decline in agricultural employment, the level of activity was maintained. And,

significant employment increases took place in construction, trade, transportation, and government services.

The Second Development Plan 1395-1400 A.D.-1975-1980

A.D. (1975) was in comparison very different, for it was formulated under conditions of financial independence. The Second Plan commences with a note on development goals.

"Planning implies the efficient use of a country's resources in accordance with certain rationally-determined priorities for the attainment of nationally-cherished goals. Since goals are culturally, historically, and politically oriented, a country's development plan essentially reflects its fundamental values and principles" (p. 3).

The Second Plan goes on to discuss specific goals. First the high rate of economic growth, in which it is stated that the Kingdom's human and natural resources will be efficiently used to accomplish this, and to reduce the country's dependence on oil. Such a goal required the diversifying of the economy into agriculture, industry, and mining, with particular emphasis upon petro-chemical and mining industries of comparative advantage. Incentives were to be provided for the expansion of the private sector into these areas.

Next was the question of human resource development, which indicated that Saudi Arabians were to have access to educational and training facilities at all levels, and that health service would be provided free of charge. It was

necessary to create a healthy social and physical environment and economic climate to enable the individual to find gainful employment in accord with his capabilities, to exercise self-dependence, and to contribute to the country's development.

Third was social well-being, toward which the government would make essential goods available at stable and reasonable prices, with subsidies if necessary; provide free education at all levels with adequate medical services and a healthy environment; arrange favorable housing terms so that each Saudi family would eventually own its own house; extend social security plus other benefits, including charitable donations; and make credit available free of interest to those of limited incomes.

Fourth concerned physical infrastructure, in which the government would expand and improve the physical infrastructure, that is, transportation, communications, municipalities and housing. Lastly was economic freedom within social welfare. Since the economic system of Saudi Arabia is based on a free economy, this was to be encouraged. However, the government took the option of instituting measures to make the market system conform to greater social interests of Saudi Arabia.

Development strategy under the Second Plan involved three key elements. The first was the diversification of the economic base through emphasis on increasing agricultural and industrial production, which would lay the

foundations of economic self-sufficiency in the future as a precaution against the eventual depletion of petroleum. Thus, significant investments were to be made in industrial ventures such as natural gas and minerals. Rapid development of the Kingdom's manpower resources was second. This was essential for all aspects of Saudi Arabia's progress. The Plan called for the increase of both Saudis and non-Saudis in the labor force, the rise in productivity of this force through education and training, and the shifting of manpower out of the agricultural sector into others.

The third element of the Second Plan was the development of the economic regions of the country by a widespread distribution of productive investment based on the specific physical and human resources of each region. Also, social programs would be applied depending on need.

The central region was to see continued development of Riyadh as the administrative center; the development of industry without need for water; plus large-scale agricultural projects in non-urban, rural areas. The eastern region was to see a major development of hydrocarbon-based industry, with some agricultural development. The western region was to have hydrocarbons brought in by pipeline so as to develop a second industrial growth area, and to continue development of commercial, tourist, and pilgrim activities, plus agricultural growth. The southwestern region was to see agricultural development; domestic tourism in the elevated regions; industry as was possible; and development

of mineral resources. The northern region was to see the development of minerals, industry and agriculture as possible.

At the same time, the real income of families was to be increased by expanding and upgrading educational and health services; widening and strengthening social transfer programs; implementing a comprehensive housing program; and expanding and improving the system of municipalities.

The Second Plan emphasized careful management of hydrocarbons; acceptance of additional foreign labor; continuing internal migration; a major role for private enterprise; elimination of economic constraints; improvement in governmental speed and effectiveness; wise use of international cooperation programs; and sound monetary and fiscal policies.

Overall, significant growth rates were obtained in the Saudi economy during the Second Plan. Gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of over eight percent; the non-oil sector grew at an average annual rate of over fifteen percent.

The foreign element of the labor force was increased significantly, and an energetic program was commenced to expand education and training for Saudi nationals. Most rapid growth was in the service sectors.

The most unsettling feature of the Second Plan was inflation, which was severe during the first two years. However, this inflation was contained within a short time

due to the government's ability to indentify the causes and to introduce appropriate counter-measures.

Two developments in foreign trade were typical of the Second Plan. One was increasing levels of imports. The second was the declining contribution of oil exports to gross domestic product.

Regarding social planning, the Second Plan was the first time that the country's fully integrated approach was applied to planning nationally. Per capita gross domestic product doubled during the Second Plan. The expanding economy provided people with many new opportunities for employment. There were genuine improvements in the quality of life.

In overview, economic gains during the Second Plan were: an increase in water supply capacity, increase in desalination and associated power generation capacity; higher agricultural productivity; the peak of crude oil production; commencement of a large gas-gathering program; increase in domestic refinery capacity; increased electric power; spread of solar energy production, further minerals development; expansion of hydrocarbon-based manufacturing; greater contribution on non-oil manufacturing; Saudi Industrial Development Fund established to provide interest-free industrial finance to private sector; significant contributions by public sector entities; capacity increase in commercial sector; and major contribution by construction to gross domestic product.

Human resource gains were: the major growth of the labor force; expansion of education and training; new occupational safety regulations; more women in the work-force. Social development gains were: improvement of hospital services; expanded social care and rehabilitation; increased government social security; expanded social insurance program; growth of sports programs; expansion of arts and cultural activities.

Physical infrastructure gains were: development of modern telecommunications system; expanded scope of postal services; transportation facilities grew; construction of ports; more paved roads; new international airport at Jeddah; development of municipalities; improvement in the quality of housing.

Regarding the Hajj, pilgrims continued to arrive at a very high level, and the government expanded all facilities for them, so that they might be accommodated securely and safely.

The Third Development Plan 1400-1405 A.H.-1980-1985 A.D. (1980) is currently in progress. At the Third Plan's beginning, Saudi Arabia was one of the world's most important financial powers, in addition to being the major oil exporter of the free world. The strategy of the Third Plan was again long-term goals for development, but with some new aspects. While the first two plans emphasized high growth rates in all sectors and the relatively open importation of non-Saudi labor, the Third Plan emphasizes more selective

growth. One goal is to consolidate the foreign labor force rather than expand it. The Third Plan has a specific limit on future growth of foreign labor.

A structural change in the economy is planned by adopting oil and gas production levels which will permit the extension of these resources for as long as possible, while generating sufficient revenues; directing a major part of capital and manpower into production sectors in agriculture, industry, mining, etc., to promote diversification; reducing the percentage share of physical infrastructure in total investment after continuing commitments from the Second Plan are fulfilled; adopting strong but flexible fiscal and monetary policies.

The participation and social welfare aspects of development will be reached through the promotion among Saudis of development goals and needs of the country. The society will be guided in their contribution for this effort. Also, there will be the stimulation of the entire country through a system of national, regional and district development service centers.

Economic and administrative efficiency are to be increased through the improvement of administrative organization; the more efficient use of manpower; the improvement of individual performance and responsibility; and the adopting of incisive manpower development policies with the objective of replacing foreign manpower with Saudi nationals. Also, national fixed capital is to be preserved by the

improving of routine repair and maintenance. Allocations of manpower and finance to operate infrastructure will be ensured. And, the level of government civilian expenditure will be limited.

Water development will continue unabated during the Third Plan. Ultimate objectives are to provide sufficient quantities of high quality water to meet the needs of urban and rural populations; to secure water supplies to match industrial development and increase agricultural expansion; to conserve and develop water resources efficiently; and to seek new water resources.

Regarding agricultural development, the main objectives are to: establish and maintain self-sufficiency in food production; provide opportunities for reaching reasonable agricultural incomes, plus raise the living standard of rural inhabitants; optimize the use of agricultural water resources; make the best use of land resources; optimize use of marine resources; improve the level of skills in the agricultural sector; and protect the agricultural and marine environment.

Third Plan objectives for hydrocarbons are to: conserve oil and gas reserves; maintain productive capacity; continue exploration; increase value added from hydrocarbons; link policies governing hydrocarbons; strengthen technological and service base; strengthen the Saudi workforce in this area; and protect the environment.

In the mineral sector, the desire is to stimulate the development of a solid mineral industry; survey and record the geology of Saudi Arabia; investigate mineral resources and build an inventory; and relate geology to needs of other sectors.

Regarding manufacturing, the Third Plan calls for hydrocarbon-based industry development in petrochemical plants; the establishment of more refinery capacity; and expansion in all non-hydrocarbon manufacturing areas. In construction, the Third Plan is to encourage the development of an efficient Saudi national contracting industry; improve the manufacturing side in construction materials; and disseminate construction information. In commerce and services, the desire is to ensure an adequate flow of supplies to Saudi Arabia, provide appropriate support to the producing sectors, and protect interests of individuals.

In education and training, the Third Plan calls for the improvement of the quality of education and training; the increase in responsiveness by education and training systems to the needs of the economy; increased efficiency through better management; and to facilitate balanced quantitative growth.

Regarding labor, goals are to achieve a cooperative relationship with the ministries and other organizations; to secure the development and application of objective measures for deciding how many positions are required by ministries

and agencies; to prepare position descriptions and classifications for civil service positions; to reduce non-Saudi participation in the civil service; and to establish a data bank and information system to improve management and use of human resources.

The Third Plan also devotes efforts to cultural affairs, with the desire of identifying and surveying areas of historical and cultural interest in Saudi Arabia so as to conserve the country's archeological and cultural heritage. There is also the desire to provide Saudi citizens with a sense of knowledge and pride in their heritage.

Health goals are to improve the health conditions of the population; provide each citizen with comprehensive medical services free of charge; improve the quality of medical care and the efficiency of management; increase the workforce in areas of medicine; establish a National Health Council; emphasize more environmental health, preventive medicine and primary care; improve present facilities; and encourage the private sector to expand medical services for the population.

Third Plan objectives for social and youth services are very specific, and are particularly relevant to our study. These objectives are as follows. First is the need to maintain the religious values of Islam, and encourage the spread of the sharia. Next is to urge the participation of all citizens in the development effort. Third is the provision of assistance to especially family units to deal

with difficulties of rapid economic and social change. Fourth is to increase the living standards of all groups within Saudi society. Fifth is to foster social stability by preventing social disruptions. Sixth is to provide special facilities for the disabled and poor. Seventh is to contribute to the development of Saudi Arabia's resources of the human type, including greater literacy, increased information and removal of restrictive attitudes. Lastly is the enhancement of social services administration. Special programs for nomads will be instituted in addition to the preceding.

Physical infrastructure development is also an important part of the Third Plan. This includes plans for expanding and maintaining international and domestic transportation systems; developing and increasing telecommunications and postal services as necessary; and the further development of municipalities and rural areas throughout the country, plus plans for housing to serve the growing population.

Statistical data regarding the achievements of the first and second development plans are contained in such sources as The Statistical Indicator: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1981), Saudi Arabia: Achievements of the First and Second Development Plans 1390-1400 (1970-1980) (1982), Second Five-Year Development Program for the Municipalities (1975), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Statistical Yearbook 1401 A.H.-1981 A.D. (1981), and Statistical Publication About

Workers, Occupations, Wages, and Working Hours in the
Private Establishments in the Kingdom During 1399-1400 h.
1979-1980 q. (1980).

Taylor's (1982) "The Jubail Superproject" is appropriate to end the literature review, because it underscores a major point of the introduction, that Saudi Arabia is embarked on an unprecedented modernization and development path. The project involves the literal creation of an industrial city, one of the most ambitious undertakings in the history of the world. Ultimately the project will cost over \$135 billion. Both Jubail and Yanbu (a similar development to the southwest on the Red Sea) represent efforts to guard against the eventual depletion of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves. The site at Jubail was dedicated in 1977 when the area was little more than a small fishing village and miles of sand. Within twelve months, some 13,000 workers were comfortably housed, and a 13,000-foot runway had been built. Because of the city's location, most manufactured goods must be shipped in partially assembled form. Underway at the present time are a \$1 billion oil refinery, a \$300 million petrochemical facility, a \$2 billion polyethylene project, a \$4 billion industrial chemicals plant, a \$600 million iron and steel facility, and a \$360 million fertilizer plant. In the Third Development Plan, it is noted that both Jubail and Yanbu are 20-year development projects. It is anticipated that Jubail will be a major industrial area with a population of some 370,000,

and Yanbu will have some 150,000--both of these in previously sparsely inhabited areas.

Saudi Arabia will no doubt change, and change significantly with the advent of modernization and development, but it appears from the literature that the process can occur within the boundaries of traditionalism and religion. If that is the case, then Saudi Arabia will have maintained its cultural and religious identity, plus benefitted from what the outside world has to offer. The results would be a stronger, contemporary society with the insight of the past and an informed perspective on the present and future.

We will now proceed in our discussion to an examination of the relevant research on family and family history in Islam and Saudi Arabia. This will be the final section which deals with material and information specific to Islam and Saudi Arabia. After its conclusion, the paper will proceed to current theories and approaches to development, and from these we will draw together a statement of theoretical approaches to be compared with what is found later in the study when the research is completed and findings are available for examination.

Family and Family History in Islam and Saudi Arabia

Muslehuddin (1977) wrote that women, in Islam, are considered equal with men in their rights to enter into contracts and to hold property and dispose of it as they wish. They enjoy economic independence and possess all such

rights as give them an equal human status with men but they are required to observe certain rules of morality so that promiscuity may not lead to corruption.

The fundamental principle, with regard to women, is that they should be held in honour, the mother that bore us must ever have reverence, the wife who is our best companion should be treated well. Men and women are quite equal to each other in their origin:

"O ye mankind! fear your Lord, Who created you of soul and He created thereof its spouse and from the pair of them spread abroad many men and women" (4:1).

Most of the customs, prevailing practices, and laws regarding marriage and family practices are rooted in the Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. According to Islamic law, a marriage is a contract and not a sacrament. However, its spiritual value is recognized, and it is ordered in Islamic law that a marriage is an act of worship; every capable individual should marry.

Both men and women have certain rights regarding each other in marriage, but there are differences in the rights and obligations of a man and woman during their married life and with respect to divorce. The man is able, of his own accord, to divorce the woman under certain formalities against her will. A woman's case for divorce must be made through a court, and must be for a valid reason, e.g. abuse, impotence, disease.

According to Islamic law a Muslim female remains under the control and care of her parents, but on attainment of puberty, she theoretically obtains all the rights and privileges which belong to her as an independent human being. She is entitled to share in the inheritance of her parents along with her brothers, though in different proportions. Upon her marriage, her individuality is not lost, and she remains a distinct member of society; her property is hers as an absolute individual right.

The Qur'an advocates measures that were intended to improve the condition of women; infanticide of girls is forbidden. The abuse of polygyny and of the husband's right in traditional Islam to repudiate his wife has led recently to the legislation of reformed family laws in many Muslim countries.

Lemu (1978) has described the status of women as follows:

1. Spiritual status. The Qur'an states that men and women who practice the principles of Islam will receive equal rewards for their efforts. "I will not let go waste the deed of a worker amongst you--male or female, one of being from the other." Al Quran (3:195).

2. Intellectual status. The Prophet Muhammad said that it is the duty of all Muslims, male and female, to search for knowledge. Therefore, in Islam, both men and women are credited with the capacity for learning, understanding, teaching, and acquiring knowledge.

3. Relations between the sexes. The Qur'an states that marriage is a relationship of interdependence. Man and woman are expected to find tranquility in one another's company, and to be bound together through love, mercy, and their sexual relationship. See Al Quran (30:21).

4. Rights and obligations. The Qur'an states that men will maintain the family. "Men are the maintainers of women because of what Allah has made some of them exceed others and by reason of what they spend out of their wealth." Al Quran (4:34). Thus, anything earned by a Muslim wife is hers to own and to dispose of as she wishes. The Muslim wife is responsible for the care of the home and for the welfare of the family. The wife is expected to obey the judgments of the husband, due to his status as the person responsible for running the family.

5. Marriage. It is a part of Muslim tradition for both boys and girls to be married with the permission of the parents; however, either a boy or a girl is expected to be consulted concerning the choice of a spouse. A widow or a divorced woman is free to marry whomever she chooses, as reported by both Bukhari and Muslim the Prophet peace be upon him said: "No widow should be married without consulting and no virgin without her consent and consent in her silence.

6. Divorce. Divorce is considered to be an action of last resort in Islam; therefore, reconciliation is

encouraged. Once a divorce is decided upon, a woman must wait three monthly cycles, during which time the husband may not make the woman leave the family home, although she may if she desires to do so, after which she is free to remarry. If, at the end of the waiting period, the couple desire to remain married, such action is permitted. If, however, they separate, the man is not permitted to remarry the woman until such time as she has been remarried to another man and has been subsequently divorced. If a decision to divorce is rescinded by reconciliation twice, the third divorce decision is irrevocable.

7. Right to inheritance. The Qur'an provides for women to inherit property. In general, a woman is permitted to inherit one half of the share granted to men. In any future marriage or in any existing marriage, a husband has no claim on the inherited property.

8. Role as a mother. The woman's role as a mother is possibly the role of highest status fulfilled by women in Islam.

9. Sex. Sex is not permitted outside marriage for either man or woman in Islam.

10. Dress. A Muslim woman may wear any dress of her desire in the presence of her husband, family, and her women friends. When outside the home or in the presence of men other than her husband or close family, she must wear clothing which covers all parts of her body and which does not reveal the figure and a greater amount of privacy is

required for women than men as the Quran stated in (24:30-31).

11. Polygamy. Monogamy is the norm in Islam, although men are permitted to have more than one wife, if the man concerned is able to fulfill all of his obligations to each wife.

It is traditional in Islam for young people to be married with their parents' permission. Divorce is considered as a final option. The woman's role as mother is accorded very high status in Islam. And, a woman may dress as she chooses in the presence of family, women friends, etc., but must cover herself when in public.

Patai (1976) wrote that family bounds are so strong in Islamic culture that all members suffer a loss of face after the dishonorable act of any person. There is, however, a distinction between shameful events involving women and those which do not. The most significant dishonor that can befall a man is when sexual misconduct occurs by his daughter or sister or niece.

Ahmad (1974) listed the objectives and the functions of the family as preservation and continuation of the race; upholding of morals; provision of stability; socialization in culture and values; social and economic security; social cohesion; and motivation for effort and sacrifice.

Heeren (1978) discussed the basic education offered in Islamic families. The educational topics include: jihad

(struggles for the cause of Islam); individual duties; history and tradition; and the Islamic milieu.

Levy (1965) discussed most essential aspects of Islam, with chapters on the status of women, the status of children, and marriage.

The work on one of the major tribes in the Arabian Peninsula by Cole (1975) represents one of the important studies about the tribal structure and family tribe relations when he wrote about the Al Murrah tribe.

Beck and Keddie (1978) edited a number of very good articles about the women and their role, change in the Muslim world.

Barth (1973) wrote an anthropological work about Sohar, culture and society in an Omani town.

In Saudi Arabia, the family and religion are part of one institution. Much of the social, economic, and political life is still organized in terms of the family or tribe. With increases in oil wealth, several innovations have come to affect the Saudi family. Saudis are able to travel widely, and come into contact with different ways of life. Most Saudi men (and increasingly women) venture abroad for recreational purposes and to see things not available in Saudi Arabia. This, plus a general awareness of freer relationships between men and women in other parts of the world, has had a significant impact upon the institution of marriage. Women expect more in terms of companionship, free social intercourse, etc. They demand

high bridal payments, separate homes away from the man's parents or relatives, and the right to divorce should the husband seek another wife. All of these demands and others are radical in comparison to the traditions of Saudi society.

A wide range of references provides more detailed information in this area. Among them are: Smith (1903); Helaissi (1959); Lapidus (1973); Dicaprio (1966); El-Din-Ali (1966); Fuller (1970); Granquist (1935); Hilal (1971); Rosenfeld (1968); Najarian (1959); Lutfiyya (1970); and Lichtenstadter (1952).

Development

We have divided this section into two parts. The first part covers the general economic, political, and social approaches to the phenomenon of development. Then we proceed to an examination of subjects more specific to the topic at hand. From these we will be able to proceed with some theoretical approaches in the final section which will lend some structure and objectives to our study.

It might be suggested that "development" has not yet been and perhaps never will be defined to the satisfaction of all parties in all nations. However, it broadly refers to desirable social and economic progress, hence the debate concerning what is "desirable." One could say that development certainly must imply an improvement of basic living conditions, and economic growth and industrialization are

usually prerequisites for this. In addition, development involves a profound adaptation of the entire economic and social structure, which includes changes in production and demand as well as improvements in income distribution and employment. It requires the creation of a more diversified economy, with increased interdependence for the supply of inputs and for expanding markets for output. Patterns of structural transformation will vary from one country to another depending upon a number of factors (resources, geography, skill levels, etc.). There are thus no universal rules for economic development. And, economic development is only a single part of the process. Development is also political and social. It carries with it desires for greater human dignity, security, justice, and equity in addition to economic betterment. And, quite importantly, development does not suggest a replacement of traditional ways with new ones. Rather, it is throughout a process of adaptation in which a society adjusts in a manner suitable to itself.

Weber (1947) wrote how traditional societies are those in which the guides to action are received in the past, and these meet confusion as they come to be increasingly unbalanced with changing environments. Durkheim (1933) examined modes of integration, solidarity, or cohesion in society. He argued that primitive society is characterized by mechanical solidarity. There is a simple division of labor and people are quite alike (with slight differences due to

social experiences). But with the division of labor comes a significant change. People have become very different, with the parts of society highly interdependent. Solidarity has become organic rather than mechanical. He suggests that there is less homogeneity of values and behavior, strong social constraint, loyalty to tradition and kinship, and now people will be held together by shared beliefs and values derived from the complex division of labor.

It seems entirely fitting to discuss the contributions of fourteenth century Ibn Khaldun of Tunis, as his significant efforts in the study of sociology and development (antedating European sociology by more than four hundred years) were not only the first in Islam, but his ideas remain applicable today. Much of his thought is provided by Issawi (1963).

Khaldun was the first to state and apply basic principles of sociology--that social phenomena appear to obey laws which are constant enough to order social events; that these laws operate on masses without significant influence by individuals; that these laws can only be evident through research and gathering of massive facts plus observation; that the same set of social laws appear in societies with similar structures; that societies are not static; and that these laws are sociological, not merely due to biological or physical factors.

The concept of 'asabia (social solidarity) is the essence of Khaldun's sociology. The isolated individual

cannot survive, and society is thus natural and necessary. However, in order to exist, sanctions must be created. This need generates the state, and may be traced to the blood ties holding together smaller societies. Social solidarity is strongest in tribal society due to the continuing need for mutual aid. A state can only be founded by strife, as is true with a religion. Religion succeeds only with the assistance of a powerful social solidarity, and greatly enhances the influence of this solidarity. Khaldun attributes the Muslim successes of the fifth century to a remarkable combination of religious and tribal solidarity.

Khaldun wrote that the extent of an empire varies directly as the strength of the original solidarity which created it, and inversely as the power of the solidarities it confronts. States can only arise from original solidarity. As it becomes established, solidarity decreases due to custom and unbroken authority. However, the state is vulnerable to change and decay. In the early stages, the state derived from tribal solidarity is distinguished by cohesiveness and brotherhood, with participation by the people in government. With time this decrease, and the ruler becomes absolute, which leads Khaldun to say that the natural end of solidarity is sovereignty.

Ultimately the state faces extinction, even though a reform of fundamental laws and institutions may extend this fate. Society is doomed to an empty and unending cycle of rise and fall.

Khaldun made some of the earliest and most insightful commentaries on economics and development. He understood that production (as opposed to trade) was the source of wealth. He even made the keen observation that as civilization progresses, the relative importance of agriculture decreases. Services then take on increased importance. Khaldun understood centuries before Durkheim the concept of division of labor and how it reinforces social solidarity. He even set out the stages of economic development, commencing with the itinerant beduin and ending with industry and settled life. The key to Khaldun's view of development was religion. He declared that vast and powerful empires were founded on the basis of religion, and that a religion reinforces (as mentioned earlier) the power that a state develops from solidarity and population.

Spencer (1892) wrote that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Just like evolving aggregates in general, societies demonstrate integration, both by simple increases in mass and by coalescence and recoalescence of masses. The change, he continued, from homogeneity to heterogeneity is multitudinously exemplified; up from the simple tribe, alike in all its parts, to the level of civilized nation, which is full of structural and functional differences. There is a progression toward greater size, coherence, multiformity and definiteness. Comte (1877) wrote that the progress of civilization follows laws, and

that the epochs of civilization are theological and military, then metaphysical and juridical, and finally, scientific and industrial.

Spengler (1926) wrote that cultures are organisms, and world history is their collective biography. All cultures (and progressions within individual cultures) have specific durations. These are, he indicates, always recurring, always the same, with the emphasis of a symbol.

Hagen (1962) suggested that traditional societies were stable because outlooks and traditions were transmitted in pattern form. Ogburn (1922) showed how social patterns related to technology are likely to change more rapidly than are social institutions. McClelland (1961) offered the idea that achievement is encouraged through the educational system.

Toennies (1957) wrote that two periods are contrasted with each other in the history of the great systems of culture--a period of *Gesellschaft* follows a period of *Gemeinschaft*. The first period is characterized by social will in the form of folkways, mores, and religion; the second is characterized by social will in the form of convention, legislation, and public opinion. Smelser (1973) wrote about mechanisms of change and adjustment of changes. He believed that the discussion on economic and social development has been organized around differentiation, which characterizes a social structure as moving toward increased complexity, and integration, which at times balances the

divisive character of differentiation. There are also social disturbances, which result from discontinuities between differentiation and integration.

Hoselitz (1960) connected social change and economic development with theories of demography, social structure, and organization. Lewis (1955) gave emphasis to education, administration, institutions, and knowledge. Parsons et al. (1962) indicated that systems must change, but continuity must remain for order. Gusfield (1967) wrote that traditional culture is not a consistent body of norms and values; that traditional society is not a homogeneous social structure; that old traditions are not displaced by new changes; that traditional and modern forms are not always in conflict; that tradition and modernity are not mutually exclusive systems; and that the modernizing processes do not weaken traditions. Moore (1955, 1967) showed the tension between order and change and suggested that the character of economic organization shaped the social order.

Schneider (1975) offered that industry and social change are intimately related. But, he continued, development inevitably occurs in countries that have distinctive historical backgrounds which are still bound to count as the countries modernized. Parsons (1966) included writings that indicated that the main problem of social change is the reconciliation of the stability of social systems with the efficiency of individual activities. Jacobs (1967) wrote that impediments to development arose out of social

maladjustments to change and conflicts of values within developing societies. Belling and Totten (1970) described modernization as a type of social change originating in the industrial revolution; change in one sector has repercussions in others. They continued that the traditional posture of sociological theory goes back to the influence of Plato--change is slow, gradual, continuous, and intrinsic to the changing society. Modernization, they said, is a uniform process of evolution plus repeating the experiences of other areas. And, every social structure possesses enduring characteristics which may either aid or hinder modernization.

Barratt (1976) suggested several motivations for development. Critical in the process is the national will to develop, which represents a mental challenge to which people will respond. The developmental need, he noted, is peculiar to the twentieth century, due to limited options. And, development is impossible without the reallocation of social privilege. Jaguaribe (1968) wrote that development is a total social process. Moore (1966) offered that interest in the comparative study of social change was hardly in evidence until after 1945; much of modern sociology has been built upon the conception of society as a system characterized by the functional interdependence of major elements and relationships, and by an orderly and persistent balance and equilibrium.

Foster (1962) wrote that one of the major factors in the dynamics of change is how people perceive and interpret the new phenomenon. He noted cultural barriers to change (traditional values and attitudes, fatalism, ethnocentrism, pride and dignity, norms of modesty, relative values, logical incompatibility), social barriers (mutual obligations within the family, fictive kin, and friendship relations, small group dynamics, public opinion, factionalism, vested interests, authority dictates), and psychological barriers (differential cross-cultural perception, perception of the role of government, role perception, perception of purpose).

Hoselitz (1956) offered population changes, urbanization, and changes in the value structure as being among several conditions for modernization. Sadie (1980) wrote that the economic condition of underdeveloped areas is fundamentally a function of their sociocultural customs and institutions. Two works, Anderson (1961, 1963) underscored an earlier point that education is essential to development. Nash (1971) focused upon the pattern of social stratification, the value system, and the economic and political subsystems.

Black (1976) offered that modernization does not mean the westernization of other societies. It involves no more than these societies making use of some Western forms and inventions which are easier to take over at the present time than to spend time in working out anew. Once the essential

spirit of a culture survives the impact of the intellectual, technical, and organizational aspects of modernization, and has continued into spontaneous development, there should then be no fear of borrowing or imitating.

Almond and Powell (1966) indicated that political development is the response of the political system to changes in its societal or international environment, and in particular the response of the system to the challenges of nation-building. Pye (1966) offered that the concept of political development is the political prerequisite of economic development and modernization. Huntington (1965) wrote that national integration, democratization, and mobilization of participation are necessary for political development. Huntington also noted that the major difference between modern and traditional society lies in the greater control which modern man has over his natural and societal environments. He characterized the modernization process as complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenizing, irreversible and progressive.

Sutton (1963) distinguished characteristics of traditional society and modern, industrial society. Malenbaum and Stolper (1980) indicated that there is no single ideological-economic relationship. Shils (1962) wrote that in political development, adaptability will run toward concessions to the traditional order. Rasmussen (1972) wrote that economic development appeared to offer an opportunity to democratize political system.

Finkle and Gable (1971) covered the recurring themes in political development. Smelser (1971) wrote that undifferentiated institutional structures frequently contribute the primary social barriers to modernization. Seligman (1968) wrote that maintaining the balance between the impulse to change and conservatism is contingent on two factors--the rate of change and the methods of change. Shils (1960) wrote that intellectuals must be able to overcome tradition to succeed. Pye (1962) outlined the main characteristics of the transitional political process.

Pye (1961) addressed the relationship between armies and civilian leaders. Dube (1964) indicated that bureaucracy forms an important element of the modernizing elite in developing states. Deutsch (1969) suggested that social mobilization brings an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. Olson (1963) pointed out that rapid growth must involve fast and deep changes in the society and can be destabilizing. Weiner (1965) wrote that there are several different kinds of integration problems faced by developing nations.

Higgins (1968) presented the most comprehensive study of economic theories and their applications in the field of developmental economics. Kahn (1979) indicated that the world is in a great transition from preindustrial to postindustrial conditions. Ginsburg (1957) summarized the importance of resources. Geertz (1963) wrote that a wide range of cultures is capable of generating entrepreneurship

and economic growth. The U. N. Industrial Development Survey (1974) underscored that income distribution, social objectives, and an improved environment are important in development. Singer (1964) emphasized the entrepreneur. Seers (1966) commented on the necessary conditions for development. Rostow (1968) gave an account of economic growth based on a dynamic theory of production and interpreted in terms of actual societies; growth is a historical problem. Baldwin (1972) wrote that we are far from a general theory of economic development. Dillard (1973) discussed the importance of capitalism to development.

Frank (1966) wrote that underdevelopment is not due to anything but the historical process which generates economic development--capitalism. Adelman and Morris (1967) suggested that in the transition of societies, the social fabric changes its patterns and relations. Gill (1973) noted the general factors underlying development. Another aspect of economic development is found in the literature on multinational corporations. Barnet and Muller (1972) outlined some of the main ideas as to the impact of mncs. Finally, North-South: A Programme for Survival (1980) stated that development involves a profound transformation of the entire economic and social structure.

We would now like to turn to some very specific literature, that involving class structure and stratification, and that on the styles of coping with social change. Our purpose at this point is not to add substantially to the

literature review, for that has been rather comprehensively accomplished. Rather, we wish to cite a few important references which detail experiences in the West, compare these with our estimation of Islamic society, and in so doing be in a position to describe some general approaches in the final section.

Much has been written on the position of the individual in society. Davis and Moore (1945) discussed the relationship between economic returns and position in society. They suggested that it becomes convenient for society to use unequal economic returns as a principal means of controlling the entrance of persons into certain positions. While position alone does not bring power and prestige, the income which accompanies it does make a difference in others' evaluation of the individual. The authors also noted that as the cultural heritage grows, increased mobility because of greater specialization results in less stratum solidarity. While traditional society limits the degree of functional specialization, the degree of segregation of strata, and the magnitude of inequality, these all change with growth and development.

Kahl (1967) stated that community prestige is a sentiment in the minds of men that is expressed through interpersonal interaction. But values must be shared in defining the criteria of superiority, for prestige exists only as long as subordinates recognize the superior position. The author distinguished from the preceding the concept of

occupation prestige, which holds that certain positions are viewed the same no matter what the location. Kahl also indicated that through income and wealth come relationships of prestige, and these in turn provide more money and material possessions.

That said, let us consider what has traditionally been understood to constitute the relationship patterns among those of Muslim and especially Arab culture. Here we call upon the collective evidence in many of the references on Islam and Saudi Arabia that we reviewed earlier in this paper. What have been traditionally revered in Saudi society and in Arab society are Islam and the responsibilities the religion brings to our lives and work. Special respect is accorded to religious leaders and to the central institution, the family. Traditionally, the father heads the family, and is given the most respect. Finally, the family has always been the center of all political, economic, and social activities. The preceding suggests more of an emphasis on tradition and morality than on prestige and material things.

Now, to reiterate what we said earlier about styles of coping with social change, we refer to the works of Karl Mannheim. Mannheim (1940, 1953) introduced a concept of thought-styles for coping with change. He suggested that the upwardly mobile are quickest to leave tradition behind. Those groups which are socially-uprooted by change become disorganized and develop inconsistent ideas. Others, those

without identities, are vulnerable to the whims of the dominant body. Finally, those groups that do not fit in the above categories develop a unique style in that they aim for compromise.

Our readings on Saudi Arabia and Islam suggest the development spirit of Islam is successfully propelling change while adapting to changing social conditions without changing the essence of the religion. Development contributes to the betterment of life, which complements the Muslim concept of dealing with life in a practical manner. So, it would seem that the people of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, when presented with social change, develop their own styles of coping in a way consistent with their religion and tradition.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Merton (1957) wrote that methodology is not particularly bound up with sociological problems, and that sociologists must be cognizant of the design of investigation, the nature of inference and the requirements of a theoretic system. With these ideas in mind, one may add, as suggested by Blumer (1969), the elements of scientific inquiry essential to empirical science. These are the possession and use of a prior picture or scheme of the empirical world under study; the posing of questions of the empirical world; the conversion of questions into problems; the determination of data sought; data-gathering techniques; and the determination of relations between data and interpretation of findings. Every element in this process, however, is subject to the test of the empirical world and must be validated through such a test.

To investigate the subject of our inquiry here so as to best follow the above guidelines, we decided to use survey research. This method is probably the best available to a social scientist desiring to collect original data for

description of a population too large for direct observation. Surveys are also well suited for the measurement of attitudes and orientations prevalent within a large population. Another benefit of the survey in this study is, as Selvin and Stuart (1966) noted, that the survey is an exploratory tool. Few of the possible and meaningful hypotheses are specified in advance of data-gathering. In addition, the form of survey analysis usually evolves as the data are examined. Further, the researcher has significant freedom, regardless of the configurations of the data, because only rarely is there a single viable direction at any stage of the analysis.

In this study, a self-administered questionnaire was distributed to students in a random sample of Saudi Arabian university courses in the capital city of Riyadh. We choose self-administered questionnaires because, as Babbie (1979) indicates this instrument has the advantages of being generally less expensive and more time-efficient than the other likely instrument (interview surveys). Such considerations are especially important in this case, that of an unfunded scholar. In addition, because our survey was conducted in Saudi Arabia, the anonymous quality of self-administered questionnaires was important. This was especially true for those questions dealing with sensitive issues.

Limitations of the Approach

An initial problem arose because of the cross-cultural nature of our inquiry--employing a Western survey instrument, which contained a certain amount of Western structure, bias and orientation, in a non-Western, traditional society. We believe this problem was substantially offset by several measures. First was a questionnaire pre-test conducted with an Arab sample in the U.S. Second was a trip to Saudi Arabia to interview a number of influential individuals in religion, education and other positions of leadership. Not only were we concerned with subjects they considered to be most important, but we carefully noted the specific terminology they used in describing these subjects. Third, we combined the knowledge obtained from the first two efforts, and carefully constructed the English version of the questionnaire. Next, in translating the questionnaire to Arabic, we were careful to consider the main points suggested by Deutscher (1968). Those points are that the researcher be familiar with the cultural milieu of which language is a part, and that efforts should be directed toward obtaining conceptual equivalence without concern for lexical comparability.

There are, in addition, a number of problems in conducting sociological research in a country that has had little exposure to the social sciences. One significant problem is the absence of scholarly research for background material. Available studies of Arabian societies primarily

reflect the interests of researchers rather than the relative importance of the social units studied. Such things as the excitement of the bedouin way of life have encouraged a large, sensational literature of travel and description. Studies of tribal life that are done in a systematic fashion are few. Settled life in Saudi Arabia has been almost completely ignored. In fact, most of the descriptions available are fragmentary from a social science standpoint. Much of the literature on social change is based upon journalistic surmise rather than on systematic study.

Another major problem is related to the lack of education, even among university students, on how to respond to survey research instruments--questionnaires in this case. In America and a number of Western countries people are socialized as respondents early in life. The multiple choice test and the ballot used to express opinion and elect representatives prepare the way for the social scientific survey.

In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, this is not the case. For cultural reasons, we could not ask a number of questions which one would consider important in similar instruments in the West. For example, questions on premarital sexual behavior and on dating are difficult topics to cover in Saudi Arabia. For one thing, such practices are still uncommon, even among the wealthy, widely-traveled, educated urban population. For another, such questions would violate

strongly held notions of privacy and promote anger, which could result in refusal to answer. Thus, we needed to avoid questions which would have been appropriate and useful in the Western context. A number of such questions were included in the pre-test questionnaire which were excluded from the final version.

The interviews with Saudi influentials allowed us to narrow down the concerns of this study. The preliminary study among Saudi Arabian students attending the University of Florida served as a pretest, and allowed us to determine which questions could be included before contacting the portion we examined.

Sampling Technique

The sample was taken from students attending universities and colleges in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. There are two men's universities (with some women taking classes there separately), four military colleges and two main colleges for women in the city. The total student body is some fifteen thousand men and some four thousand women.

We used a multi-stage sampling technique. Multi-stage sampling is carried out in two or more stages, with the first stage involving selection of larger units, in our case academic departments, and the second stage involving selection of smaller units from within the larger units, in our case actual classes being held. Our sample was in essence a cluster sample (see details below), using clusters of cases

(classes being held) rather than selecting individual cases directly from the total population. A certain number of clusters were then selected for study. By definition (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969), cluster samples involve multi-stage sampling if a sample is taken within each of the selected clusters, that is, if not all the cases within clusters are used.

Questionnaires were distributed in all of the above-mentioned institutions in Riyadh. The final sample size was 404 students in total, approximately one in 370. So as not to duplicate responses, the distribution of questionnaires contemplated classes that met during the same period. The actual classes were selected at random from a list of classes meeting at a singular class period that day. Further details are provided in the next section.

Survey Application

Our arrival time in Saudi Arabia for application of the survey was not ideal, particularly for the subject group of college and university students, for it was the week before final exams. By the time the questionnaire was translated, proofread and was ready for distribution, it was examination week, and it was difficult to find students with available time to answer questions because they were preparing for tests. But, with the assistance of Allah, then with the help of many friends, students and faculty at these institutions, we made arrangements to survey many students in as

random a manner as possible. Rather than distribute the questionnaires for completion and return during class time as we had originally planned, we had to allow students to take the questionnaires home.

In this manner, some 1,200 questionnaires were distributed, and 404 were returned. We could not detect differences in the return rate either by university or by level of study. Considering the odds we faced, we have considered this to be a very successful return rate. It is interesting to note that the questionnaires that were returned were carefully filled out with practically no missing data.

There are four military colleges for the training of students after they have completed their secondary education. Each of them awards the B.S. degree in military education, with variations such as violence studies, military techniques, security and national guard training, respectively. A random sample was taken of these colleges (from the National Guard College). Samples were also taken from women who study at the University of King Saud and the University of Imam Muhammed Ibn Saud. Random samples were also taken of other students at these universities.

Some of the students obtained their undergraduate degrees at the University of King Abdul Aziz in Jeddah, the Islamic University in Medina, the University of Petroleum in Dhahran, the University of King Faisal in Damman and Hafouf, the University of Um Kar in Mecca or other colleges or

universities in Riyadh and elsewhere. There is also a junior college in Riyadh from which samples were taken. Junior college students are mostly teachers in the elementary schools, but the new system requires them to have a higher level of education than the secondary diploma. Thus they have returned to college. Since most of them are married, it was thought they would be a valuable sample for this study.

In administering the questionnaire, we encountered the anticipated problems from a society that has had little experience with social science research. As Deutscher (1968) pointed out, it may well be within the bounds of courtesy to ask personal questions in other parts of the world, but many people--especially those in traditional societies--set limits. For example, there is no truly discreet way to ask respondents their religious views. In our case, some respondents asked why we would cause people to doubt their beliefs. Often refusals to respond to survey questionnaires were based upon the feeling that certain questions are unwarranted intrusions into personal affairs. Indeed, numerous respondents here wished to know why we would ask such things as mosque attendance and the number of persons residing in a particular home.

Another problem might have been that the survey instrument was regarded with suspicion, particularly because of the check-list and yes-no type of questions, which some studies have found to be too direct. Other problems were

possibly encountered with questions that required the respondent to play a role, e.g., "What would you do . . . , To whom would you turn . . ." This difficulty may be interpreted within a culture-personality framework, for such questions are handled with greater facility by people who are closer to what Riesman (1961) called other-directed personalities. Further, those people who have a less rigid conception of themselves and of proper conduct in the world are better able to rearrange their self-systems upon short notice for purposes of these types of questions.

The Variables

Because this is an exploratory study, we have not established beforehand the dependent and independent variables. In fact, our main analytical task is to identify varieties of variables. In attempting to diagnose relations, we seek to recognize patterns that can be conceived of as styles. The references that follow are all to the questionnaire in the Appendix.

Demographic Items

Demographic elements involve the study of population size, composition and distribution, including the patterns of change therein. From the broadest perspective, population composition and distribution include not only such variables as sex, age, mortality, etc., but also marriage, divorce, family size, race, education, migration, etc.

In this study, the demographic items are of two types--self and family. For self, these include: age-Q3; sex-Q4; type employment, foreign travel, Q12, 13; marital status-Q9-11, 97-100; level of study-Q1; grade average-Q107; major-Q2; place of birth-Q5; and also indicators of personal goals (e.g., aspirations, jobs sought, etc.)--this technique has been useful in sorting out persons holding traditional values from those holding modern goals (see questions 51, 56, 63, 70, 72, 76, 78, 80, 86, 88, 91).

For family, the demographic items include: place of birth-Q17, 18; age-Q19; parents living or dead-Q15; education-Q22; father's occupation-Q14; mother's occupation-Q23; father's religiosity-Q33, 49; income-Q29; identify-Q8, 35, 40, 78.

Family Variables

Family variables involve all items relating to the basic kinship unit, in its minimal form the nuclear family and in the widest sense the extended family. These are subdivided into family structure, family relations, power, roles, mate selection, family types and parent-child relationships.

Family structure. To examine this it is necessary to collect information describing communication patterns, i.e., who talks to whom about what (questions 41-48). The resultant information may be arrayed as a sociometric matrix, and analyzed following the usual procedures.

Family relations. An examination of family relations requires data which describe the regard of one family member for another. The overall esteem for various members can then be contrasted across the groups (questions 39, 53, 54, 62, 66, 69, 74, 77, 79).

Power. Power has been defined as the ability of one person to cause another person to perform an act that the second person would not ordinarily perform. This definition of power blurs slightly the distinction between power and influence, but in the subject case this is not too serious a problem. The most effective form of power is found legitimized in authority, but it is not always possible to institutionalize power. Actually power is often inherent in relationships within and between social units. In order to assess the nature of family power in the development context, a series of vignettes are presented, vignettes in which an individual's preferences conflict with family preferences (questions 52, 64, 85, 87).

Roles. The selection of indicators for an examination of roles assigned to family members is straightforward. Subsequent to the literature review, a pilot study determined the types and scope of roles that are assigned within families. In the full-scale study, these roles were offered to respondents (questions 23, 51, 60, 63, 73, 92, 106).

Mate Selection. Questions about mate selection are investigated using two methods. First, we had respondents rate attributes of a potential spouse. To accomplish this,

we asked that such things as intelligence, appearance, family status, etc., be arranged in desirability from high to low. Comparison of the psychological aspects of spouse selection could then be made. These assessments are then compared across groups. A second aspect of spouse selection concerns source. We wished to uncover the role of family values in procuring a spouse (questions 35, 39, 49, 94).

Family Types. The prevalence of family types among groups is a relatively simple matter to investigate; the relevant data for this was collected by asking about family size, ages and relations within the home (questions 16, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 66, 97, 98, 99, 100).

Parent-Child relationships. The issue of differences in parent-child relationships is more complex than many of the earlier questions. An adequate examination should include analysis of authority and affection. The characteristics of both can be assessed in two ways. The ideal situation, e.g., how much authority should mother/father have, must be examined. The actual circumstances should also be determined. Differences attributable to attitudes need to be sorted out, preferably by a regression analysis, from the differences due to other factors. The degree of dissatisfaction in this situation between different attitudes will be revealed by calculating the algebraic sums of the ideal versus the actual situations. This latter comparison will be useful for characterizing the degree of

stages on the family unit attributable (questions 41-48, 52, 53, 66, 69, 85, 44).

Attitudes Toward Social Changes

The topic of social change in the family as an institution can be explored only briefly in the type of study proposed here; answers to this question will require a longitudinal data base, a data base difficult to develop. Some predictions as to the future of the family can be generated from data collected for prior questions. However, conclusions here must be extremely tentative (questions 16, 39, 54, 74, 79, 89, 94, 104).

Also of importance are attitudes toward: parents-Q21; income-Q30; conflict between family members and non-members-Q54; women working-Q63, 67, 68, 73; polygamy-Q97-100. Sources and types of information (from family, neighbor, government, foreign, etc., and from newspaper, radio, etc.) are also important. Again, there is the obvious connection between value structures and information sources (questions 8, 45, 55, 57, 104). Other items of importance are affect toward information sources (whether these are believed, supported, etc.), for it is not enough to know where information comes from; we must know how it is received (questions 57, 104); attitudes toward western and eastern and other ostensibly modern nations and peoples (questions 55, 56, 57); and questions about development, its

current direction and what direction it should take (questions 103, 105).

Social and Family Solidarity

This refers to a combination of social cohesion and collective action toward the realization of common goals. We may distinguish mechanical solidarity from organic solidarity, the former being societal solidarity based on homogeneous values and behavior, strong social constraint and loyalty to tradition and kinship, and the latter being societal solidarity typical of modern industrial societies based on the interdependence of many specialized roles within a complex division of labor. Our study includes a number of related questions (questions 39, 40, 54, 61, 62, 66, 71, 77, 83, 84, 89, 73, 74, 79, 81, 8, 12, 21, 25, 31, 35, 41, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 69, 85, 90, 94, 101, 104).

Religiosity

This variable relates to interest and participation in religious activities. Since different religions emphasize various behaviors and values, a general conceptual definition is not possible. Operationally, religiosity can be defined in terms of the individual's participation in religious rituals or other activities and attitudes of religious importance to the group (questions 33, 40, 49, 59, 61, 65, 70, 71, 72, 78, 80, 88, 95, 96).

Data Analysis

The exploratory nature of this study requires that we use descriptive strategies of data analysis. Thus, in Chapter IV we used mostly single frequency counts and crosstabulations. For some cases, we used means and standard deviations. In Chapter V we explore the discovery of patterns through the use of correlation analysis and factor analysis which employ. This approach to multivariate analysis is used here. It is employed to discover patterns among the variations in several variables. This is accomplished through the generation of dimensions that correlate highly with several of the real variables and that are independent from one another.

Factor analysis is a necessary tool for reducing the data collection to a smaller set of theoretically and empirically justified scales. Principally, though, it is employed to identify clusters of variables which are considered to represent "styles" of coping with social change.

We are using SAS programs available at the University of Florida North Eastern Regional Data Center.

CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter is composed of a series of tables which are commented without attempting to elaborate explanations. Our purpose here is a first examination of the data and its running commentary. We have attempted to follow the classification of variables we included in the Methodology section as much as possible. Nonetheless, the need for coherent flow of exposition has dictated some rearrangements.

Demographic Items

The data on respondent's level of study are displayed in Table 1a. Table 1B on grade averages produced almost the traditional bell curve for student performance. We found almost 27% were "A" students (higher than average), a solid 45% were "B" students, and almost 24% were "C" students. Also, a fairly high number, 7%, were "D" students. None indicated that he was failing, which makes sense, for otherwise he wouldn't have been present to answer our questionnaire. For the most part, overall responses indicate high achievers at the college and university level, with almost 68% in the A-B range. We found that most of our

Table 1a. Level of Study. Frequencies and Percentages.

Level	N	%
First Year	117	28.96
Second Year	80	19.80
Third Year	78	19.31
Fourth Year	55	13.61
Graduate	<u>74</u>	<u>18.32</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 1b. College GPA. Frequencies and Percentages.

Grade	N	%
D	30	7.43
C	100	24.75
B	182	45.05
A	<u>92</u>	<u>22.77</u>
Total	404	100.00

respondents were first-level students, some 29%. Second and third-level students were about equally represented at 19%. Fourth level students number about 14%, and graduate students about 18%. This represents a good cross-section of university students, for all levels were fairly well represented (see Table 2 for comparison).

Table 3 refers to the respondents' majors. Because we selected numerous academic departments and then picked classes at random within them, we were able to obtain good representation in most disciplines. Of course, some are more heavily represented than others, which may suggest the interest level of certain fields. The four largest categories of majors were history at 14%, Islam at 11%, geography at 14% and sociology at nearly 10%. The smallest categories of majors were from disciplines such as economics, landscaping and literature.

Table 4 displays the respondents by age and sex. We found that some 59% of our respondents were male and some 41% female. These figures demonstrate a larger than anticipated representation of female students, since women make up just over one-fourth of university students in the city. In Saudi Arabia students enter elementary school at age six, and complete twelve years of education through the secondary level by age eighteen. This might lead us to expect that students should then enter college and complete their training by age twenty-two. However, in Saudi Arabia it is common for students to commence college training some years

Table 2, Statistical Summary Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud University Academic Year 1980-1981.

Table 3. Major. Frequencies and Percentages.

Major	N	%
Accounting	3	0.74
Agriculture	24	5.94
Arabic	17	4.21
Art	3	0.74
Business Admin.	5	1.24
Chemistry	18	4.46
Civil	2	0.50
Communications	6	1.49
Curri.	2	0.50
Economics	7	1.73
Education	17	4.21
English	9	2.23
Geography	56	13.86
Geology	9	2.23
History	57	14.12
Islam	45	11.14
Lands.	2	0.50
Literature	1	0.25
Mathematics	2	0.50
Medicine	24	5.94
Milit.	27	6.68
Museu.	2	0.50
Physical Ed.	4	0.99
Psychology	8	1.98
Public Admin.	4	0.99
Science	9	2.23
Sociology	40	9.90
Statistics	1	0.25
Total	404	100.00

Table 4. Age and Sex. Percentages.

Age	Male	Female	Total
18-20	14.71	52.41	30.20
21-23	42.86	42.17	42.57
24-26	23.53	3.01	15.10
Over 26	<u>18.91</u>	<u>2.41</u>	<u>12.13</u>
Total	58.91	41.09	100.00
N=	238	266	404

after graduation from secondary school, and also for those with lesser degrees to attend the university to improve their skills. In our case, some 42% of the male respondents and over 5% of the female respondents were 24 and older.

Table 5 deals with the place of birth of the respondents. We found that most students were urban born, which might lead to the suspicion that the respondents would thus be more appreciative of development and change. Q7 on residence in Riyadh was taken out of our analysis because not all students reside in the city, even though they might be staying there temporarily.

Table 6 involved marital status. We have eliminated Q10 and Q11 from the analysis because most of the respondents for Q9 indicated that they were single. Those few who were married had gained that status only recently and for most it was the first time. Thus we examine Q9 on actual marital status. We found that some 75% of our respondents were single, and that some 25% were married. Only two were divorced. Questions about marriage continue with questions 97-100 (see Table 7). Some 76% of the respondent's fathers had one wife and some 20% had two. Very few had more. When men were asked to say how many wives they would have, their responses followed closely with those of their fathers. Some 78% opted for one wife and some 20% indicated the desire for two. When female respondents were asked how many wives they would allow their husbands to have, the responses was dramatic--over 98% said only one! When all respondents

Table 5a. Place of Birth. Percentages.

Person	Urban	Rural	Total
Father	40.10	59.90	100.00
Mother	41.34	58.66	100.00
Student	<u>60.64</u>	<u>39.36</u>	<u>100.00</u>
Total	47.36	52.64	100.00

Table 5b. Where Family Lives Now. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Urban	296	73.27
Rural	<u>108</u>	<u>26.73</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 5c. Opinion of One Self is Seen as Urban or Rural: Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Urban	337	83.42
Rural	<u>67</u>	<u>16.58</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 6. Marital Status. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Single	301	74.51
Married	101	25.00
Divorced	<u>2</u>	<u>0.49</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 7. Number of Wives for the Following. Percentages.

	No. of Wives	One Wife %	Two Wives %	Three Wives %	Four Wives %	Total of % N
For Father	75.99	19.55		2.73	1.73	100.00 404
For Male Student	77.50	19.58		2.50	0.42	100.00 238
Female Student Allowed for Husband to Have	98.18	0.00		2.92	0.00	100.00 166
Expected for Son	93.32	6.44		0.00	0.24	100.00 404

respondents were asked about how many wives they would want for their son, over 93% said just one, and over 6% said two. Clearly, these results indicate that the impulse toward a primarily monogamous society exists, and that the trend is both growing and self-reinforcing. Also, the findings suggest that while the option for many wives exists, most do not take advantage of it, and the society has possibly been more monogamous all along than some Western observers might have imagined.

Table 8 relates to travel outside Saudi Arabia. This was to determine how much contact the respondents had had with other parts of the world. The growth in petroleum wealth has provided, certainly to university students, access to foreign travel on an unprecedented scale. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that an "average" Saudi university student is able to afford a few trips per year to Europe or even more to other areas. We found that some 53% had traveled outside Saudi Arabia, and of these some 32% did so 2-5 times. Such contact with the outside world is high, especially when compared with similar contact over the years. Of course, one would not wish to read "Western" into the assessment of contact with the outside world, for many countries where Saudis travel are Arabic and regional, and usually have similar cultures and traditions. While the statistics suggest that we have a fairly mobile and affluent group of respondents, with some indicating as many as 30-50 trips abroad, we should also note that some 47% indicated no

Table 8a. Travel Outside of Saudi Arabia. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Yes	213	52.73
No	<u>191</u>	<u>47.27</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 8b. Number of Times Out of Saudi Arabia. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
None	192	47.52
1	32	7.92
2	57	14.10
3	31	7.67
4	25	6.18
5	15	3.71
6	6	1.48
7	11	2.72
8	11	2.72
9	4	0.99
10	4	0.99
11	1	0.24
12	1	0.24
15	4	0.99
20	4	0.99
25	1	0.24
26	2	0.49
30	2	0.49
50	<u>1</u>	<u>0.24</u>
Total	404	100.00

such travel. It has been suggested that richer information could have resulted from a question requesting places of travel. While true, our purpose is preliminary research, and the inclusion of open-ended questions in an already lengthy survey would have been impossible. It was not our intention to gather such detailed information.

Demographic Items Relating to Family

As contrasted with the respondents' birthplaces, we found that birthplaces for mothers and fathers in Table 5 were primarily rural. This suggests a definite generational advantage on the part of the respondents to comprehend and appreciate development and change because of longer exposure to urban, and presumably more developed, environments. As can be seen in questions five, seventeen and eighteen, the responses were open-ended. With the aid of a map of Saudi Arabia and the official census classification of the localities mentioned as either villages (rural) or cities (urban), we coded the responses to the questions as either rural or urban. That the parents were more often rural-born shows, on the one hand, a pattern of migration toward urban centers. Here again, however, we face ambiguity. Because we took the current census classification of localities, many things are different than they would have been when the parents were born. For example, many localities now considered to be cities were only villages years ago.

Table 9 discusses the ages of the parents when the respondents were born. The highest percentage for fathers

Table 9. Age of Father and Mother at the Birth of Student. Frequencies and Percentages.

Age	Father		Mother	
	N	%	N	%
14	--	--	18	4.45
15	--	--	16	3.96
16	--	--	14	3.47
17	22	5.45	25	6.19
18	4	0.99	34	8.42
19	7	1.73	16	3.96
20	16	3.96	45	11.14
21	3	0.74	13	3.22
22	21	5.10	10	2.48
23	7	1.73	18	4.46
24	18	4.46	9	2.23
25	43	10.64	32	7.92
26	2	0.49	5	1.24
27	11	2.72	14	3.47
28	9	2.23	13	3.22
29	4	0.99	4	0.99
30	40	9.90	47	11.63
31	7	1.73	3	0.74
32	7	1.73	7	1.73
33	1	0.25	--	--
34	10	2.48	3	0.74
35	38	9.41	23	5.69
36	7	1.73	2	0.50
37	4	0.99	3	0.74
38	6	1.49	10	2.48
39	4	0.99	5	1.24
40	25	6.19	8	1.98
41	2	0.49	--	--
42	4	0.99	3	0.74
43	4	0.99	--	--
44	7	1.73	--	--
45	26	6.44	4	0.99
46	5	1.24	--	--
48	2	0.49	--	--
49	2	0.49	--	--
50	7	1.73	--	--
51	3	0.74	--	--
52	4	0.99	--	--
55	9	2.23	--	--
56	1	0.25	--	--
60	6	1.48	--	--
69	4	0.99	--	--
70	2	0.49	--	--
Total	404	100.00	404	100.00

was 11% at age 25. This may not be as significant as one might think, however, because other high percentages turn up at widely varying ages, e.g. 10% at age 30, over 9% at age 36. Still, it would not be imprecise to suggest that most of the fathers were 40 or less when the respondents were born. Statistics on mothers' ages when the respondents were born can be easily contrasted. The mothers tended to be younger; some were mothers at age 14, whereas the earliest age for fathers was 17. Also, mothers for the most part tended to have children before age 25. Interestingly, however, the highest overall percentage for mothers was at age 30 when almost 12% had the respondents.

As Table 10 indicates, some 82% of respondents had both parents living at the time of this survey. Of those whose parents had died, some 15% of the fathers and some 2% of the mothers died at less than age 40. In fact, it was quite rare that deceased parents were over age 40. This is in keeping with the shorter life expectancy in more traditional societies, and further upholds the fact that women tend to outlive their husbands.

Table 11 presents some interesting points on parents' education. We found that some 20% of fathers were illiterate, and over one-half had not completed the elementary levels. Only about 8% had a college degree, and the percentages at higher levels were negligible. The statistics were even higher for mothers, demonstrating that women in Saudi society had not traditionally has the same educational

Table 10. Are Parents Alive? Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Father died at age greater than 40	59	14.60
Mother Died at age greater than 40	7	1.73
Both Living	330	81.69
F Died less than 40	1	0.25
M Died less than 40	<u>7</u>	<u>1.73</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 11. Father's and Mother's Level of Education.
Percentages and Frequencies.

Level of Education	Father	Mother
1. Cannot Read or Write	20.30	58.66
2. Some Elementary Education	32.17	25.78
3. Elementary Degree	19.3	10.89
4. Intermediate Degree	9.16	2.97
5. Secondary Degree	5.70	1.73
6. Some College Education	3.71	--
7. College Degree	7.92	--
8. Master	1.24	--
9. Doctorate	<u>0.49</u>	--
Total	100.00	100.00

Mean for Father = 2.99

Stand. Dev. = 1.88

Mean for Mother = 1.63

Stand. Dev. = 0.91

N=404

opportunities as men. We found that almost 59% of the mothers were illiterate, and over 84% had not completed the elementary level. None of the respondents' mothers had had any college level training at all. Such figures are, of course, not unusual for developing societies. What is important, however, is the evident effort being made to ensure that future generations will not be so uneducated. That many students attending universities at various levels are being educated when most of their parents had little or no such opportunity is a credit to the educational development aspects of Saudi Arabia's development plans. Of greatest importance is the large and increasing participating of women (as evidenced by almost one-half of our respondents being women), so that the discrepancy between male and female educational levels will hopefully disappear. In fact, female students who experience higher education will continue to demand even more from society.

Table 12 informs us, not unexpectedly, that 98% of the respondents' mothers had no job outside the home when they were growing up. The inclusion of women in the educational system in greater numbers would suggest that this figure will be substantially diminished in the future. Educated women will seek better and more frequent outside employment, higher salaries, greater benefits, and will thus contribute increasingly to family income and well-being.

Regarding occupations in Table 13, we found that almost one-third of the respondents' fathers were still engaged in

Table 12. Mother's Type of Work. Frequencies and Percentages.

Type of Work	N	%
No work outside home	394	97.53
Work outside home	<u>10</u>	<u>2.47</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 13. Fathers Occupation. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
1. Farmer or Worker	129	31.93
2. Government Employee	127	31.44
3. Professional	<u>148</u>	<u>36.63</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 2.04

Stand Dev. = 0.82

either farming or hired labor. Almost one-third were government employees, and the largest percentage was professionals at nearly 37%. This demonstrates a trend common in many developing areas to deemphasize the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (depending on overall resources and if these needs are being met through other means such as importing), and concentrate on the government and service sectors.

Fathers' religiosity is discussed at length in the section on religiosity variables, but it should be noted that frequent mosque attendance is very high--90%. This would suggest that even as the society changes (e.g., more service jobs, more education for women), the piety is the same and religious beliefs remain strong (see Religiosity in this chapter).

Regarding attributes most important in a potential spouse (from the parents' perspective), we found in Q49 that the most important considerations were fertility and religiosity. Least important were income and family wealth. This significantly upholds what we said earlier about the importance of religion and the disinterest in material things.

Table 14a on family income indicated a fairly even breakdown. Some 33% made less than 6,000 S.R. per year, about 38% made the mid-range salary, and some 28% had higher incomes. This suggests a quite even distribution of wealth in the society. An interesting point that even when some of

Table 14a. Family Income. Frequencies and Percentages.

Income	N	%
1. 6000 SR or less	135	33.43
2. 6100-9000 SR	155	38.38
3. More than 9100 SR	<u>114</u>	<u>28.29</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 1.95

Std. Dev. = 0.78

Table 14b. Perceptions about Own Family's Income Compared to Others. Frequencies and Percentages.

Perceptions	N	%
1. One of the highest	11	2.72
2. Higher than average	88	21.78
3. Average	275	68.10
4. Less than average	19	4.70
5. One of the lowest incomes	<u>11</u>	<u>2.70</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 2.82

Std. Dev. = 0.67

the respondents checked 6,000 S.R., they indicated "average," just as those respondents who checked 9,100 S.R. did (see Table 14b). While this might appear to be a contradiction, it might also be in accordance with Islamic teaching. Despite a higher or lower income, people are satisfied with their lots in life, and may tend to regard as average what is average for them. People are generally content because they have what they want and their demands are based on what they can afford. Since they do not demand more than they can afford, they are probably satisfied. This may be one of the signs of their belief and the blessing of their religion, this being that each person must be satisfied and content with whatever he has, and should not attempt to compare with what someone else has. This outlook is especially important in contributing to a stable society. It is supported by the idea that many respondents did not consider their families poor as it shows in Table 15 which indicated that some 93% considered themselves able to afford what they wanted, and that they were thus not too poor. Another point which should be mentioned is that perhaps the range of income choices might be increased, for the span between 3,000 and 12,000 is not that significant, and may in fact cover a very average range.

Identity

Table 5c overwhelmingly identified respondents and their families as conceiving of themselves to be

Table 15. Family is Too Poor to Buy Necessities.
Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Yes	30	7.43
No	<u>374</u>	<u>92.57</u>
Total	404	100.00

urban--83%--which is most definitely a trend away from identification with rural backgrounds. Since many parents had rural origins, this figure is even more significant.

Table 5b points out that some 73% are now urban.

Table 16 suggests an interesting point, that family importance is not a consideration when selecting a spouse. Over 81% would not consider a spouse simply because he or she was from a more important family. This is significantly at variance from Western approaches to the same subject where importance is a major factor, and a key aspect of relationships (especially within the upper classes) is to enhance one's importance.

Table 17 is an explicit question of identity, and we should not be surprised to find that the greatest identity is with Islam. Some 85% identify themselves as Muslim. The second highest would be identity as an Arab and then as a Saudi citizen. The allegiance is to religion and society, and less so to the family, tribe, etc. This is important because growth and development do not seem to have weakened the bonds with Islam and Saudi society. One might think that growing cosmopolitanism would result in greater global consciousness in terms of thinking as a citizen of the world like so many are now doing in the West. But this is not the case. It is surprising that Saudi citizens were ranked above the tribe. Given the tribal background of the country, and the strong tribal content of much of the population, this was perhaps unexpected. But then one of the main

Table 16. Preference to Marry More Important People.
Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Yes	76	18.81
No	<u>328</u>	<u>81.19</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 17. Identification of One-self. Percentages.

	Father's Child %	Tribe's Child %	Saudi Citizen %	Arab %	Muslim %	Citizen of the World %
7 (Most important)	11.63	23.27	26.25	26.73	84.65	23.53
6	18.81	7.18	19.31	22.77	6.93	2.73
5	14.60	9.65	25.49	22.77	5.20	7.93
4	18.32	15.84	15.59	12.13	0.99	7.44
3	11.14	27.97	10.39	12.13	0.49	6.45
2	24.51	12.62	2.23	3.22	0.25	43.25
1 (Least important)	<u>0.99</u>	<u>3.47</u>	<u>0.74</u>	<u>0.25</u>	<u>1.49</u>	<u>8.64</u>
Total	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404
Mean =	4.23	4.30	5.26	5.29	6.67	3.65
SD =	1.75	1.86	1.43	1.46	.96	2.18

goals of Saudi development plans is to gradually settle many of the nomadic groups. If respondents value Saudi citizenship above tribal affiliation, then perhaps this effort has been successful. But the most important point made in this section is that Islam and Saudi culture are far and beyond the primary interests.

Family Variables

Family Structure

This first section deals with communication patterns--the relevant Table 18. We found that the father was accorded the highest respect of anyone in the survey. This was true for both male and female respondents, 76% and 75%, respectively. The mother also warranted respect, especially in matters of closeness. It may be suggested that perhaps her role in the loving, caring, and upbringing of children adds substantially to the perception of closeness here. Sisters seemed to regard brothers with a certain degree of respect, while brothers did not do so significantly with each other. Neither brothers nor sisters indicated respect for sisters.

In seeking advice about the family, sons were likely to seek the advice of the fathers, and daughters were likely to seek advice from the mothers. The same was true, though not as significantly, for engagements (and here, sisters often brothers as well). That the fathers' and mothers' roles are

Table 18. Family Matters by Sex. Percentages.

	<u>Father</u> H	<u>Mother</u> F	<u>Brother</u> H	<u>Sister</u> F	<u>Spouse</u> H	<u>Friend</u> H	<u>Other</u> H	Total
Has the Highest Respect	76.47	74.70	15.55	16.87	0.42	2.41	0.00	0.00
The Closest to You	21.85	11.45	48.74	58.43	6.72	3.61	2.52	13.25
Seek Advice to Run the Family	53.36	23.49	10.50	37.35	11.76	7.83	2.10	16.27
Seek Advice About Engagement	33.19	21.69	25.63	28.31	7.56	22.29	16.39	10.84
Consult Politics	21.85	30.72	0.00	0.00	13.45	30.72	0.00	3.61
Consult Religion	44.59	41.57	2.10	9.04	3.36	21.69	0.42	0.60
Family Dispute with Neighbor	35.71	31.33	0.42	9.64	9.24	9.64	0.00	1.81
Family Dispute	53.36	42.17	7.98	19.88	7.98	13.25	0.84	0.00
Total	238	166	238	166	238	166	238	166

less distinguished in matters of engagements underscores the traditional role that both parents have had in locating spouses for their children. This role is still quite evident in Saudi Arabia today. It would tend to counter suggestions that development has altered the basic roles in engagements, however, it does not offer insight into those cases where the respondents do not go to anyone for advice on the subject. Such individuals may well be within those elements of society which adhere to modern concepts of spouse selection and engagement. In political matters friends played an important role, at least for males, while females were more likely to seek advice from fathers and brothers. This is a finding of no small significance because traditionally the family was the locus of all social and political activity. Perhaps greater communication and increased sources of information have made non-family advice more common. In religious matters, the religious scholar was most often sought after the father, a finding which is in keeping with tradition.

For family disputes with a neighbor, the father was most often consulted by male respondents. However, female respondents often consulted with others. In family disputes proper, the father was most often consulted, although so were other people, and especially mothers in the case of female respondents.

These results indicate that while the fathers' role is, on the average, predominant in family matters, this is

changing. More people, especially the mother and outsiders are having greater influence. This does not suggest that the family is being undetermined, only that communication patterns are changing because of changing times and greater social exchange in the society.

Family Relations

This section concerns the regard that family members have for each other's beliefs and traditions. Table 19 refers to marriage outside one's "class." "Class," however, is defined as membership in one of two social categories: Kabeli (belonging to a tribe) and Khaderi (not belonging to a tribe). Historically, in Saudi Arabia, these have been endogenous categories. People discriminate in terms of these social categories only for purposes of marriage. Some 24% say they would marry outside their "class" if their parents approved, and another 20% would do so if the tribe approved. However, fully 34% would not have a spouse from another "class."

Table 20 covers the same information in Table 18, and, therefore, the figures are not elaborated upon. Q62 refers to support given to relatives, and the respondents said in overwhelming numbers--99%--that they would support relatives in time of need. This emphasizes that the ties of family are extremely strong, and devotion extends through relatives.

Table 19. Preference to Marry Out of One's Own Class.
Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Does not mind if family approves	95	23.51
Does not mind if spouses' family is wealthy	2	0.49
Does not mind if tribe approves	82	20.31
Does not mind at all	78	19.31
Yes, minds	137	33.90
Other	<u>10</u>	<u>2.48</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 20. Ideal and Actual Affection for Family Members by Sex. Means and Standard Deviations.

		Should		Actual	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
Father	mean	4.83	4.70	4.85	4.94
	stand. dev.	0.49	0.59	0.43	0.36
Mother	mean	4.19	3.57	4.16	3.76
	stand. dev.	1.16	1.35	1.14	1.21
Brother	mean	4.13	3.88	4.03	3.88
	stand. dev.	1.03	1.23	1.02	1.01
Sister	mean	3.49	2.92	4.13	4.44
	stand. dev.	1.34	1.32	0.96	0.85
Grandparents	mean	4.48	4.69	3.66	3.71
	stand. dev.	0.94	0.67	1.16	1.21
Spouse	mean	3.77	3.65	3.88	3.80
	stand. dev.	1.16	1.16	1.08	1.12
Relative	mean	4.35	4.73	3.48	3.68
	stand. dev.	1.02	0.76	1.47	1.53

5 = Total affection

1 = Least affection

Q66 concerns the domicile of at least one married son, whether this should be with the parents. Almost three-fourths thought yes, which further emphasizes the continuing importance of extended family relations. Somewhat significantly, over one-sixth thought not. It will be interesting to note how these statistics change with time.

Q69 refers to assisting with the support of brothers and sisters, and the respondents agreed almost 100% that this should happen--an extremely strong example of family solidarity. These figures support the mounting evidence that family relationships are little affected by change. The desire to assist at all levels is extremely evident.

Family influence on the respondents' aspirations was discussed in Q74. Significantly, and in apparent conflict with some other findings, some 59% said that family did not influence their aspirations. On the other hand, over 40% did see an influence or did not know. A closer examination of these figures reveals that there is possibly no conflict. Respondents may not have been aware how much the family has indirectly influenced aspirations. Further, while individual choice is certainly apparent, this does not mean that the respondents would necessarily go against what might be suggested by their families so as to influence aspirations.

Q77 concerns the ability to live away from relatives. The findings here are not as strong as might be expected.

First of all, only some 54%, just about one-half, said they would be unhappy away from relatives. About one-fifth was uncertain, and 25% would not be unhappy. Now, this question does not take into consideration exactly what living away from relatives would be. If it simply means living outside the extended family household, with ready access to relatives through close proximity, then the question is not so threatening to family ties. If however, it means living some distance away, then the findings would take on greater meaning.

In Q79 we examine the question of success and its relationship to one's family or one's spouse's family. Again, as we noted early on, prestige is not a major concern, and some 69% rejected the notion. Also, we determined earlier that success comes from hard work and living within God's laws, so there should be no dependence on family prestige. Still, almost one-fourth did see this as important, and therefore this statistic should be closely watched, for an increase would be indicative of changing notions of importance on such things as prestige (see Religiosity in this chapter).

Power in the Family

In Table 21, we discuss the proposed and actual perceived authority of the father. The father's proposed authority is overwhelmingly high--he is without doubt the

Table 21. Ideal and Actual Authority of Family Members by Sex. Means and Standard Deviations.

		Should		Actual	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
Father	mean	4.78	4.93	4.32	4.31
	stand. dev.	0.55	0.40	0.91	0.78
Mother	mean	3.47	3.57	3.01	3.07
	stand. dev.	0.93	2.93	1.27	1.23
Brother	mean	3.01	2.73	3.20	3.76
	stand. dev.	1.01	1.05	1.07	1.15
Sister	mean	2.25	2.18	3.83	4.86
	stand. dev.	0.95	1.68	1.30	0.86
Grandparents	mean	3.18	3.65	3.14	3.46
	stand. dev.	1.09	0.85	1.29	1.14
Spouse	mean	2.61	2.66	2.85	2.67
	stand. dev.	1.11	0.93	0.98	0.91
Relative	mean	3.61	4.50	4.47	3.04
	stand. dev.	3.06	1.05	1.85	1.80
N		238	166	238	166

5 = Total authority

1 = Least authority

head of the household. Also significant is that the actual perceived authority, while not as high, is very solid.

It might seem that, given the changing society and the extent to which development has affected all strata in Saudi Arabia, the responses would not have been so strong in support of the father's authority. However, if one adds together the two highest categories in both proposed and actual perceived authority, the figures are some 88% and 81%, respectively. While we are making these comparisons at the favorable level, we should not ignore the opposite side. Some 8% proposed little authority for the father, and some 10% perceived little authority, figures of some consequence. And, if we combine the two lowest authority categories as we did with the two highest, the figures are even higher--9% and 12%, respectively. These indicate that a fair amount of the respondents rejected the concept of paternal authority or at least do not measure it highly.

As to the mother's proposed and actual perceived authority, the former is high, but the latter is lower. These findings follow the traditional position of the mother vis-a-vis the father in Saudi society. It is interesting to note that the mother's actual perceived authority is much lower than her proposed authority. To make the same comparisons as in the father's case, some 38% of the two highest categories in the proposed authority question granted strong authority to the mother, and some 23% did so in the actual

perceived authority question. Oppositely, fully 23% proposed little authority, and some 31% perceived little actual authority. There was obviously little of the total authority proposed and perceived for the father.

For brothers, sisters, and relatives, more authority was proposed than was actually perceived for them. This was interesting, because one might think that an opposite response appropriate. This perhaps indicates a desire to have more ties with relatives. Some 20% proposed the higher rankings of authority for brothers, and perceived actual authority from these same categories was some 43%. For sisters, proposed authority in the higher rankings was only about 5%, while actually authority was perceived as 65%. Grandparents resulted in proposed authority of 51%, and actual authority was perceived as 24%. For relatives, proposed authority was 26%, and actual authority was perceived as only about 2%.

Q58 refers to the removal of the word "obey" from the marriage service since this might compromise their understanding of a wife's status. The majority, some 84%, indicated that "obey" should remain. This suggests that male respondents were quite traditional in their outlook, and that female respondents were in accordance with the outlook that traditional society thought they should have. This is an indication of the source of power in the family.

But most of those who advocated obedience also said that this was limited. There should be no obedience to someone if it is against God's law. And, the relationship is governed in any case by laws, regulations and discussions. We should also note that some 13% indicated that the word "obey" could be removed without any impact. If the trends we have noted so far continue, then we may see this percentage increase with time.

Q63 dealt with the impact on the husband's manhood if his wife were to choose to work. The majority, some 69%, indicated that manhood is not affected if she works. This finding is in agreement with the culture and history of Saudi Arabia where women have worked in the fields, the farms, and in the desert for centuries. There are numerous women in Saudi history who have contributed to society through their work (see Table 22).

Q64 discusses the husband's final say in family matters. As anticipated, some 87% agreed that this should be so. This finding firmly establishes the husband's position as final arbitrator and source of power in the family. However, since some 7% disagreed, this is indicative of a pocket of resistance to the idea of male dominance, and one might expect to see more future agitation for equality by wives.

Q85 concerns freedom of the individual at age 17. The majority of respondents indicated that they were not free to

Table 22. Respondent's Agreement with the Following Statements by Sex. Means and Standard Deviations.

Statement		Mean		STD	
	M	F	M	DEV	F
Q58. Women removing "OBEY" are not wives	4.17	4.13	1.26	1.18	
Q60. Against nature-women supervising men	4.05	4.33	1.30	1.16	
Q63. Bad for manhood if wife works	2.69	1.84	1.38	1.09	
Q64. Equality is good but husband has say-so	4.35	4.26	0.95	0.91	
Q87. Husband and wife have equal say in family	3.76	4.18	1.09	1.16	
Q67. A woman is better off at home vs. work	3.86	3.33	1.24	1.23	
Q68. A woman has a right to a profession	3.02	3.86	1.35	1.17	
Q73. Husband is responsible for wifes' needs	<u>4.03</u>	<u>4.30</u>	<u>0.91</u>	<u>1.00</u>	
N	238	166	238	166	

5 = Strongly agree

1 = Strongly disagree

come and go at that age, thus suggesting parental control. However, a strong 42% did have considerable freedom. This seems to draw a sharp contrast between tradition and modern habits, and it would be interesting to find out which respondents came from urban, development-minded families and which came from more rural, traditional-minded families.

Q87 also concerns equality between husband and wife, and contrasts strongly with the findings in Q64. Some 77% said that husband and wife ought to have equal say. Perhaps one reason for this conflict is that the case is ideal, and that in reality the wife does not have much say (see Table 22).

Family Roles

This section studies roles assigned to family members. Table 17 on mother's occupation was discussed earlier. Q60 deals with the question of women supervising men. Some 82% agreed that it was against the nature of women to engage in that function. We realize that this is part of Islamic teaching and culture, but wished to see if development was changing the situation. While the evidence strongly supports the status quo, there is nevertheless some 16% who rejected the notion, and wished for women to manage men if they are able. Q63 deals with a man's reputation if the wife works. The majority, some 69%, indicated that manhood

is not affected if the wife works. This is in agreement with what we stated earlier.

Q73 has to do with a husband's satisfaction of his wife's needs, thereby suggesting a possible contrast to the concept of working wives. Since some 82% said that the husband is responsible for the wife's emotional and financial needs, this might mean that she should not work. But the point is not explicitly stated. It is evident that the respondents perceived a need to take care of women.

Q92 discusses the children's freedom after age 15, and we found the respondents to be divided on this issue. Most, 48%, did not wish for children to be free, but 42% said that they should be free. This may be one area of conflicting opinions where agitation for children's independence is gaining ground.

In Table 23 we examined the plans of women only for when they would graduate. The findings indicate that 30% plan to have careers and work as long as possible, and, oppositely, 16% planned not to seek work at all or no answer. For the latter group the reason for attending college is either to gain education or to pass the time until marriage. Six percent indicated that they would work until marriage, which supports the idea that Saudi women to some extent fill their free time with education or work until marriage. Another 47% indicated that they would work

Table 23. Women's Plans after Graduation. Frequencies and Percentages.

Plans	N	%
Will not work at all	3	1.80
Work until married	10	6.02
Work until child	79	47.60
Will work	50	30.12
No answer	<u>24</u>	<u>14.46</u>
Total	166	100.00

after marriage, but would cease to do so upon the generation of children, at which time their efforts would be fully concentrated on their offspring. These findings support the statistic that some 70% of women in Saudi labor force are considered as temporary.

These findings agree with the changing role of the mother in Saudi society, as many more women are seeking employment outside the home, and indication with increasing education for women. Findings from other data support these trends.

Mate Selection and Marriage

On this subject, Table 19 was detailed earlier. Table 24a and 24b was discussed earlier as regards to parents, but no respondents in detail. Religiosity was ranked highest, and both intelligence and education are important. Sixty-eight percent of respondents gave religiosity the highest ranking. Family wealth of the potential spouse was significant, as it was the person's income which was rated second after religiosity. This again suggests that material things may go hand in hand with religion.

Some 47% of respondents rated the appearance of the potential spouse quite high, while some 72% gave love and romance 8, 9, or most important. Fertility also scored high, with more than half emphasizing this. There is then

Table 24a. Parent's Ranking of What One Considers in Choosing a Spouse by Sex. Percentages, Means and Standard Deviations.

Table 24b. Student's Rankings of What One Considers in Choosing a Spouse by Sex. Percentages, Means and Standard Deviations.

direct evidence that traditional standards are maintained, but also that there is increasingly new emphasis on affection in relationships.

Q94 relates to the family choosing husbands. The majority 77%, said they should be free to choose their own husbands. However, this does not mean that parents cease to be consulted in the process. It is simply a sign of a change which indicates that forced marriages will no longer be simply accepted. Since the respondents indicated greater interest in love and romance than their parents, these factors obviously are conditioning their responses.

In Table 25 to 28, we have some interesting items on marriage and the family. A large percentage, 61%, indicated that the expected age of marriage for them was between 18 and 25. This is certainly contrary to the trends in other parts of the world where economic difficulties, the desire for a career, and independent lifestyles mitigate against early marriage. However, given the fact that sexual relationships are not sanctioned outside of marriage in Saudi Arabia, and if such relationships are important and essential to life, then society and religion in effect urge young people into marriage. The ideal age for marriage, as indicated by respondents in Table 28, follows the pattern set out below for expected childbirth. Some 35% of male respondents said they would marry ideally at age 25, while

Table 25. Expected Age at Marriage. Frequencies and Percentages.

Age	N	%
1. 18-25	247	61.14
2. 26-30	154	38.12
3. Over 30	3	0.74
Total	404	100.00

Table 26. When First Child is Expected after Marriage.
Frequencies and Percentages.

When	N	%
1 year after marriage	243	60.15
2 years after marriage	146	36.14
3 years after marriage	<u>15</u>	<u>3.71</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 27. Number of Children Expected. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
1. 1-4	90	22.28
2. 5-7	163	40.35
3. 8-10	58	14.36
4. Over 10	18	4.45
5. No Answer	<u>75</u>	<u>18.56</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 28. Respondent's Ideal Age at Marriage for Man and Woman. Frequencies and Percentages.

a. Ideal Marriage Age for Man

Age	N	%
15	9	2.23
17	2	0.49
18	6	1.48
19	1	0.25
20	25	6.19
21	5	1.24
22	28	6.93
23	27	6.68
24	28	6.93
25	142	35.15
26	19	4.70
27	31	7.67
28	15	3.71
29	2	0.49
30	60	14.85
35	2	0.49
40	2	0.49
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 24.647

b. Ideal Marriage Age for Woman

Age	N	%
14	11	2.72
15	13	3.22
16	12	2.97
17	24	5.94
18	77	19.06
19	27	6.68
20	142	35.15
21	14	3.47
22	25	6.19
23	24	5.94
24	10	2.48
25	25	6.19
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 19.5

for female respondents, some 35% would do so at age 20, followed closely by 19% at age 18.

Some 60% expected to have their first child after the first year of marriage, that is, immediately. Thirty-six percent opted to have a child during the second year of marriage. Combined, these figures total some 96%. Again, such a high percentage might be unlikely in other parts of the world, especially the West, because the factors we noted earlier which work against early marriage work just as well against having children early on.

A significant percentage, some 41%, expected to have between five and seven children, again an expectation at variance with other regions of the world, but important in that tradition is very much evident. The expected continuity of activities with those of their parents is underscored. It is important to note that some 16% did not answer, stating that only God knows, and thus adhering strongly to fate and leaving the future in God's hands.

Family Types

This section deals with family types among groups. Table 29 sets out to describe the families of respondents. Some 68% indicated that their family structures were nuclear only, a very substantial amount considering that other

aspects of this survey have upheld traditional patterns. The extended family type received only about 16%. There seemed to be very little incidence of divorce. This would suggest that while the family is still strong overall, there is a tendency away from the traditional household with three to four generations residing within.

Table 30 deals with the number of brothers and sisters of respondents. There were extremely large numbers of both in most cases. Smaller families of two or three as are common in the West were almost non-existent. More than 75% had 5-15 siblings. There were even hefty percentages for those with siblings numbers in the 20s--a strong indication of unrestrained procreation that is common in especially traditional and/or underpopulated areas.

Table 31 deals with the type of family residence. We found that over 71% lived in houses, the rest in apartments or suites. No respondent indicated to be living in a room. The high percentage of house residents is consistent with having solid means, on the one hand. It should also be pointed out that in the early 1970s, the Saudi government established a fund for people to build homes. People were given loans without interest, and for many who had their own land the amount of the loans were sufficient to build houses. There have been both negative and positive results of this program. On the positive side, living conditions are improved, and many people live in houses with yards,

Table 29. Description of Family. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
1. Couple w/children	276	68.32
2. Couple, children and parents	63	15.59
3. Father living w/children	8	1.98
4. Mother living w/children	8	1.98
5. Other	<u>49</u>	<u>12.13</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 30. Number of Brothers and Sisters. Frequencies and Percentages.

No.	N	%
3	3	0.74
4	14	3.47
5	26	6.44
6	13	3.22
7	36	8.91
8	36	8.91
9	38	9.40
10	34	8.42
11	40	9.90
12	23	5.69
13	21	5.20
14	23	5.69
15	24	5.94
16	8	1.98
17	14	3.47
18	11	2.72
19	11	2.72
20	8	1.98
21	3	0.74
23	4	0.99
24	4	0.99
25	4	0.99
26	2	0.49
28	4	0.99
Total	404	100.00

Mean=14.75

Table 31. Type of Family Dwelling. Frequencies and Percentages.

Type of home	N	%
1. House w/yard and garage	289	71.54
2. Apartment	52	12.87
3. Suite	<u>63</u>	15.59
Total	404	100.00

garages, etc. However, from the negative side, the program accelerates the breakdown of intergenerational family ties. Each nuclear family has the legal right to request the government to provide the means for them to build a house. The extended family used to reside under one roof, but now, with each family in its own house, the formation of the nuclear family is encouraged. Incidentally, the suite is an ordinary home made of mud or cement, and it does not have a yard or garage. People park in the streets, and interior space is limited. Obviously, the preferred type of dwelling is the house with yard and garage.

Table 32 dealt more specifically with the respondent's housing. They indicated that 41% resided in their parents' houses, some 29% in dorms, and in other cases it was common to stay with relatives. In only 14% of the cases was the domicile rented, which upholds our contention that the family support system remains strong.

Table 33 dealt with home ownership, and again there seemed to be an indication of a fairly affluent group, because some 88% were homeowners--a very high figure. Of course, we have no indication about the size of these houses until the next question, and it should be recalled that it is Saudi government policy for as many people as possible to have houses, so there is most likely a strong impulse for such dwellings.

We found in Table 34 that some 67% had houses with eight or more rooms. Such size may be due to several

Table 32. Student's Housing. Frequencies and Percentages.

Type	N	%
1. Dormitories	118	29.21
2. Rent Apt.	58	14.35
3. Parent's House	167	41.34
4. Brother's house	34	8.42
5. Relative's house	<u>27</u>	<u>6.68</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 33. Home Ownership. Frequencies and Percentages.

Type	N	%
1. Owned	355	87.87
2. Rented	<u>49</u>	<u>12.13</u>
3. Total	404	100.00

Table 34. Number of Rooms in Home Dwelling. Frequencies and Percentages.

No. Rooms	N	%
1. Less than 4	41	10.19
2. 4-7	92	22.77
3. 8-12	171	42.32
4. More than 12	<u>100</u>	<u>24.75</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 2.81

Std. Dev. = 0.92

factors; including family type, a cultural desire to have a large home, planning for future growth, i.e. more children, and possibly to accommodate other family members or guests.

In Table 35 on the number of people residing in their houses, respondents indicated that more than 12 persons were living in their houses in 37% of the cases, and some 35% said that between 8-12 persons lived in their houses. These figures, totalling 72%, indicate that large families under one roof are still quite the norm. One might suggest that especially in those cases with 12 or more persons, the evidence is strong for the continued role of the extended family. While at first glance this might seem to conflict with our findings on family types, the numbers given for children suggest that there are still mostly nuclear families with large amounts of children. However, since more than 25% are smaller, this area should also be monitored over time to determine if the smaller or nuclear household is gaining strength as was suggested.

Regarding the respondents' number of wives, the findings indicate that almost 76% of student's fathers had only one wife and that some 20% had two. Those with more wives were very few in number, with some 3% having three and some 2% having four. This suggests that even though it is permissible to have more than one wife, in practice very few do. In fact, the practice is not encouraged by Islam, for the husband is required to fulfill several duties for each wife separately and equally,. This is not a simple

Table 35. Number of People Living in Home. Frequencies and Percentages.

Number	N	%
1. Under 4	46	11.39
2. 4-7	62	15.35
3. 8-12	145	35.89
4. Over 12	<u>151</u>	<u>37.37</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 2.99

Std. Dev. = 0.99

task, and is reason in itself not to have more than one wife. Further, as the society changes, women do not readily accept the role as one of many wives. They are increasingly requesting and gaining exclusivity in marriage, and some have reached agreements that permit divorce should the husband seek to have another wife.

Parent-Child Relationships

All the relevant questions--41-48, 52-53, 66, 69, 42--were covered already.

Attitudes Toward Social Change

This section explores social change in the family in brief, but is still of benefit. Questions 16, 74, 79, 84 were already covered. We already noted that Table 19 had important findings about class, and that some 19% indicated that they were willing to get married no matter what the conditions of the marriage, whether for or against the traditions of the institution. While this figure is small, it should not be ignored. When one-fifth of the respondents indicate such a preference, it is necessary to stop and consider that development and the ideas that it brings must surely have had an effect on the society. At the same time, these respondents were college and university students, so the percentage might be much higher than for the society at large. But if these same respondents are to be the leaders of tomorrow, their beliefs must be weighed heavily.

Q89 involves a family-focused perspective which suggests indifference with others. Nearly half disagreed with this position as if to suggest that while the family is of utmost importance, this does not mean the outside world should be ignored. Certainly, in living a proper life, one should act according to God's law in all capacities. This means taking into consideration not only those very important people in your family, but also all the other people in God's world.

Table 36 refers to the possibility of conflict between family members and non-family members, with options to ensure one's family's success, to aid one's family if the cause is just, to remain indifferent, to aid whichever party is just, to telephone the authorities, or to have some other response. The largest percentage indicated that it would assist whichever cause was just, whether family or not. Further, some 32% indicated that they would assist their families only when they were right. This response underscores the Muslim belief in doing what is just, even without regard to family, and counters the tribal notion that the family is to be supported without question no matter what the circumstances of the case. Such response would suggest that the society is indeed evolving from tribal reasoning which was so prevalent over most of its history to a more truly Islamic reasoning. This means full application of Islamic tenets without the limitations placed by tribal beliefs. It is essential to be true to the family, but it

Table 36. Conflict Outside of Family. Best Thing to Do. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
1. Make sure family wins	30	7.43
2. Help family only	130	32.18
3. Remain uninvolved	37	9.16
4. Aid correct party	178	44.06
5. Call police	7	1.73
6. Other	<u>22</u>	<u>5.45</u>
Total	404	100.00

is more important to be true to one's religion and what is just.

Questions 63, 73, 97-100, 8, 45, 56 about the attitudes toward social change have already been covered.

Table 37 demonstrates how students felt the community considered their families. We found that some 48% believed that their parents were considered important, and if this figure is added to the percentage who said their parents were considered very important, we arrive at about 56%, which is a truly high level of self-perceived stature.

Some 42% indicated that they perceived their families to be of average importance, and only 1.20% indicated that they perceived their families to be less important than average.

If the educational background figures for parents are examined, it is found that many of them are unable to read and write. This leads one to the question--how, by Western standards, may someone unable to read and write be of importance. This is further complicated by the fact that an examination of income reveals that 33.42% list incomes less than 6000 Saudi Riyals. Thus the answer cannot be importance from an economic perspective. Let us examine a few points.

This piece of information is indicative of a subjective attitude on the parts of the respondents; we were not interested in actually testing socio-economic status in the community.

Table 37. How Most People in the Community Consider
Respondent's Parents. Frequencies and
Percentages.

Parents are Considered	N	%
1. Very Important	37	9.16
2. Important	192	47.54
3. Average	170	42.10
4. Less than Average	<u>5</u>	<u>1.20</u>
Total	404	100.00

Mean = 2.35

Std. Dev. = 0.66

It further shows that the community is so integrated that each person has an influence. While this influence varies, each has some, and decisions come from the group on many matters.

The family is the mediator between the individual and the community as in most of the world. In Saudi Arabia, the father is clearly the head of the household and is consulted on many subjects, followed by the mother. It is evident why they would be regarded as important.

Q67 and Q68 refers to a woman working. About two-thirds of the respondents indicated that women are better off at home. But a solid one-fourth thought otherwise. There is possibly some movement in the society away from the woman's traditional role.

The change which is taking place in Saudi Arabia is unlike change which occurred in the West (a gradual process). The discovery of oil precipitated the country from a position of no wealth to massive riches, and permitted it to develop more each year than in the totality of its history.

Regarding information sources, we found in Table 38 that most respondents receive information on Saudi Arabia from television. This was followed by Saudi radio, the family, and the local newspaper. Evidently, with the exception of television, information sources on the

Table 38. Source of Information. Percentages.

Source	Saudi Arabia	Muslim World	Entire World
1. Family	12.10	5.45	4.46
2. Neighbor	1.73	0.99	0.49
3. Television	55.45	52.23	50.49
4. Saudi radio	13.12	12.87	7.92
5. Foreign radio	3.22	9.65	16.83
6. Local newspaper	11.39	7.92	8.42
7. Foreign newspaper	0.50	5.94	7.67
8. Books	1.49	3.22	3.22
9. Other	<u>0.99</u>	<u>1.73</u>	<u>0.49</u>
Total	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404	100.00 N=404

country were local, and families still figure as sources although less so than in earlier times. As to information about the Muslim world, again the majority, 52%, received information from television, followed by Saudi radio and foreign radio. The family was not a significant factor in this area of information. As to the world at large, television came out on top with 50%, followed by foreign radio. These figures would suggest that Saudi society, perhaps because of continuing high levels of illiteracy, still relies on verbal transmissions--television, radio, family, etc., for information. This may mean that they are receiving neither the full content nor the objectivity one might receive from numerous other sources. But we cannot state this as a certainty.

Table 39 deals with the importance of information about Saudi Arabia and in the Muslim world at large. Information on events in Saudi Arabia was predictably of greatest importance, with some 83% indicating that they considered this of major significance. By contrast, only 2% indicated that they were not interested in events in Saudi Arabia. Interest in the Muslim world was also high, but considerably lower, with some 52% giving it the highest significance. Of note here, however, was that virtually all--100%--considered news of the Muslim world important or very important. Interest in the world at large commanded a very important category, produced a respectable figure of almost 80%. The

Table 39. Respondents' Importance of Information.
Percentages.

	Importance of Information about		
	Saudi %	Muslim World %	The World %
1. Very important	88.92	52.22	17.82
2. Important	15.10	46.78	62.87
3. Not important	<u>1.98</u>	<u>0.10</u>	<u>19.31</u>
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

results may be presented in a simple hierarchy--self, culture, the world--which is in keeping with tradition.

In Table 40 we were concerned with radio reports from various sources, including Saudi Arabia, other Arab radio, the United States, England and the Soviet Union. Some 70% indicated a belief in the content of Saudi radio, 34% in Arabic radio, 34% in U.S. radio, 65% in London radio and 24% in Soviet radio. Two of these figures are not surprising. Support for Saudi radio would quite naturally be high, as would support for London radio, given its long exposure in Saudi Arabia. However, that radio broadcasts from other Arab countries are suspect is surprising, especially since the belief rate is the same as for U.S. radio. One would think that more support would exist for those broadcasting with the same culture, religion and traditions. Another point is that many respondents believed none of the radio reports, and indicated that simply listening to them did not imply acceptance of their content. Others choose to selectively decide on which content from any particular source was believable. The very low percentage for Soviet radio underscores the long and deep mistrust of that society.

In Table 41 and 42 we discussed the impact of development. In the former, some 24% said that the country was moving too fast toward development, and that, one may assume, the process should be slowed. But against this was about 70% who believed it was moving at just the correct

Table 40. Belief in the Radio Reports. Percentages.

Report From	Yes %	No %	Total
1. Saudia Radio	69.55	30.45	100.00
2. Arabic Radio	34.16	65.84	100.00
3. U.S. Radio	33.66	66.34	100.00
4. London Radio	65.35	34.65	100.00
5. Soviet Radio	24.01	75.99	100.00

N=404

Table 41. Respondent's Opinion About the Speed of Saudi Arabi's Development. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
1 (Too fast)	99	24.51
2 (Just right)	279	69.05
3 (Too slow)	<u>26</u>	<u>6.44</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 42. Opinion of Saudi Arabia's Development.
Frequencies and Percentages.

Opinion	N	%
1. SA become like West	22	5.44
2. SA should not abandon Islam	381	94.31
3. SA should not develop	<u>1</u>	<u>0.25</u>
Total	404	100.00

speed, and even 6% said they wished to see it move faster. These figures suggest that the respondents were quite satisfied with the developmental process, and would work along with it. Such information is vital for the stability to the country and its institutions. We have consistently demonstrated that traditions are being maintained as change occurs, and it appears that the two processes are complementary. In Table 42 it was rejected that Saudi Arabia should develop like the West. Perhaps most important was the almost absolute rejection of a return to the old ways--only one respondent advocated this. Some 94% indicated that development should be undertaken with Islam in mind. They apparently believed that there could be no strong, sound stable development without such a bond. Further, Islam and its tenets would not stand in the way of development, rather, it would encourage the progression of development. Mention should be made of those respondents who indicated that it was possible to pursue development, strive for the West's model, and maintain the teachings of Islam--all without contradiction.

Social and Family Solidarity

This section refers to a combination of social cohesion and collective action which we see as present in Saudi society. Many of these questions were elaborated in other sections, and there is no need to repeat them here.

Q61 dealt with the question of whether a school should encourage mosque attendance. The answer, quite expected and significant, was about 99% in favor. This figure speaks for itself--religion is to be encouraged by all sectors of society. Q59 reached the same conclusion; 99% agreed that one should defend religion above all else.

Q71 concerned Islamic brotherhood, and 84% valued this more than blood. It is evident that religion, again, is the overriding concern and matter of greatest importance.

In Table 43a and 43b we discussed the importance of the tribe. Because of the overwhelming predominance of desert in Saudi Arabia, the settled populations have been relatively less important historically than elsewhere. The traditions of the bedouin tribes have long been the most valued of life in the country. These traditions include important considerations for family and social solidarity, and tribal influence is stronger in Saudi Arabia on even settled populations than in many other countries of the region. But because of migration, war, and greater urbanization, it is possible that tribal influence is decreasing. Some 59% of our respondents cared about their tribes, but 41% did not in Table 43a. Table 43b was only slightly stronger in support of the tribe, for two-thirds were able to name their tribes. However, it is suggested that tribal identification and support are two different things, and that identification itself is not that significant.

Table 43a. Care about Tribe. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Yes	238	58.92
No	<u>166</u>	<u>41.08</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 43b. Naming Tribe. Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Named	267	66.10
Not named	<u>137</u>	<u>33.90</u>
Total	404	100.00

Q81 relates to the ability to move away because of education. However, this would only be meaningful in a minor way if a large number had said yes, which would thus imply that they could and might do so. But since less than one-third agreed, and greater numbers said no or didn't know, we suggest that this is not strongly indicative of anything.

Q83 comments on the desire for solitude, and a majority some 51%, said they enjoyed themselves most when away from other people. While this might seem to contradict the involved family life in Saudi Arabia, let us suggest that everyone needs a time away from even the family, and that may be the reason for so many to seek solitude.

Q84 relates to Q89 which dealt with interest in the society and helping out. Eighty-two percent of the respondents indicated that they would spend time assisting other people. This is continuing evidence of solidarity in the society.

Q90 dealt with goal-oriented indifference to others. surprisingly, these data do not accord with the other points we have been suggesting. Some 66% said they would pursue goals without concern for the opinions of others. Perhaps this is a result of desires for affluence, etc., which come with education, development, but they are still contrary to what we have recorded elsewhere (see Table 44).

Table 44. Respondent Agreement with the Following Statements by Sex. Means and Standard Deviations.

Statement	Mean		Std. Dev.	
	M	F	M	F
Q62. Support relatives if need	4.81	4.63	0.46	0.61
Q66. One married son should live with parent	4.03	3.73	1.21	1.05
Q69. Should help parents support family	4.74	4.80	0.50	0.41
Q77. Living away from relatives is unhappy	3.35	3.43	1.16	1.23
Q83. Enjoy one self is the best	2.94	3.62	1.23	1.24
Q84. Not approve of helping others	2.04	2.03	0.85	0.94
Q89. Help family let others alone	2.86	3.20	1.17	1.38
Q90. Other opinions are not necessary	3.61	3.81	1.19	1.25
Q81. By education will be able to move away from community	3.02	2.44	1.08	1.20
Q79. Success depends on family's prestige	2.47	2.06	1.25	1.15
Q85. At 17 could come and go as pleases	3.41	1.77	1.21	1.06
Q92. After 15 children are capable of deeds	2.93	2.75	1.26	1.22
Q94. Families should not choose husband	3.79	4.16	1.19	1.18
Q74. Family influences aspirations	2.60	2.31	1.29	1.26
N	238	166	238	166

5 = Strongly agree

1 = Strongly disagree

Religiosity

This section examines a specific question which some of the previous sections touched on--religiosity. Since the question is so important, we will include in our discussion those points raised earlier on the subject.

Table 45 discusses the frequency with which male respondents and their fathers attend the mosque. The mosque is the place of worship and prayer, and a Muslim must pray five times per day. It is recommended that these prayers be performed in a mosque, which can be anywhere a group of Muslims comes together for a group prayer regularly. The requirement is most strongly applied to men; women, while they must also pray, may do so at home as well as in the mosque. The figures inform us that fathers and male respondents attend the mosque frequently. Some 90% of fathers attended the mosque 1-5 times daily. Oppositely, we found only some 1% who said fathers attended the mosque rarely. Some 87% of respondents attended the mosque daily 1-5 times, and less than 1% rarely went. It might seem that for many situations, developmental progress and change would contribute to a greater secularization in society, particularly among youth. That is why we sought to compare the practices of fathers and sons. Interestingly enough, the results are the opposite of what one might expect. Apparently, development in Saudi Arabia does not detract from mosque attendance, and may in fact lead to more people attending the

Table 45. Male Students and their Father's Attendance to Mosque. Percentages.

	Father %	Student %
1-5 times daily	89.85	86.60
Friday only	2.48	11.30
Twice a year	0.74	1.26
Hardly every	<u>6.93</u>	<u>0.84</u>
Total	100.00	100.00
	N=404	N=238

mosque as if to reaffirm their religious beliefs and commitments in the face of development and change. The result is an intensification of religious practices and a stronger faith.

As we continue with this display of religious devotion, Table 22 provides additional support, since the part on Muslim identity drew the greatest response, with some 85% identifying themselves as Muslims first before ethnicity, nationality, family, etc. Likewise when considering a potential spouse, we found that both male and female respondents considered that parents would regard religiosity as the most important factor. This was also true for the respondents themselves in considering a potential spouse.

In Q59 we asked whether people should defend their religion against all other things. The response was overwhelmingly 99%. The level of defense is consistent with other questions of religion, and is most emphatically stated. It is clear that religion is the top priority. Likewise, on the question of mosque attendance and school support, Q61 told us that 99% said it was indeed the school's function to encourage the practice. All sectors of society are thus responsible for encouraging and maintaining the religion.

Q65 covers the seriousness of breaking God's law versus men's law. Some 99% agreed that God's law was most important, thus suggesting that while man is temporal with his laws made by other men and subject to revision, God's laws

endure over time, have always been, and take complete priority over any others.

Q70 produced results of 82% in support of predetermination according to God. In Islamic thought this does not eliminate freedom of action within God's rules. Also, the predetermination may not cover every aspect of life, and person must show good faith, especially if he wishes to be considered favorably by God in the future. Q96 also relates to this issue since some 73% agreed in predestination for heaven or hell.

In Q71 some 84% affirmed that Islamic brotherhood is more important than blood, i.e., family. The bond of religion thus supercedes all other considerations, starting with family and continuing on to other aspects of society.

In Q75 it was flatly rejected that one should develop his behavior to conform to that of his environment. Some 92% thus implied that they would maintain their habits, including their religious ones, no matter what the circumstances. Religion transcends all other requirements, and is to be followed above all else. Q93 also supports this as some 65% said they would not change their opinions to please others.

The question of religiosity is also related to success as we see in Q72 and Q76. Respondents indicated that success was not regarded as a goal in itself, and that God's

law was to be preserved in seeking it (94% said so); otherwise, such success would be unworthy of either attempt or achievement.

Q89 tells us that while God guides us, we must work hard to be worthy of his good graces. Therefore, some 85% thought that working was correct--God will not help us if we do not help ourselves. Ninety-four percent in Q88 said that they believed God would reward hard work. Over 99% thought of God's teachings as the constant ideal to strive for, which strongly supports all of what we said earlier.

In Q96, we considered the question of freedom of religion, and if some young people reject religion because of lack of choice. Some 70% of our respondents did not seem to agree, which suggests that there is no requirement to believe in Islam, for faith and belief should be accepted in the hearts and minds of the people. Therefore, if some young people choose not to believe, then they are electing that option freely and not because of any restriction (see Table 46).

Self Concerns Personal Goals

Since many of the students in our survey--at least at the community college level--were teachers, and a good number were graduate students and women, it was not surprising to find that the highest percentage, almost 31%, planned on becoming teachers after graduation. Our second largest category does not provide much information because

Table 46.. Respondent Agreement with the Following Statements by Sex. Means and Standard Deviations.

Statement	Mean		Std. Dev.	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Q59. People should defend religion above all	4.94	4.91	0.33	0.48
Q61. Schools should encourage mosque visits	4.89	4.87	0.43	0.54
Q65. More serious breaking God's law vs. man	4.88	4.93	0.43	0.28
Q72. Reach success no matter how	2.00	1.72	1.03	0.93
Q75. When in Rome do as the Romans do	1.57	1.36	0.88	0.81
Q76. Success not valid without God's law	4.60	4.31	0.64	0.92
Q82. God's teaching is the constant aspiration	4.83	4.85	0.40	0.49
Q71. Islamic brotherhood more important than blood brotherhood	4.28	4.16	0.84	1.01
Q95. No freedom of choice cause religion rejects	2.10	2.26	1.21	1.21
Q70. People are predetermined by God	4.07	4.21	1.04	0.89
Q96. Human beings are predetermined	3.98	4.15	1.38	1.13
Q88. God rewards hard work	4.68	4.71	0.67	0.69
Q80. Future is in the hands of God's so don't work	1.72	1.81	0.94	1.12
Q93. Changing ways for others convenience	2.47	2.31	1.15	1.20
N	238	166	238	166

5 = Strongly agree

1 = Strongly disagree

27% indicated "other." However, from the remaining categories, it is clear that traditional careers retain strong interest, and some 16% opted to enter religious scholarship. Diplomacy and business were next (see Table 47).

Table 48 demonstrated that the respondents had significant attachment to their home country, since nearly 64% desired to remain in Saudi Arabia to work. Still, some 12% would work in another Muslim country, and fully 24% indicated a desire to work elsewhere. The latter figures add up some 36% who would work abroad, which is significant and a sign of growing interest and participation in the external world. Those who would work in non-Muslim countries apparently feel secure enough with their beliefs and traditions to live in a foreign environment.

Q70 discussed predetermination, and many apparently felt that they had little choice in decisions, for 82% said that they were predestined in what they did by God. This notion not necessarily limits the amount of choice in personal goals, and perhaps does make the declaration of such goals less meaningful because they are being stated as preferences and not as actual objectives, given the significant acceptance of predetermination but there are rooms for human choice because the person does not know about what God set for him or her. It could also be interpreted that a life by and through God is preferable, and thus goals are not that significant, and by the same token, predetermination is to be regarded favorably.

Table 47. Respondent's Choice of a Job After Graduation.
Frequencies and Percentages.

	N	%
Religious Scholar	63	15.59
Editor	18	4.45
Teacher	125	30.94
Diplomat	40	9.90
Sportsman	7	1.73
Private Business	41	10.15
Other	<u>110</u>	<u>27.23</u>
Total	404	100.00

Table 48. Place of Choice for a Job After Graduation.
Frequencies and Percentages.

Where Job	N	%
Saudi Arabia Only	257	63.61
Saudi Arabia & Muslim, Arab Countries	50	12.38
Others	<u>97</u>	<u>24.01</u>
Total	404	100.00

This thought is supported somewhat by Q72 on success. The vast majority did not regard success as an objective in itself--some 85% altogether. Apparently they would welcome success should it come, but would not compromise anything and everything to achieve it if it is against God's laws.

The reinforcement of our discussion continues with the evidence provided in Q76 on success within God's law. Some 94% agreed that this must be the case; otherwise, success is not valid nor is it apparently worth having. The percentages of those who would seek success at any cost and outside God's law are very small.

Q78 assesses the issue of riches versus scholarly work. Some 77% would prefer to be a scholar, and only 9% seemed to prefer riches. Obviously, wealth does not provide the type of inducement in Saudi society that it does in the West. Material possessions are simply not given the same importance.

The responses to Q80 might initially seem to contradict earlier findings since some 85% said that man should work hard even though his fortune is in God's hands. But, in fact, this point strengthens our discussion because even though life may be predetermined, God's hand is unseen, and we cannot know what to expect at any given point in time. Therefore we must uphold the values and ethics of our lives though such things as religion, work, etc. It may well be that God guides us in these efforts, but if we show no interest or willingness to do so, and demonstrate a desire

to merely sit back and wait for life to act upon us, God would no doubt be displeased, and our lives (still considering the notion of predetermination) might then be affected in a negative way.

Q86 underscores the foregoing point since some 90% believed that a person needs to work in order to contribute to the world and to have a reason for existence. Only about 5% did not support this belief. And, it follows that if we take the initiative and engage in hard work, then we can only be perceived as having chosen the path God would have us follow, and we are thus eligible to be looked upon favorably by Him. In Q88, some 95% believed that God rewards hard and good work. This is not to say that one should expect a reward from God for working hard, for God alone chooses when and how to act. Further, as His hand is unseen, we could be rewarded in a manner in which we are not consciously aware.

Q91 disavows explicitly any interest in working simply to make money, and some 88% did not agree with such an approach. Otherwise, we would not have had the consistency of answers in earlier questions. It is quite evident from this series of questions on personal goals that the desire is to live a full and productive life within the requirements of Islam (see Table 46).

Table 49 seems to suggest a contradiction, for among the important things to look for in a job, some 66% ranked Islam least important as a consideration. However, this

Table 49. Rank of Importance of Attributes in a Job by Sex.
Percentages.

Rank	Prestige		Salary		Creative		Service to Islam		Service to Society	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1 (Most Important)	19.33	25.90	29.83	36.14	11.34	9.64	7.56	9.04	10.92	4.22
2	22.69	34.94	13.87	19.88	23.11	23.49	5.88	3.01	13.45	10.84
3	13.87	11.45	18.49	26.51	34.03	39.76	10.50	5.42	16.81	16.87
4	15.13	12.65	13.45	8.43	8.82	7.83	15.13	9.64	38.66	60.24
5 (Least Important)	28.99	15.06	24.37	8.43	22.69	19.28	60.92	72.89	20.17	7.83
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N=	238	166	238	166	238	166	238	166	238	166

finding might not be as significant as it appears at first. There was evidently a good deal of indecision regarding this question, for none of the options seemed to interest any significant numbers of students. The only categories which received some support were salary and prestige, and these were only 32% and 22%, respectively. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that people in Saudi Arabi work for the reasons discussed earlier, and not only for such inducements as prestige, income, etc. And, it may be that Islam does not enter as a consideration here, because service to Islam does not need to be aspired to for it is automatic. It may be that the respondents could imagine listing it as a consideration because it is always in their hearts and minds.

Material Objects

Table 50 related to material objects that the respondents and their parents and grandparents had, and also what the respondents hoped for their children to have. The vast majority of respondents had all the items listed. These included stereos, cars, televisions, videos, refrigerators, telephones, houses, university educations, books numbering more than 50, and most had traveled abroad for recreational purposes. In contrast, while most of their parents had many of the material items, only 32% had stereos and 43% videos, which suggests less interest in very modern items. Also, only 22% had university educations, so the fact that they also had few books (only 23% with more than 50) follows.

Table 50. Possessions in Four Generations. Percentages.

	Guardian Parent	Parent	Respondent	Respondent Children
Stero	1.70	32.17	94.55	99.51
Car	6.93	93.82	95.30	74.26
T.V.	5.94	94.31	94.06	98.76
Video	4.95	43.32	92.10	98.76
Refrigerator	10.64	94.55	95.55	98.76
Telephone	7.28	93.56	94.55	98.76
House	11.39	91.34	74.01	99.26
University Education	3.71	21.78	97.53	99.26
More than 50 books	3.46	23.02	94.31	99.26
Travel abroad	3.22	16.83	64.60	99.01

N=404

The responses for grandparents are of little use, because most students did not answer this question, but it seems that they had few of the items listed. As for the respondents' hopes for their children, the vast majority, most close to 100%, expected their children to have all of the items listed. This suggest a very high level of expectations and a desire to achieve them and an indicators of the speed of the development in Saudi Arabia.

CHAPTER V
IDENTITY, FAMILY AND CHANGE

Factor analysis is a statistical procedure employed to designate the basic irreducible variables underlying a large number of interrelated variables. When measurements for several variables have been received, factor analysis may be used to reduce them to a smaller number of basic types or factors. The procedure then involves the analysis of the correlation among variables. The variables that are highly correlated with each other are seen as representing the same factor, and the extent to which each variable has more or less ability to measure this factor is indicated. Thus we have a compact rendition of the same information available from all the variables.

Factor analysis has certain advantages. It is an efficient method of discovering predominant patterns among a large number of variables, as we suggested above. Also, factor analysis presents data in a form that can be interpreted by the reader or researchers. For a given factor, the reader may easily discover the variables loading highly on it, thus noting clusters of variables. Or, the reader may easily determine which factors a given variable is or is not loaded highly on.

There are disadvantages as well to this procedure.

Factors are generated without any regard as to substantive meaning. Quite often one will find factors which produce very high loadings for a group of substantively disparate variables. This may lead to questions about what the factor represents, and at times to nonsensical designations. Also, factor analysis is often criticized philosophically. For example, a hypothesis must be disconfirmable or in reality it is either a tautology or useless. Factor analysis suffers from this problem, for it produces a solution in the form of factors no matter what data are fed in. Thus it is that the generation of factors may not result in meaning.

We performed a series of factor analyses to further improve the descriptive value of the data we have been describing. The analyses that we report in the next pages represent the result of a larger number of analyses. Our research plans contemplated an even larger number but several peculiarities of the data, such as high as 99% responses in one category impeded our research in those areas. Nonetheless, such is the nature of exploratory studies. Thus, we report those analyses that were most related to the principal aim of our research.

Urbanization and Identity

The first of these analyses attempted to discern underlying factors among the question which probed the different identities of our respondents. Our intention here

is to introduce some precision to the delineation of a future area of research that appears to be of central importance, certainly of great interest to this researcher because of inclination and training. Theoretically, this area is specially promising as we will attempt to demonstrate.

To study social change the questions in which we requested a statement of the perceived attitudes of parents are particularly important indicators. The same is even more true of those questions that request objective information across generations. Some of these are particularly revealing.

A crucial event that has accompanied development in other parts of the world, urbanization, is also accompanying the development of Saudi Arabia. We can see from Table 5a that the proportion of students born in urban centers is twice as high as that their parents. This phenomenon is hard to overemphasize. Its social consequences are far reaching.

First, the move to the cities reveals a shift in the economic base of Saudi society. From being a society composed of nomad tribes and sedentary farmers, Saudi Arabia has become a society with an extractive economy struggling to industrialize. Besides, the urban population of Saudi Arabia has a substantial proportion of bureaucrats. It must be emphasized that the problems of employment which accompanied urbanization in the West, specially that of a

lumpen proletariat in great urban centers, is not present in Saudi Arabia because of its over-employment in which 75% of its work force is still foreign.

Second, urbanization should be expected to have dramatic effects on the arrangement of solidarity and loyalties in the Saudi society. We have probed this important area to find that the strongest sense of identity is derived by these students from being Muslims followed, and in this order, from being Arabs, Saudi citizens, Tribe's child, Father's child and Citizens of the World. Table 51 displays correlation between subjective urban-rural identity with other identities which shows that urban men tend to identify more as Arabs than women do. This is a result of the fact that "Arab" is a political identity, not a cultural or racial one. Because of the position of women in Arabic society, politics is an affair almost entirely of men's concerns. Besides, this type of political concern is an almost exclusive urban affair.

By contrast rural men exhibit a strong father's child identity, i.e. with the kin group, more visible and active in the countryside. This is all buttressed by the stronger allegiance of urban women to the tribe.

Table 52 presents the rotated factor pattern. We used a Varimax Rotation because we wanted to maximally distinguish the different factors. In this factor we processed the items concerning the importance of the different types of identity that we have just analyzed and

Table 51. Urban-Rural Identity Other by Identity. Kendall Tau b's, by Sex.

Identity	Tau B's	
	Male	Female
Muslim	0.043	-0.036
Arab	-0.130*	0.126*
Saudi Citizen	-0.030	-0.113*
Tribe, Child	0.003	-0.101*
Father Child	0.133*	0.029
Citizen of the World	-0.087*	0.095*

*Significant at the .05 level or better.

Table 52. Rotated Factor Pattern. Varimax Rotation. Nine Sources of Identity.

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Citizen of the world	0.760*	0.236	-0.214	0.004
Arab	0.709*	0.019	-0.219	0.129
Saudi Citizen	0.416	0.383	-0.349	-0.005
My father's child	-0.722*	-0.155	-0.188	0.127
My tribe's child	0.374	0.591*	-0.223	-0.082
Muslim	0.067	-0.066	0.481*	0.040
Opinion of oneself	-0.080	0.021	-0.029	0.399
Preference of marrying out of class	-0.001	0.015	-0.169	0.281
Do you care from which tribe you are	-0.177	0.213	0.023	-0.436*
Variance Explained by each Factor				
Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	
1.961	0.629	0.563	0.470	
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 3.625				

*Item loads on this factor.

three items which also probed identities. These were the opinion of self as either rural or urban, whether they preferred to marry within or outside one's own class and whether they cared or not to which tribe the respondents belonged.

The total variance explained by the analysis is 3.625%. This limits the results to the extent of making them trivial. This is an indication that each of the questions might be tapping conceptually independent dimensions. Certainly this was our intention when we included the different questions. With the caveat of its poor explanatory power, we can observe how factor one clusters citizen of the world, Arab, Saudi, and my father's child. We call this factor Secular Identity. The second factor includes the single item of tribal identity, and we label this a factor of Tribal Identity. The rather important loading that this item has also on factor one indicates that this is also a secular factor. The third factor is clearly a religious factor which includes only the identity as a Muslim. The fourth factor includes the urban rural identity and the item that asked whether or not the student cared about tribal identity. This last item also loads importantly on the factor of tribal identity.

In conclusion, the factor analytical procedure does not contribute much to our knowledge, per se. We do learn, though, that the original conceptualization is solid. This, of course, does not close our analysis or answer any

questions. Rather, it opens an analytical space to empirical and conceptual exploration. We suggest that this space is a rich research lode. It is not by chance that Durkheim (1933) selected the notion of solidarity to come to grips conceptually with social change. His concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity, in our opinion, are particularly valuable to disentangle the riddles that Saudi society is facing. Our data, though, are perplexing because social change, specially among university students who are being trained in a type of instrumental rationality, should have brought about the emergence of organic type of solidarities. In terms of our data one would have expected that more importance be given to being an Arab and to being one's father's child, the two types of identity that imply organic type of identities. Nonetheless, what appears to be most important is a type of mechanical solidarity, being a Muslim. We do not need to repeat here the description of Islam as a source of identity. What our data importantly confirm is the relevance of taking a closer look at Muslim identity as a type of solidarity which might go into a development process of unique characteristics.

Attributes of Potential Spouse

Another set of questions in which we attempted to obtain an idea of intergenerational change in values was that in which we asked the students to rate the importance of attributes of a potential spouse, as they would see it

and as they saw their parents doing the rating. Of course, we have not expected a correspondence between the perception of the students and the actual opinion held by their parents. What we are measuring here is, from one perspective, an internalized view of intergenerational differences on an important personal matter. In the previous chapter, we examined the attributes we consider here and observed that Religiosity was ranked highest and both intelligence with income and education are important. Sixty-eight percent of respondents gave religiosity the highest ranking. Some 47% of respondents rated the appearing of the potential spouse quite high. Fertility also scored high with more than half of the students emphasizing this.

In Table 53 we have assembled the correlation coefficients between the reported perceptions of parental rating and self rating of the attributes of a potential spouse broken down by sex of the respondent. In this table, of course, a high correlation indicates a close ranking of the specific attribute in terms of how the respondents perceive the importance of that attribute and how they perceive that their parents rank the same trait.

An interesting finding is that, in the average, males and females show very similar correlations, .402 and .421 (sd. of .171 and .127) respectively. This means that these students see their values considerably close to those of their parents when it comes to these attributes and that

Table 53. Respondent's Ranking of Attributes of Potential Spouse by Respondent's Perception of Parents Rankings By Sex. Kendall Tau B's.

	Male	Female
1) Family Status	-0.012*	0.321
2) Intelligence	0.310	0.452
3) Religiousity	0.471	0.528
4) Family Wealth	0.566	0.480
5) Appearance	0.405	0.316
6) Love	0.354	0.346
7) Fertility	0.523	0.609
8) Income	0.565	0.524
9) Education	0.046*	0.218

*Not significant (.05 level).

there is little overall difference how men and women perceive their ranking and that of their parents. In terms of social change, these students do not see themselves as being too distant from the values of their parents. Notwithstanding there are important differences between how the men and the women perceive the values of their parents and their own. In fact, we see that the women see their ranking as being much closer to that of their parents (.321) than men see theirs (-.012) when it comes to the family status of the prospective spouse. A very similar difference, males .045 and women .218, is to be found concerning the education of one's potential spouse.

One must be reminded that Islam prescribes that the men must look for their wives consulting with their parents. Then, the wife's family would be consulted. This latter family will consult with the prospective bride. If she agrees to consider the suitor as a potential spouse, she will see him. After this encounter, usually in the presence of relatives of both bride and groom, the potential husband and the potential wife make a decision to be engaged or not. This procedure is usually followed in Saudi Arabia with minor variations in individual cases. In these processes the man has considerably more freedom, and certainly far more initiative than the woman. Thus, it is no wonder that women see themselves as more conservative than the men in these respects. It must be underscored that these attributes are objective indicators of a person's worth, the kind

of attributes which are public knowledge, so to say. We must also emphasize that men and women considered family status to be the second most important attribute after the religiosity of the potential spouse (see Table 28a and 28b).

The three highest correlations among women are those between their perceptions of their parents and their own valuation of fertility (.609), religiosity (.528) and income (.524). Among men the highest correlations are between family wealth (.566) and also between fertility and income.

Overall, the University students in our sample see themselves as being quite close to their parents in the value they give to different traits of a potential spouse. The lowest correlation in the case of men is on the attribute intelligence (.310) in the case of women it is on the importance of love and romance (.346); the correlation for men is rather low too in this attribute (.354). Men and women, of course, saw themselves as giving more importance to this attribute but I would hesitate in predicting a momentous social change from the magnitude of the differences.

Status Indicators

Table 54 displays the rotated factor pattern matrix for a factor analysis on the indicators of status which were included in the questionnaire. Our intention was to find out whether these indicators could be reduced to a smaller number of dimensions, such as objective and subjective. The

Table 54. Rotated Factor Pattern Matrix. Indicator of Status.

	Factor 1 Income	Factor 2 Education	Factor 3 Home	Factor 4 No. People
Income of parents compared to others	0.691	-0.002	0.035	-0.107
Community considers my parents to be	0.461	-0.024	-0.010	0.126
Approximate gross family income	-0.569	0.215	-0.182	0.154
Mother's level of education	0.056	0.700	0.138	0.045
Father's level of education	-0.239	0.671	-0.026	0.010
Status of home	0.007	0.097	0.542	-0.004
Number of rooms in home	-0.225	0.063	-0.435	0.386
Number of people living in home	0.017	0.019	-0.024	0.500
Variance Explained by each Factor				
Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	
1.27	1.00	0.53	0.453	
Final Communality Estimates: Total 1 = 3.122				

results reported merely confirm the conceptual adequacy of the items selected. Clearly, factor one includes indicators, objective and subjective, of income. Factor two pulls together indicators of education while factor three includes only the indicator of the size of the home. Factor four only includes the number of people in the house, hardly an indicator of status by western standards. In Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, this is not so clear where the number of children constitute an indicator of prestige. The separate loading of this item in a factor of itself suggests that this constitutes a separate dimension of status.

As with the previously reported factor analyses the variance explained by this procedure is very low. We would like to explain this characteristic as revealing a lack of crystallization of the attitudes among college students in these matters. The alternative explanation appears to be that the questionnaire itself is technically defective. In fact, both these explanations amount to say the same thing. The lack of crystallization of attitudes we would like to claim only makes sense in this context in terms of how these attitudes can be measured. We have already mentioned that the questionnaire is an unfamiliar type of instrument in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, one must keep in mind that there is an individualistic bias in the questionnaire measurement of attitudes. The questions must be answered in isolation. The meaning given to assertion of individual opinions in this fashion is no doubt substantially different in Saudi

Arabia and in United States. One of the values of the current endeavor is that it will allow to examine this issue more closely (see Table 55).

Men and Women

Table 56 displays the rotated factor pattern matrixes of two factor analyses we did on those questions having to do with attitudes towards relations between men and women. We ran separate factor analyses for men and for women respondents to examine the more abstract differences which could be proposed between the way this topic is seen by men and by women.

The first observation to report is that the factor analyses do yield different results. Specifying the Eigen value unit as a cutting point four factors were generated among the women but only three among the men. We interpret this to mean that among men, the attitudes under study respond to a smaller number of more abstract principles. In other words, these attitudes have more clearly crystallized into a smaller number of clusters among men than among women. If one looks at the general distribution of the factor weights this interpretation is reinforced by the observation that the women's solution has far more items with ambiguous loadings, this is in several factors. Furthermore, this conclusion is reinforced by looking at the variance each factor explains. We see that in the men's

Table 55. Indicators of Status by Sex. Kendall Tau B's.*

	1 M	1 F	2 M	2 F	3 M	3 F	4 M	4 F	5 M	5 F	6 M	6 F	7 M	7 F	8 M	8 F
1) Father's Education	---	---	0.453	.374	0.020	.168	-0.05	.018	.138	.126	.245	.449	.212	.044	.183	.006
2) Mother's Education	0.451	.374	---	---	0.020	.016	-.05	.054	.138	.023	.102	.182	.084	.051	.072	.064
3) Status of Home	0.020	.168	.122	.016	---	---	0.066	-.134	-.281	-.199	-.125	.054	.041	.077	.045	.053
4) No. of People in Home	-0.05	-.039	.073	.054	.066	-.134	---	---	.081	.433	.004	.053	.001	.060	.002	.019
5) No. of Rooms in Home	.138	-.007	-.025	.023	-.281	-.199	.081	.443	---	---	.331	.174	.217	.079	.036	.007
6) Family Income	.245	.233	.192	.182	-.0.124	.054	-0.004	.053	.331	.174	---	---	.530	.361	.155	.223
7) Income Compared to others	.212	.153	0.084	.051	.039	.077	.001	.060	.217	.079	.530	.311	---	---	.363	.153
8) Community position of Parent	.181	.006	.072	.064	.045	.053	.002	.039	.036	.007	.155	.239	.363	.153	---	---

*Significant at the .05 level or better when above.

M = Male

F = Female

Table 56. Rotated Factor Pattern Attitudes About Relations Between Men and Women.

	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Women Removing, "Obedy" Aren't Wives Against Nature--Women Supervising Men	-0.511	-0.166	0.597	0.652	-0.036	0.291	---	0.462
Bad for Manhood if Wife Works	-0.520	0.313	0.580	0.623	0.247	0.409	---	0.174
Equality' is good but husband has main say	-0.439	0.778	-0.246	-0.279	0.575	-0.010	---	0.024
A Woman is Better off at Home vs Work	0.567	0.094	0.536	0.422	-0.093	-0.176	---	-0.713
A Woman has a Right to a Profession	0.340	0.411	0.528	0.221	-0.006	0.319	---	0.060
Husband Responsible for Wife's Reeds	0.554	-0.712	0.007	0.156	-0.217	0.407	---	0.266
Husband & wife have Equal Say in Family	0.349	-0.336	0.178	-0.128	0.715	-0.676	---	-0.394
At 17 Could Come and Go as Pleaseed	0.570	-0.430	0.131	-0.303	0.292	-0.394	---	-0.128
Variance Explained by Each Factor								
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Final Communality Estimates			
Men:	2.243	1.451	1.150	---	3.845			
Women:	1.727	1.594	1.400	1.194	5.917			

factor analysis, factor one explains 2.243% of the variance while among the women it explains only 1.727%.

Among the men, factor one pulls together five or six of the items, but three of the items also have important loadings in factor two. Factor one appears to represent a women's rights factor among the men. Factor two is almost identical with the exception that the item about equality and husbands main say so loads in this factor with more strength. Factor three among the men represents a "provider's" factor inasmuch as it clusters the husband's responsibility for the wife's needs and the damage to manhood when the wife works.

The situation with women is quite different, the first, the most important factor brings into a cluster two items that refer quite clearly to women's rights in the area of work. Factor two among the women brings into a cluster the items that referred to a woman's obedience and a woman's supervision over men. This is clearly a subordination-superordination factor among the women. Please note that while these two items loaded negatively in men's factor one in this factor among women these items load positively. While on occasion the sign of the factor loading can be accidental (specially in low magnitude loadings) depending on which side of the factor axis the item fell, in this case a perusal of the means and standard deviations and correlation matrix shows that women do in factor hold the opposite opinion to that of men in these matters. In this

procedure we included the last item in list, at seventeen I could go as I please. The idea was to use this item as a test for the meaning of the factors generated in this procedure. Our reasoning was that given that this item clearly marked a distinction between men and women--men being allowed far more freedom--the factor in which it loads might be showing a differential autonomy between men and women. If our reasoning is correct, then the fact that this question loads negatively on the women's factor two is indicative that the positive loading of the other two items represents women's more liberal attitudes than men's on this subject.

Among women, factor three includes only the item that stated that the husband was responsible for a wife's needs and factor four the item of equality being good but husband having the main say so.

In conclusion, men and women, as should be expected differ in important respects on the principles which organize their attitudes towards the relations between men and women. Most importantly, women are not in agreement with men's views concerning the meaning of their work or of their subordinate position in society (see Table 57).

Table 57. Correlation Matrix. Attitudes Towards Men and Women Relations.
Tau B's.*

	H Q58 F	H Q60 F	H Q63 F	H Q64 F	H Q67 F	H Q68 F	H Q73 F	H Q87 F	H Q85 F
Q18 Women removing "obey" after wife.	0.378 0.252 0.061 0.001 -0.024 0.035 -0.050 0.042 -0.159 0.093 -0.128 -0.006								
Q40 Equal nature women unprivileged men.	0.378 0.252 0.119 0.112 -0.019 0.112 -0.006 0.146 -0.039 -0.189 0.034 -0.024								
Q53 Bad for manhood if wife works.	0.081 0.082 0.119 0.112 0.270 -0.034 -0.068 0.169 -0.242 -0.378 -0.034 -0.082								
Q64 Equality is good but husband has main say.	-0.024 0.035 -0.019 0.132 -0.270 -0.094 0.069 0.205 -0.072 0.154 0.013 0.118 -0.113								
Q67 A woman is better off at home vs. work.	-0.050 0.142 -0.006 0.136 -0.033 0.109 0.291 0.059 0.130 -0.177 0.106 -0.013								
Q68 A woman has a right to a profession.	-0.198 0.013 -0.229 -0.189 -0.242 -0.378 0.205 -0.072 0.130 -0.177 0.067 -0.061								
Q71 Husband responsible for wife's needs.	-0.128 -0.066 0.005 -0.024 -0.014 -0.082 0.154 0.043 0.106 -0.041 0.047 -0.061								
Q87 Husband & wife have equal say in family.	-0.152 0.046 -0.163 -0.107 -0.039 -0.031 0.138 -0.133 0.069 -0.018 0.192 -0.021 0.276 0.389								
Q85 At 17 could come and go as pleased.	-0.158 -0.186 -0.187 -0.173 -0.020 0.050 0.130 -0.353 -0.041 0.021 0.269 -0.104 0.192 -0.023								
									0.114 0.047

*Significant at .05 level or better when above.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

It was with some reluctance that we embarked upon the exploratory study that we are about to conclude. We wanted to produce, on this occasion, a series of elegant analyses of causal relations and multivariate discoveries. Early in the work, though I was able to appreciate what the infancy of the social sciences in an area of the world means. Not only was I not able to lay hands on the results of the last census but after a laborious literature search we discovered that very little is known about the contemporary Saudi family and how it is faring within the process of accelerated social change that the society is undergoing. No matter how limited the results of our survey, these are among the first empirical data on which to start building hypotheses and isolating areas of social scientific concerns. Our initial reluctance has been replaced by a sense of excitement and accomplishment. We will be unable to do full justice to this conviction.

As stated in the introduction, we set to explore the impact of development and social change on society in Saudi Arabia, with an emphasis on the family. We wanted to find out if the encouragement of development could be conducted

within an Islamic society and obtain an idea, no matter how indirect, of some of the empirical parameters of the process in terms of values, beliefs and ideas. Our aim was to identify "styles of coping with social change." We expected that these styles would emerge from the results of elegant factor analyses. As it turned out the factor analyses did not contribute very much to the identification of such styles. We have interpreted this "finding" as a sign of a lack of crystallization of such styles and as the overwhelming influence of religious values in Saudi society.

In another sense, though, the idea of styles of coping with development is not an empirical reality. This is, if we asked Saudi students to tell us what is their style of coping with development they would think we are joking. The idea of types originated in our analyst's mind. This means that the reality we seek to study will not be found in the data themselves but in the patterns that we, as analysts, are able to establish in those data. What follows is a recapitulation of those patterns that we call styles.

Development Through Tradition

The first finding to underscore in these conclusions is that change is very much in evidence in the responses of students. We have seen how many more of them were born in urban centers, how a high percentage of their parents did not complete elementary school, how the number of

possessions have increased geometrically from one generation to the next. To these findings one would certainly need to add the high numbers that have traveled abroad. We have also seen how there is a tendency towards monogamy and an indication of some importance given love and romanticism. Nonetheless, these tendencies might have been in evidence for quite some time without us knowing it.

Within this context, our respondents appear to be, overall, a traditionalist lot. They show strong attachments to their home country, strong religious faith and view themselves as eminently close to their parents in some crucial values. This, not to mention the values that they hold concerning interpersonal relations, life plans, and so forth. We must confess surprise at the magnitude of some of the figures we have reported. Any visitor to Saudi Arabia will become aware that religion permeates everyday life to a great extent and that overall it is a country impregnated by traditional views. Nonetheless, the selection of university students was made because we considered them to be "agents of social change." If these are agents of social change, they are a special kind of such agents. The data we have collected do not permit us to contribute much on this topic. Nonetheless, they do contribute to our knowledge about the delineation of a research area.

When we selected Manheim ideas as a pivotal set of concepts to guide our research we expected that the students

in question would show a number of utopian traits in their ideology. Nonetheless, it appears that our students have more of ideologists concerned with the maintenance of the status quo than with the bringing about a new era. In fact, though, our data do not authorize such conclusion because we have little to compare these beliefs with. It might well be the case that within the context of Saudi society a return to the source, to traditional values and ways might well represent the style that this stratum of the population has chosen to cope with the extraordinarily accelerated rate of social change. As we belong to that stratum we are not in a position to speculate at this point. Nonetheless, in future research we intend to research more closely the ideology of modernity in Saudi Arabia.

The empirical and conceptual importance of this topic is not small, especially in Saudi Arabia. My suspicion is that the data just reported have shown us the tip of an iceberg that is aggressively begging for social scientific research. In the series of studies that could follow one will need to be careful not to fall into some of the dichotomous stereotypes much en vogue up to the middle sixties: stagnant versus developing nations, tradition versus modernity, ideology versus utopia. My contention is not that dichotomies are not useful conceptual tools but, rather, that we should be very careful not to assume an empirical radical contradiction when doing research. As Rudolph and Rudolph (1971:42) have put it, "The assumption

that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of modernity as it is found in modern societies and a misapprehension of the relationship between them." Not only have students of "modern" societies increasingly stressed traditional "survivals" but students of "traditional" societies have stressed their modern elements.

Mechanical and Organic Solidarity

Practitioners of the social sciences who will labor in the "developing nations" will need to be guided by a triple theoretical awareness. On the one hand we will need to "adapt" the Western social scientific thinking to fit our research needs. On the other, we will need to be careful not to superimpose extraneous conceptualizations. Finally, we will need to be careful not to reject frameworks just because of their foreignness.

A good example of how this triple theoretical awareness has to do with our findings related to religion and types of identity. We have found repeatedly that religion is a paramount concern in almost every aspect of life that we researched, identity, interpersonal relations, personal goals, work plans, education, family relations and so forth. We have interpreted the religious identity as a type of mechanical solidarity, but one that is not confined to the national borders of Saudi Arabia. The more organic types of

. solidarity to the tribe and to the nation did not achieve the importance that being a Muslim achieved.

Durkheim's insight into mechanical solidarity is strictly applicable only to the primitive "Horde" in its pure form. Nonetheless, when applied to the actual social forms under consideration the solidarity with Islam is considered mechanical because it is fundamentally based on the practice of identical beliefs, and an identical life style. Tribal membership, by definition, is a differentiated membership. Besides the designations of different kin, a tribe member is born into a complex of interdependent roles and hierarchies. Ibn Khaldun, as presented by Iassawi (1963) noted that the extent an empire varies directly with the strength of the original solidarity which created it, and, inversely with the power of the solidarities it confronts. States can only arise from original solidarity, but as it becomes established, solidarity decreases due to the custom of unbroken authority. This process makes the state vulnerable to change and to decay. In the early stages, the state derived from tribal types of solidarity that emphasized cohesiveness and fraternity in the participation of people in government. With time, this decreases and the ruler becomes absolute. Khaldun says that the natural end of solidarity is sovereignty. In more modern terminology we would say that the end of solidarity is autocracy in government.

These ideas seem to give support to a modern participatory democracy, but they also give support to a government based on the concensus of the tribes. This is why the Saudi Arabian government has maintained some obvious tribal structures of government, such as the Majeles. The tribal solidarity that these open public meetings enact is still strong as our data indicate. We have seen this tribal solidarity as a form of organic solidarity when contrasted to the religious types of solidarity manifested in the coalescence about a Muslim identity. Needless to say, when contrasted with the solidarity of workers in a factory, tribal solidarity would need to be treated as a mechanical type of solidarity. What we are doing with these ways of conceptualizing solidarity is to remove Durkheim's evolutionary perspective and conceive of a social order as being based both on organic and mechanical solidarity. These types do not seem contradictory, nor is mechanical solidarity a fossil of a primitive era. Rather, both types need to coexist in a social fabric.

Bendix (1978) notes that Muhammad's original appeal was to faith rather than kinship. He originally, when the prophet gained adherents to new faith, the traditional tribal solidarity was broadened to all muslims. They are a single community (Umma). This appeal to faith rather than kinship as the basis of the community represents the other great break with tradition. Muhammad extended tribal beliefs and practices to the entire community of believers.

The doctrine of the Umma, the community of Muslims, is the basic political concept of Islam. All members of that community are bound together by ties of religion rather than race or kinship, since all profess their belief in Allah and in the mission of His prophet.

To insist, the exploratory nature of our data merely suggests directions of research. One of these directions, in our opinion, is that of the future of tribal solidarities. We have seen how these solidarities are very much in evidence, even though they are not as important as other types of solidarity. Urbanization has not brought about the demise of tribal identity but rather relocated it. I plan to continue this research along two directions. On the first we would like to research the "survival" of tribal solidarity in the city of Riyadh. Very much as reported by Vidich and Bensman (1960) and Gans (1972) for U.S. cities, the city of Riyahd has inherited a number of tribal integrating symbols and mechanisms. For example, in planning my future residence I have given paramount importance to being near my relatives. This manifestation of solidarity is not without competition because, in my case, the University I work for has given me, free of charge, a lot near my work place. This puts me in the center of two conflicting forces that can be conceptualized as tribal solidarity and instrumental solidarity. This micro conflict is being enacted throughout society in a much larger scale. How long will it be before the Saudi Arabians totally surrender their rural

tribal identities? Do we, as a nation want this? What functions could a tribal identity perform in urban society? What other social traits, customs and institutions will need to go with tribal identities and solidarities?

Motivation to Achieve

Throughout our study we have found that the university students in our sample appears to be very idealistic. Most strikingly there appear to be little impulse for monetary and personal gain. If anything, greater riches and income are seen as a divine reward for hard work and as a way to enhance their quality of life. The students, though are far from exhibiting an achievement motivation, a notion so popular in studies of development. This is not the place to embark upon a discussion of this topic in any extension. Nonetheless, we must conclude with a reflection on social change, the family and Saudi Arabia. Our idea of achievement motivation is that presented by McCleland (1951). In this conceptualization achievement motivation is a way to measure mobilization for development. Psychologically this notion amounts to what people want out of life and includes the view of a potential for increasing the range and the quality of their aspirations.

No doubt that Saudi Arabia, measured by the attitudes of these students, is mobilized toward religious and intellectual aspirations. These are hardly the motivations towards accelerated economic development. Nonetheless, we

must keep in mind that the mobilization of these students is really not tied to the development potential of Saudi Arabia. This has not been completely realized by university policy makers who are quite concerned with developing programs to give incentives for students to go into more productive professions and move away from the humanistic pursuits which are the most popular today. This will require the examination of attitudes which originate ultimately in traditional western ideas about development.

A so called First World of development is a cluster of nations that were "naturally" transformed from feudalism into development forms with a preponderance of private ownership of means of production (Horowitz, 1972). These nations of Western Europe had their take off stage about the sixteenth century in the banking houses of Italy and the mid sized industry of the seventeenth century and in the industrial mechanization of the United States and Germany in the eighteenth century. The economic emphasis is on technology, industrialization, public enrichment and public welfare.

The Second World of development is historically the Soviet Union and its block. Here the movement was from feudalism to socialism. Russia had just a very brief 25-year period of capitalism. The Third World is a collection of nations that have been associated variously since 1955. Here we find a mixture of different adaptations of capitalism and socialism. The Third World has also been called the developing world, the transitional world, the

world on the way to development, and so forth. These terms want to indicate the transitional nature of these societies.

Saudi Arabia fits none of these Worlds, at least since 1973 in which the well documented change in the price of oil brought an unparalleled amount of wealth to the country. It is not an exaggerated to say that this generation does not need the impetus of aspirations for personal enrichment to propel development. Development in Saudi Arabia depends more directly on the oil wealth under its territory. Within this context the idealism of the students in our sample for religious and intellectual pursuits could well have the most realistic ideology.

APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC

عزيزي الطالب

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

ومن

هذا الاستبيان سمي للحصول على أنكارات وآراء حول التنمية وعلاقتها بالأسرة في المملكة العربية السعودية من خلال نظرية طلاب وطالبات الجامعات والكلجيات السعودية ، ويكون اجابتك ومشاركتك ساهمة في رسالتي للدكتوراة في "علم الاجتماع" التي ستقدمها إلى جامعة فلوريدا في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية .

وكما تعلم فإن علم الاجتماع هو دراسة علمية للمجتمع ، وتفاعل الناس وعلاقتهم الاجتماعية مع بعضهم ، وكذلك كيفية تعرفنا على العالم من حولنا .
وأود أن أؤكد لك أن اجابتك ستكون سرية وسوف تستعمل في البحث وللحث
نقط على أساس تعميقي وليس عن فرد بعينه ، ولهذا فلا يملي المطلوب منك كتابة
الاسم أو التوقيع أو ما يدل على شخصيتك الذاتية .

والمرجو أن يخدم هذا البحث التنمية الشاملة في مجتمعنا ، فتأمل العرض على
اجابة جميع الأسئلة ، وإذا لم تتأكد من إجابة سؤال "ما" فأرجو اختيار الجواب الذي
يقلب على ظنك أنه الجواب المناسب . وهناك ورقة خالية ملحقة في آخر هذا
الاستبيان وضعت لتنكتب عليها أي ملاحظة أو نقد أو آراء أخرى .

إن نجاح هذا البحث يتطلب المشاركة الفعالة منك بالإجابة على جميع
أسئلة هذا الاستبيان بدقة وعناية ، وأقدم شكري الجزيل والله المونق .

أخوك

ابراهيم سارك الجويمر

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

عزيزتي الطالبة

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته . . . وبعد

هذا الاستبيان سمي للحصول على أنكاري وأراك حول التنمية وعلاقتها بالأسرة في السلالة العربية السعودية ، من خلال نظرة طلاب وطالبات الجامعات والكليات في السلوك ، وتساهم اجابت وشاركت في رسالتي للدكتوراة في علم الاجتماع التي ستقدم إن شاء الله إلى جامعة فلوريدا في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية . وكما تعلمون ، فإن علم الاجتماع هو دراسة علمية للمجتمع وتفاعل الناس وعلاقتهم الاجتماعية مع بعضهم وكذلك كيفية تعرفنا على العالم من حولنا .

انني أود أن أؤكد أن اجابت ستكون سرية وسوف تستعمل في البحث وللبحث نقط على أساس تعميقي وليس عن ذرء بعيته ، ولهذا قلبي المطلوب منك كتابة الاسم أو التوقيع أو ما يدل على شخصيتك الذاتية .

والمرجو أن يخدم هذا البحث : التنمية الشاملة التي مجتمنا نأمل الحصول على احاجة جميع الأسئلة واذا لم تتأكد من اجابة سؤال " ما " فأرجو اختيار الجواب الذي ينطب على ظنك أنه الجواب المناسب . وهناك ورقة خالية ملحقة في نهاية هذا الاستبيان وضعت لتنكتبي عليها أى ملاحظة أو نقد أو آراء أخرى ان تجاح هذا البحث يتطلب منك المشاركة الفعالة بالاجابة على جميع أسئلة هذا الاستبيان بدقة وعناية ، أقدم شكري الجزيل والله الموفق .

ملاحظة :

أخوك

ابراهيم سارك الجوير

أرجو عزيزتي الطالبة أن تتفاوض عن استخدام ضمير المذكر في كثير من صيغة الأسئلة أو العبارات لأن الاستبيان مقدم للطلاب والطلاب ولكنني أادي وزمينا أن أكتب صيغتين ، ووثقت في تفهمك وقد يدرك فأرجو أن تعتبر كل سؤال موجه إليك بأى صيغة كانت . كما أمل التفاوض عن بعض العبارات التي قد لا ينبع ظاهرها المرأة فالقصد معرفة ورد الفعل من الجنسين تجاه مثل هذه الأسئلة . وأشكرك مرة أخرى .

- (١) المستوى الدراسي _____
 (٢) التخصص _____
 (٣) العمر _____
 (٤) الجنس _____ (ذكر) — (أنثى)
 (٥) مكان الولادة _____

(٦) أين تقطن أسرتك الآن (اسم المدينة أو القرية) _____
 (٧) كم مرّ على إقامتك بالرياض؟ _____
 (٨) أقل من سنة _____ أو أكثر (عدد السنوات) _____
 هل تعتبر نفسك ابن مدينة أو قرية (حدد بعلامة / على المكان المناسب)
 ١- مدينة _____ ٢- قرية _____

(٩) فع علامة / على حالة واحدة من الحالات التي تصف حالتك الاجتماعية؟
 أ - أعزب _____
 ب - متزوج _____
 ج - مطلق _____
 د - أرسل _____
 هـ - فراق مؤقت (خلاف زوجي) _____

(١٠) متى وهذه هي حالتك الاجتماعية (علم بـ / على واحدة من فنفك)
 أقل من سنة _____ أكثر (حدد عدد السنوات) _____
 إذا كنت متزوجاً أو في حالة فراق مؤقت أو مطلق فكم مرة تزوجت؟ (علام بـ / على واحدة)
 لم أتزوج بعد فلا زلت أعزب _____ أو _____ (عدد مرات الزواج)

(١١) هل سبق وأن سافرت خارج المملكة؟ (فضلًا علم بـ / على المكان المناسب)
 نعم () لا ()

(١٢) إذا كان الجواب على السؤال السابق "نعم" فكم عدد المرات التي غادرت
 فيها المملكة؟ _____ عدد المرات _____

(١٤) ماذَا يَعْمَلُ أَوْ كَانْ يَعْمَلُ أَبُوكِ؟ (فضلاً حدد نوع العمل بدقة قدر الامكان)

(١٥) فضلاً ضع علامة / على الوصف المناسب لوالديك واكتب الاجابة عنهم ؟

١- () والدی أحیاً كهـما

٢- () أبـن تونس وعـرـفـهـ :

٣- () ابـن تونـيـتـ وعـرـهـاـ :

(١٦) فضلاً ضع علامة / واحدة على الوصف المناسب الذي ينطبق على أسرتك

نـى الأـوـصـافـ التـالـيـهـ :

١- () زوجـانـ وـأـوـلـادـهـاـ يـعـيـشـونـ حـيـيـمـاـ نـقـطـهـ،ـ (ـأـوـلـادـ تـعـنـيـ

الـابـنـاتـ)ـ

٢- () زوجـانـ وـأـوـلـادـهـاـ وـوـالـدـىـ أـحـدـ الزـوـجـيـنـ يـعـيـشـ جـيـيـمـاـ ،ـ

٣- () أـبـ مـطـلـقـ أـوـنـىـ حـالـةـ نـرـاقـ مـؤـتـقـ يـعـيـشـ معـ أـوـلـادـهـ ،ـ

٤- () أـمـ مـطـلـقـ أـوـنـىـ حـالـةـ نـرـاقـ مـؤـتـقـ يـعـيـشـ معـ أـوـلـادـهـ .ـ

٥- () أـمـ مـطـلـقـ أـوـنـىـ حـالـةـ نـرـاقـ مـؤـتـقـ يـعـيـشـ معـ أـوـلـادـهـ وـوـالـدـهـاـ .ـ

٦- () أـبـ مـطـلـقـ أـوـنـىـ حـالـةـ نـرـاقـ مـؤـتـقـ يـعـيـشـ معـ أـوـلـادـهـ وـوـالـدـيـهـ .ـ

٧- () غـيرـ ذـلـكـ (ـفـضـلـاـ وـضـحـ)ـ

(١٧) مـكـانـ مـيـلـادـ أـبـيـكـ (ـالـدـيـنـةـ أـوـ الـقـرـيـةـ مـنـ فـلـكـ)

(١٨) مـكـانـ مـيـلـادـ أـمـكـ (ـ"ـ"ـ"ـ")ـ

(١٩) كـمـ كـانـ عـرـأـبـيـكـ ،ـ وـأـمـكـ عـنـدـ وـلـادـتـكـ بـالـتـقـرـيـبـ ؟ـ

أـبـوـكـ (ـسـنـهـ)ـ أـمـكـ (ـسـنـهـ)ـ

(٢٠) كـمـ عـدـدـ أـخـوـاتـ وـاخـوـاتـ ؟ـ

عـدـدـ الـاخـوـاتـ (ـعـدـدـ الـاخـوـاتـ)ـ

(٢١) معظم أفراد جماعتنا يمتهنون والدي (ضع علامه ✓ على مكان واحد فقط يليه المناسب)

- ١ () من الناس المهمين جداً .
 - ٢ () من الناس المهمين .
 - ٣ () من عامة الناس .
 - ٤ () أقل من عامة الناس .
 - ٥ () لا أهمية لهم على الإطلاق .
-

(٢٢) ما هو أعلى مستوى تعليمي اكتله أبوك أو أمك (علم بـ ✓ على المكان المناسب لكل منها مرة واحدة فقط)

- | | | |
|-------|-------|---------------------------------------|
| الأم | الأب | |
| _____ | _____ | -١ لا يقرأ ولا يكتب |
| _____ | _____ | -٢ بعض التعليم البدائي * |
| _____ | _____ | -٣ الشهادة الابتدائية |
| _____ | _____ | -٤ الشهادة المتوسطة (الثانوية العامة) |
| _____ | _____ | -٥ الشهادة الثانوية |
| _____ | _____ | -٦ بعض التعليم الجامعي |
| _____ | _____ | -٧ الشهادة الجامعية |
| _____ | _____ | -٨ ماجستير |
| _____ | _____ | -٩ دكتوراة |
-

(٢٣) حدد بوضع علامه ✓ على المكان المناسب الذي يصف عمل أمك حينما كنت في فترة النبو :

- ١ () لا عمل لها خارج المنزل
 - ٢ () كان لها عمل خارج المنزل وهو (حدد)
-

- (٢٤) ما هو نوع السكن الذي تسكنه أسرتك في الوقت الحاضر؟ (ضع علامة / على المسكن المناسب)
- ١- () فيلا
 - ٢- () شقة
 - ٣- () بيت شعبي (عادي)
 - ٤- () صندة (كخ أو غرفة واحدة)

- (٢٥) اختر واحداً من أنواع السكن التالية التي تصف سكناً "أنت" في الرياض؟
- ١- () السكن الجامعي
 - ٢- () شقة أو بيت مستأجر
 - ٣- () تسكن مع والدك
 - ٤- () تسكن مع أخوانك أو أحد هم
 - ٥- () تسكن مع أحد أقاربك (حدى من هو)

- (٢٦) المنزل الذي تسكنه أسرتي ملك () أو مستأجر () فضع علامة / على السكان المناسب)

(٢٧) عدد الأفراد يسكنون في المنزل : _____

(٢٨) عدد الغرف التي يحتويها المنزل (بما في ذلك الحمامات والمغذن) _____

- (٢٩) أشرب / على واحد من الاختيارات التالية التي توضح الدخل الشهري لاسرتكم من المصادر جميعها :

- ١- () أقل من ٣٠٠٠ ريال سعودي ٦ - () من ٨١٠٠ - ٩٠٠٠
- ٢- () من ٣٠٠٠ - ٥٠٠٠ ٧ - () من ٩١٠٠ - ١٠٠٠
- ٣- () من ٥٠٠٠ - ٦٠٠٠ ٨ - () من ١٠١٠٠ - ١١٠٠٠
- ٤- () من ٦١٠٠ - ٧٠٠٠ ٩ - () أكثر من ١٢٠٠٠ ١٠ - () من ٧١٠٠ - ٨٠٠٠

٣٠) ساكنة مع دخل أسر زملائهم الآخرين في الكلية يعتبر دخل أسرتي (نفلا
اختر واحداً وضع علامة / في المكان المناسب)

- ١) واحداً من أعلى مستويات الدخل في البلاد
- ٢) أعلى من المعدل لعموم الناس
- ٣) المعدل (دخل عادي)
- ٤) أقل من المعدل
- ٥) واحداً من أقل مستويات الدخل في البلاد

(٢١) هل تهتم كثيرا لأى قبيلة تتبع ؟ (أشربـ) فى الموضع المناسب

() لا () نعم

فلا اذکر اسم قبیلک (۳۲)

(٢٣) فضلاً اذكر كم مرة يذهب أبوك وتهب انت الى المسجد (فع علامه)
 لكل منكما في الموضع المناسب) | أبوك || انت

- ١- خمس صرات في اليوم .

٢- بعض أوقات الصلاة على الأقل مرة واحدة في اليوم .

٣- الجمعة فقط .

٤- بعض الجميع على الأقل مرة واحدة في الشهر .

٥- أقل من مرة في الشهرين ولكن أكثر من مرتين في السنة .

٦- مرتان في السنة .

٧- في المناسبات فقط (كحضور جنازة ونحوها) أقل

من مرتين في السنة .

٨- لا زهاب مطلقاً .

(٤٤) أسرى فقيرة جدا لا تستطيع أن تشتري لى بعض أنواع من الأشياء التي احتاجها.

() لا () نعم

(٣٥) الشخص الذى أريد أن أتزوجه (ها) يعنى أن يتزوج من أسرة أخرى أعلى من مستوى أسرتي (أشعر بـ على الموضع المناسب)
نعم () لا ()

- (٣٦) في أي سن من عمرك تتوقع أن تتزوج ؟ _____ (نفلاحدد عمرك بالسنوات)
(٣٧) في أي سن من عمرك تتوقع أن يكون لك أطفالاً _____ (نفلاحدد عمرك بالسنوات)
(٣٨) كم تتوقع أن يكون عدد أطفالك في المستقبل إن شاء الله ؟ _____ (نفلا عدد الأطفال) .

(٣٩) هل تتابع أن تتزوج من أسرة في غير مستوى أسرتك (قبيلى من خصيري والعكس ثالثاً) (نفلا اختر واحدة بوضع علامة / على الاختيار المناسب)
١- () لا أمانع اذا وافقت أسرتي
٢- () لا أمانع اذا كانت الاسرة الاخرى غنية
٣- () لا أمانع اذا لم يكن الزوج سبب مشكلات مع قبيلتى أو جامعتى .
٤- () لا أمانع على الاطلاق
٥- () نعم أمانع على الاطلاق
٦- () غير ذلك (فضلا وض)

(٤٠) رتب الانتماءات التالية حسب أهميتها بالنسبة لك الانتماء الذي تود أن تعرف به أو تنتسب اليه . استعمل الأرقام من ١-٢ لتوسيع اختياراتك .
الرقم ٢ = اكثير أهمية والرقم ١ = أقل أهمية .
١- ابن أو بنت أبي _____ ٢- ابن أو بنت قبيلتي _____
٣- سعودي _____ ٤- عرب _____
٥- سلم _____ ٦- مواطن عالي _____
٧- غير ذلك (فضلا وض)

اختر شخصا واحدا لكل قضية من القضايا الأسرية التالية بوضع دائرة حول الرقم المخصص لكل شخص؟

		قضايا أسرية								
		غير ما ذكر	الزوج	المهتم	المدقق	الأخت	الأخ	الأم	الأب	
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤١) أكثر من تعتزم من الناس
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٢) أقرب الناس اليك
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٣) سائلة النصيحة كيف تسير أمور الأسرة .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٤) سائلة النصيحة في اختبار الزوج المناسب
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٥) تتنعرف منه على نفهم الوضاع السياسي
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٦) سائلة عن الأمور الدينية
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٧) تذهب اليه لغض النزاع بين أسرتك والجيران
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	٦					(٤٨) تذهب اليه لغض الخلاف الأسري بين أفراد الأسرة

(٤٩) عند عزم انشان على الزواج فان عدة عوامل يأخذها الانسان في الحسبان نهين يكون شريك الحياة ، وهذه العوامل تؤثر في قرار ذلك الانسان . أدناه عدة عوامل . فضلاً رتب هذه العوامل مستعملًا للأرقام من ١٠-١ لتبين أهمية تلك العوامل على قرارك في اختيار الطرف الثاني في الزواج ، الرقم = ١٥ = أهم الأشياء والرقم ١ = أقلها أهمية ، فضلاً حدد ذلك بالنسبة لك وبالنسبة لوالديك كذا هو موضع أدناه .
١ - ترتيب العوامل :
٢ - ترتيب العوامل :

(٥٠) نـي رـأـيك : ما هـو العـمر المـثـالـي لـزـواـج كـل مـن الرـجـل وـالـمـرـأـة ؟
 الرـجـل _____ (العـمر بـالـسـنـوـات) الـمـرـأـة _____ (العـمر بـالـسـنـوـات)

(٥١) لو خيرتني العمل المناسب لك بعد التخرج فأى الأعمال التالية تفضلها على غيرها ؟ (فضلاً اختر عملاً واحداً فقط)

- ١) عالم في العلوم الدينية -٤) دبلوماسي
 -٢) محرر ، صحافي -٥) رياضي (لاعب رياضة)
 -٣) مدرس -٦) صاحب أعمال خاصة

٧- غير ذلك (فضلاً وضح)

(٥٢) من خلال خبرتك الواقعية مع اسرتك ما مدى الصلاحيات (السلطات) التي ترى أن كلاما من أفراد الأسرة المذكورين أدناه يجب أن تكون له من ناحية، والتي يمتلك بها نوعاً من ناحية أخرى . استعمل الأرقام ١ - ٥ - ٥ لبيان موقعك : الرقم ٥ = كامل الصلاحيات والرقم ١ = أقل الصلاحيات (فلا استخدم الرقم مرتين واحدة في كل خانة) .

الواقع	ما يجب أن يكون	
_____	_____	الأب
_____	_____	الأم
_____	_____	الأخ
_____	_____	الأخت
_____	_____	الجد أو الجدة
_____	_____	الزوج أو الزوجة
_____	_____	الأقارب

(٥٣) اعط درجه مناسبة لندرجه الموده التي يجب أن تكون والتي تشعر بها نعلاقي الواقع لكل فرد من أفراد الأسرة المذكورين أدناه . استعمل الأرقام من ١ - ٥ لبيان موقعك . الرقم ٥ = أعلى مشاعر المودة . والرقم ١ = أقل المشاعر (فلا استعمل الرقم مرتين واحدة لكل خانة) .

الواقع	الواجب	
_____	_____	الأب
_____	_____	الأم
_____	_____	الأخ
_____	_____	الأخت
_____	_____	الجد أو الجدة
_____	_____	الزوج أو الزوجة
_____	_____	الأقارب

- (٥٤) علم بـ ✓ على موقف من الموقف التالية الذي ترى أنه أعمل موقف تتخذه في حاله الصراع بين أفراد أسرتك وأفراد أسرة أخرى (اختر واحداً فقط)
- ١- () إعمل علش أن تفوز أسرتك في هذا الصراع .
 - ٢- () ساعد أسرتك اذا كانت على الحق فقط .
 - ٣- () الزم جانب العياد .
 - ٤- () ساعد الجانب الذي سمع الحق .
 - ٥- () اعمل بالسلطة الرسمية .
 - ٦- () غير ذلك (وضح)

- (٥٥) ما أهميه اطلاقك على ما يحدث في المناطق التالية (ضع دائرة على الرقم المناسب في المكان المناسب لتوضح مدى أهميه معركتك لما يحدث)

غير مهم	غير مهم	مهم	مهم	المنطقة
غير اخلاقي	على الاخلاقي			
٤	٢	٢	١	١- في المملكة العربية السعودية
٤	٢	٢	١	٢- في العالم الاسلامي
٤	٢	٢	١	٣- في العالم أجمع

- (٥٦) لو خيرت بأن تعمل في أحد أو بعض المناطق التالية فما هي تلك المناطق تجده أن تعمل ؟ (أشر بـ ✓ على واحد أو أكثر حسب رغبتك أمام كل منطقة من المناطق التي تجده أولى / أن تعمل بها)

لا	نعم	تجده
_____	_____	١- المملكة العربية السعودية
_____	_____	٢- الدول العربية
_____	_____	٣- الدول الاسلامية غير العربية
_____	_____	٤- اوروبا الغربية
_____	_____	٥- اوروبا الشرقية
_____	_____	٦- الولايات المتحدة الامريكية
_____	_____	٧- غير ذلك (فضلاً حدد)

(٥٢) هل تصدق الأخبار من محطات الراديو التالية (نعم دائرية على نعم أو لا لكل محطة)

راديو السعودية - راديو المحطات العربية - صوت أمريكا
نعم ، لا نعم ، لا نعم ، لا

هنا لندن - راديو موسكو
نعم ، لا

ستجد أدناه عدداً من العبارات التي تناقش عدداً من الموضوعات ، فضلاً
حدد موقفك من كل عبارة بوضع دائرة على الرقم المناسب في الموقف المعتبر عن
موقفك .

العبارة	موقف جداً	مواقف	أو مسترد	غير موافق	قطعاً
(٥٨)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١
(٥٩)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١
(٦٠)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١
(٦١)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١
(٦٢)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١
(٦٣)	٥	٤	٣	٢	١

قطعاً	غير موافق	غير موافق	لا أعرف	موافق	موافق جداً	العبارة
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٤) الساواه بين الرجل وزوجته أمر محسود ولكن على العموم تبقى كله الفضل نى أمور الأسرة للرجل .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٥) أعتقد أن مخالفة الشرع الالهي أخطر من مخالفه القانون البشري .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٦) يجب على أحد الأبناء المتزوجين - على الأقل - أن يعيش مع والديه نى بيت واحد .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٧) في الغالب الأفضل للمرأة أن تكون ربه بيت متفرغة على أن تعمل خارج المنزل .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٨) يجب أن تعطى المرأة الحق في السمع لاكتساب أي مهنة والعمل بها اذا أرادت ذلك ،
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٦٩) يجب على الشخص أن يخفف عن والديه عن طريق سعادته لأخوه و أخيه الأصغر منه سنا اذا احتاجوا الى ذلك ،
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٧٠) أعتقد أن الله قد قررني عليه الاولي كل شيء للإنسان ، ولكن من خلال عمل الإنسان الطيب قد يستطيع الآخرون من الحكم عليه
١	٢	٣	٤	٥		(٧١) اخوة العقيدة الاسلامية أهـ وأقوى من اخوة النسب .

غير موافق قطعاً	غير موافق	ألاذرى أو متعدد في الموقف	موافق	موافق جداً	العبارة
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٢) أَهْمَ شِئْ فِي الْحَيَاةِ أَنْ تَعْقُل النجاح فِي أى مَجَالٍ بِخَفْفَ النَّظَرِ كَيْفَ تَعْقُلُ ذَلِكَ النَّجَاحَ،
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٣) مِنْ سَؤْلِيَّةِ الرَّجُلِ أَنْ يَعْتَقِلَ الْأَكْفَانَ بِرُسْنِ عَاطِفَيْنَا وَادِيَا لِزَوْجَتِهِ -
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٤) اسْتَرْتَ تَؤْثِرُ عَلَى طَمَوْحَاتِي وَطَلْمَعَاتِي وَ
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٥) إِذَا كَتَبْتَ فِي رِوَايَا فَأَنْعَلْ مَا يَنْعَلِهُ أَهْلُ رِوَايَا
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٦) لَا يَجُوزُ لِلشَّخْصِ أَنْ يَحْتَقِلَ النجاح مِنْ غَيْرِ مَرَاعَاةِ التَّعَالِيمِ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةِ فِي كِبِيرَةِ وَنَسْعَ تَحْقِيقِ النَّجَاحِ
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٧) سَأُكُونُ غَيْرَ سَعِيدٍ لَوْ عَثَرْتَ بِعِدَا عَنْ أَقْارِبِي وَ
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٨) أَنْفَلْ أَنْ أَكُونَ عَالِمًا كَبِيرًا عَلَى أَنْ أَكُونَ غَنِيًّا جَدًا مَالِيًّا
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٢٩) نَجَاحُ الْأَنْسَانِ فِي الْحَيَاةِ يَعْتَدِدُ كَثِيرًا عَلَى مَكَانِهِ أَسْرَهُ أَوْ أَسْرَةِ زَوْجَتِهِ (زَوْجَهَا) ،
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٣٠) حِيثُ أَنْ كُلُّ شِئْ بِيَدِ اللَّهِ فَلَا يَجْبُ عَلَى الْأَنْسَانِ أَنْ يَعْمَلْ بِجَهْدِ كَبِيرٍ

المساره	جد ١	موافق	موقنه	أو متردد في الموقف	غير موافق	غير موافق	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعاً
(٨١) مستوى التعليمي سيساعدني على أن أنتقل بعيداً عن مجاعتي في خلال خمس سنوات القادمة ،	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٢) القرآن هو المدر الألهى الدائم لمن وساعده لمن نبي سلوك أفضل السبل لتحقيق أفضل النتائج .	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٣) أشعر بالارتياح عندما أخلو بنفسي بعيداً عن الآخرين ،	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٤) لا أؤيد أن أصرف وقت وجهدي لمساعدة الآخرين ،	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٥) عندما كنت في السابعة عشر من عمري كنت استطيع الخروج من البيت والعود إليه خفي أى وقت أشاء ،	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٦) أعتقد أن الإنسان يحتاج إلى أن يعمل لكن يشعر أنه مهم وأن له مكانة في هذا العالم.	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٧) الزوج وزوجته متساويان في الحقوق والواجبات ولهمذا فلا بد أن يكون لها نفس المكانة في القرار حول الأمور الزوجية .	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			
(٨٨) الله يثيب على العمل بجد وجهد .	٥	٤	٣	٢	١			

غير مواتق قطعيا	غير مواتق	لا ادرى او متردد	موافق	موافق جدا	العبارة
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٨٩) اعتقد أني يجب أن أهتم بنفسى واسرتي وليس بالآخرين وأسرهم بل ادع كلابي هم بنفسه وأسرته .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٠) أنا لا أهتم بآراء الآخرين اذا كنت متأكدا من أني نحو تحقيق أهدافى .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩١) النهاية المميدة من العمل هو أن أكسب أكبر قدر من النقود .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٢) لأنظفالنا الحق ليقرروا معظم أمور حياتهم بأنفسهم بعمر بلغتهم سن الخامسة عشرة .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٣) أباً غير رأس أو طريقة سلوكي لارض الآخرين
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٤) البنات نى الاسره يجب أن يتزوجن حسب رغبتهن لاحسب رغبة أسرتهن .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٥) بعض الشباب لم يتسكوا بالدين لأن حرية الاختيار لم تتح لهم .
١	٢	٣	٤	٥	(٩٦) لقد كتب للإنسان في القدر إن كان من أصحاب الجنة أو من أصحاب النار .

زوجه واحد	زوجات زوجات	ثلاث زوجات زوجات	أربع زوجات زوجات	ضع دائره على الرقم المناسب للموقف المناسب الثالث :
١	٢	٣	٤	(٩٢) كم عدد الزوجات اللاتن كن لدى أبيك في وقت واحد أولدها الان ؟
١	٢	٣	٤	(٩٨) كم زوجة تتوقع أن يكون لدىك في وقت واحد ؟ (السؤال للرجل فقط)
١	٢	٣	٤	(٩٩) كم زوجه ستستعين ، أو تتوقعن أن يأخذ زوجتك بما في ذلك أينت في وقت واحد ؟ (السؤال للمرأة فقط)
١	٢	٣	٤	(١٠٠) كم زوجة تتوقع (تتوقعين) أن يكون لدى ابنك في وقت واحد ؟ (السؤال للمنسجع)
(١٠١) باستعمال الارقام من ١-٥ مصلا حدد بالترتيب أهمية الاشياء التالية نسبيا الميل بالنسبة اليك ، الرقم ٥ يعني الاقل والرقم ١ يعني الاكثر أهمية. رقم من ١ الى ٥ حسب الاهميه : () المكانة المرموقة () الراتب () العمل الانتاجي () خدمة الاسلام () خدمة المجتمع				

(١٠٢) أي الاشياء المذكورة أدناه التي ملتها أو يملكتها نف عمرك الاشخاص المذكورين
أدناء وأي الاشياء تتوقع أن اطفالك سيملكون نف عمرك من الاشياء التالية
(ضع علامه / على الشيء أو الاشياء المناسبة)

الأشياء	أنت	والديك	اجدارك	أولادك
ستريو	—	—	—	—
سيارة	—	—	—	—
تلفزيون	—	—	—	—
فندق	—	—	—	—
ثلاجة	—	—	—	—
تلفون	—	—	—	—
نيلا	—	—	—	—
تعليم جامعي	—	—	—	—
مكتبة منزلية (أكثر من 50 كتابا)	—	—	—	—
سفر للخارج للسياحة	—	—	—	—

(١٠٤) اختر من المصادر التالية ، المصادر التي تأخذ منها معظم معلومات عما يحدث في المناطق التالية من العالم (ضع علامة ✓ واحدة أمام كل منطقة تحت المدار المناسب)

الاسلام	العالم																		

اذا اخترت " مصادر أخرى " فنلا وضح :

(١٠٥) نفلا ضع علامة ✓ على واحد من الاراء التالية التي توافق أو تحدد رأيك بالتقريب؟

- ١ () السلة يجب أن تحاول قدر المستطاع بأن تكون مثل الدول الصناعية في الغرب .
- ٢ () السلة يجب أن تغدو قديماً في طريق التسلب مع التأكيد من المحافظة على النهج الاسلامي .
- ٣ () السلة يجب ألا تتتطور بل تعود إلى ما كانت عليه .

(١٠٦) (هذا السؤال خاص بالطالبات الجامعيات فقط)
نفلا ضع علامة ✓ على واحد من الاراء التالية الذي هو أكثر تعبير عن مخططك بعد التخرج .

- ١ () بعد تخرجي لن أعمل خارج المنزل بأي حال من الاحوال .
- ٢ () أتوقع أن أصل بعد التخرج إلى أن أتزوج .
- ٣ () أتوقع أن أعمل حتى بعد الزواج إلى أن أرزق بطفل وأطفال .
- ٤ () سأعمل بعد التخرج على طول .

(١٠٧) (هذا السؤال لكل طالب وطالبة)
ما هو المعدل الدراسي الفعلى أو المستوى لك في الكلية ؟

شكراً على تجاوبكم وتعاونكم ، واذ كرم أن الممنحة التالية مخصمه للتعليل
بالاراء الاخرى التي لم ذكر في هذا الاستبيان وتودوا أن تخبيئوها هنا ...

ملاحظات وآراء

APPENDIX B
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Student:

This questionnaire is designed to obtain your ideas and opinions about the Saudi Arabian family. Your participation will contribute to a Ph.D. dissertation in Sociology to be presented to the University of Florida in the U.S.A.

As you know, Sociology is the scientific study of society. It is concerned with the interaction of people in groups and how we gain insights into the world around us and human relations. What we learn from studies such as this one, in which you are being asked to participate, can be used to improve our society.

There are no identifications of any sort on this questionnaire. To completely protect your anonymity, please do not sign your name. Your answers will be confidential and will be used only for the research purposes. Please be sure to answer every question. If you are not sure, but can make a reasonable guess, please do so. The blank sheet at the end of the questionnaire is for your comments or further opinions.

The success of the research work depends on your completing the questionnaire to the best of your ability. I hope, therefore, that you will fill out the questionnaire with care.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you!

Sincerely,

Ibrahim M. Al Juwayer

1. Level of your study _____
2. Major _____
3. Age _____
4. Sex _____ (Male) _____ (Female) _____
5. Place of birth _____
6. Where does your family live now? _____
7. How long have you lived in Riyadh?
_____ less than a year _____ years
8. Do you consider yourself a city or country person?
(Please check one)
1. _____ city 2. _____ country
9. What is your current marital status (Please check one)
(1) Single _____ (3) Widowed _____
(2) Married _____ (5) Separated _____
(3) Divorced _____
10. How long has this been your marital status?
_____ less than a year _____ years
11. If you are married, separated, widowed or divorced, how many times have you been married?
_____ Never, I am single. _____ time(s)
12. Have you ever traveled outside of Saudi Arabia (Please check one)
Yes () No ()
13. If "yes" to above question, how many times have you left Saudi Arabia? _____ time(s)
14. The occupation of your father is (was)? (Be as specific as possible)

15. My parents are: (Check () and complete those that apply)

1. () both living
 2. () Father is dead, died at age _____
 3. () Mother is dead, died at age _____
-

16. Which of the following most closely describes your family? (Check () one)

1. () Only the couple and their children living together.
 2. () The couple and their children as well as the parents of spouses living together.
 3. () Father divorced or separated living with children.
 4. () Mother divorced or separated living with children.
 5. () Mother divorced or separated living with children and parents.
 6. () Father divorced or separated living with children and parents.
 7. () Other (explain). _____
-

17. The place of birth of my father was:

18. The place of birth of my mother was:

19. When I was born my father was _____ years old and my mother was _____ years old.

20. How many brothers and sisters do you have?

No. of BROTHER(s) _____ No. of SISTER(s) _____

21. My parents are considered by most people in the community to be: (Check () one please)

1. () very important people
 2. () important people
 3. () just average people
 4. () of less than average importance
 5. () not at all important
-

22. What is the highest level of education that your father or mother has completed? (Please check () one for each)

	Father	Mother
1) cannot read or write	1.	_____
2) some elementary education	2.	_____
3) completed elementary degree	3.	_____
4) completed intermediate degree	4.	_____
5) completed secondary degree	5.	_____
6) has some college education	6.	_____
7) completed college degree	7.	_____
8) has master's degree	8.	_____
9) has doctoral degree	9.	_____

23. When I was growing up, my mother's occupation was:
(Please check () one)

1. () had no job outside the home
 2. () had a job outside the home as: (Please be specific) _____

24. What kind of house is your family living in now?
(Check () one)

1. () House with yard and garage
 2. () Apartment
 3. () Suite
 4. () Room

25. Where do you live in Riyadh? (Please check () one)

1. () Dormitories at the University
 2. () Rent Apartment
 3. () In my parent's house
 4. () In my brother's house
 5. () In a relative's house

26. Our home is () owned () rented?

27. The number of persons who live at our house is: _____

28. The number of rooms in our house is: _____ (Count all rooms excluding bathrooms, and storage space.)

29. What is your approximate gross family income from all sources per month? (Please check one)

1. () Less than 3000 Saudi Riyals
 2. () 3000 to 5000
 3. () 5100 to 6000
 4. () 6100 to 7000
 5. () 7100 to 8000
 6. () 8100 to 9000
 7. () 9100 to 10000
 8. () 10100 to 11000
 9. () more than 12000
-

30. In comparison to the income of the parents of other students in my college, the income of my parents is: (Check one please)

1. () one of the highest incomes
 2. () higher than average
 3. () just average
 4. () less than average
 5. () one of the lowest incomes
-

31. Do you care from which tribe you are? (Check one please)

Yes () No ()

32. Please name your tribe _____

33. Please indicate (check one in each column) how often your father and you go to the Mosque?

Your Father You

1. Five times a day _____
 2. Some prayer times, at least once a day _____
 3. Friday only _____
 4. Some Fridays, at least once a month _____
 5. Less than once a month, but more than twice a year _____
 6. Twice a year _____
 7. Occasionally, less than twice a year _____
 8. Never go _____
-

34. My family is too poor to buy the kind of things I need:

Yes () No ()

35. The person that I would like to marry prefers to marry with others whose families are more important than mine:

Yes () No ()

36. At what age do you expect to get married?

_____ (years of age please)

37. At what age do you expect to have your first child?

_____ (Years of age please)

38. How many children would you expect to have in the future?

_____ (number of children please)

39. Do you mind having your spouse from other than your class? (Check () one please).

- () No, if my family approves of it.
() No, if the spouse's family is wealthy.
() No, if the marriage will not cause problems in my tribe.
() Not at all.
() Yes, I mind.
() Other (Please explain) _____
-

40. How would you identify yourself and in which order?
(Use numbers 1 to 7. Rank order of your choice where 7 = most important and 1 = least important.)

1. My Father's child _____
 2. My tribe's child _____
 3. Saudi citizen _____
 4. Arab _____
 5. Muslim _____
 6. Citizen of the world _____
 7. Other _____ (Explain _____)
-

Circle one number which applies to the following family matters.

Family Matters	Father	Mother	Brother	Sister	Spouse	Friend	Other
41. The people you have the highest respect for.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
42. The people you feel closest to is.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
43. Go to ask for advice on how to run the family.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
44. Go to seek advice about marriage engagements.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
45. Go to understand politics.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
46. Go to understand religion.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
47. Go to when there is a family dispute with a neighbor.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
48. Go to when there is a family dispute.	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

49. When one considers a person as a spouse, several things affect one's decision. Some are listed below. (Please rank them as they are important to you, and to your parents. Use the number 1 to 10 for ranking. 1 = least important, 10 = most important. Use each number only once.)

Parent's Rank	Your Rank
------------------	--------------

- Family status of potential spouse.
 Intelligence of potential spouse.
 Religiosity of potential spouse.
 Family wealth of potential spouse.
 Appearance of potential spouse.
 Love/romance.
 Fertility.
 Potential spouse's income.
 Potential spouse's education.
 Other (write). _____
-

50. In your opinion, what is the ideal age of marriage for:

Man _____ Woman _____

51. If you had a choice of a job after graduation, which one of the following is best for you: (Please () check only one)

1. () Religious scholar
 2. () Editor
 3. () Teacher
 4. () Diplomat
 5. () Sportsman
 6. () Private businessman
 7. () Other (Specify) _____
-

52. From your actual experience in your family, how much authority would you say each of the following family members should have and actually has within your family? (Use the numbers 1 to 5, where 1 = least authority and 5 = total authority. Use the number only once.)

SHOULD	ACTUAL
--------	--------

- Father _____
 Mother _____
 Brother _____
 Sister _____
 Grandparent _____
 Spouse _____
 Relative _____
-

53. Rank how much a person should and actually does feel affection for the following members of his (her) afmily? (Use the numbers 1 to 5, to show how one should feel and actually feels. 1 = least affection and 5 = total affection. Use the number only once.)

SHOULD ACTUAL

Father	_____
Mother	_____
Brother	_____
Sister	_____
Grandparent	_____
Spouse	_____
Relative	_____

54. If there is a conflict between your family members and non-members, the best thing to do is (Check only one please).

1. () Make sure your family members win the dispute.
 2. () Help your family only if it is right.
 3. () Remain uninvolved.
 4. () Aid whichever party is right.
 5. () Call the police.
 6. () Other (Explain) _____
-

55. How important is it for you to be informed about what happens? (Circle one in each column, if applicable)

	Very Impor- tant	Not Impor- tant	Not at all Impor- tant
--	------------------------	-----------------------	------------------------------

1. In Saudi Arabia 1 2 3 4
 2. In Muslim world 1 2 3 4
 3. In the entire world 1 2 3 4
-

56. If you had a choice of jobs in Saudi Arabia, Arab country, Muslims, non-Arab country, East Europe, U.S.A., check as many as apply to you.

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
Saudi Arabia		
Arab Country		
Muslim non-Arab country		
West Europe		
East Europe		
Far East		
U.S.A.		
Other (Specify) _____		

57. Do you believe the radio reports of: (Mark each one yes or no).

	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No	Yes or No	Soviet Radio	London Radio	U.S. Radio	Arabic Radio	Saudi Radio
Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
58. Women who want to remove the word obey from the marriage service do not understand what it means to be a wife.	5	4	3	2	1					
60. People should defend their religion above all other things.	5	4	3	2	1					
61. It goes against nature to place women in positions of authority over men.	5	4	3	2	1					
62. A person should always support his relatives if they are in need.	5	4	3	2	1					
63. It is a bad reflection on a husband's manhood if his wife works.	5	4	3	2	1					

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
64. Some equality in marriage is a good thing, but by and in large the husband ought to have the main say-so in family matters.	5	4	3	2	1
65. I think it is more serious to break God's law than to break man's law.	5	4	3	2	1
66. At least one married son should be expected to live in the parental home or with the parent.	5	4	3	2	1
67. Almost any woman is better off in the home than in a job or profession.	5	4	3	2	1
68. A woman should have the right to pursue a profession if they want to.	5	4	3	2	1
69. A person should always help his parents with the support of his younger brothers and sisters if necessary.	5	4	3	2	1

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
70. I believe that a human being is predetermined in the knowledge of God, but through good work we can tell something about the person.	5	4	3	2	1
71. Islamic brotherhood is more important than blood brotherhood.	5	4	3	2	1
72. The important thing in life is to be a success no matter how you get the success.	5	4	3	2	1
73. It is a husband's responsibility to make sure his wife is always satisfied emotionally and financially.	5	4	3	2	1
74. My family influences my aspirations.	5	4	3	2	1
75. When in Rome, do as the Romans do.	5	4	3	2	1
76. It is not right to get success in life without preserving God's law.	5	4	3	2	1

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
77. I would be unhappy living away from relatives.	5	4	3	2	1
78. I would rather be a great scholar than a very rich person.	5	4	3	2	1
79. A person's success in life depends most of all on prestige of his own family or his spouse's family.	5	4	3	2	1
80. Man should not work too hard, for his fortune is in the hands of God.	5	4	3	2	1
81. My education will allow me to move away from my community within the next few years.	5	4	3	2	1
82. To me God teaching is the constant aspiration and support of the best we try to achieve.	5	4	3	2	1
83. I enjoy myself most when I am alone, away from other people.	5	4	3	2	1

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
84. I don't approve of spending time and energy in doing things for other people.	5	4	3	2	1
85. When I was 17 I could come to and go from home as I wished.	5	4	3	2	1
86. I believe a man needs to work in order to feel that he has a real place in the world.	5	4	3	2	1
87. Husband and wife are equal and ought to have equal say in family matters.	5	4	3	2	1
88. One believes that God rewards hard work.	5	4	3	2	1
89. I believe in looking to my family and my self more and letting others shift for themselves.	5	4	3	2	1
90. I am not concerned with the opinions of others as long as I am fairly certain I am headed toward my goals.	5	4	3	2	1

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Do not know Or Confused	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
91. The only purpose of working is to make money.	5	4	3	2	1
92. Our children have the right to determine most things about their lives after they reach 15 years of age.	5	4	3	2	1
93. I change my opinion (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else.	5	4	3	2	1
94. Girls in a family should marry as they wish, not as their family would want.	5	4	3	2	1
95. Some young people reject religion because they have not had the freedom of choice.	5	4	3	2	1
96. One believes that human beings are predestinated to go to heaven or to hell.	5	4	3	2	1

Circle what is appropriate.	Four Wives	Three Wives	Two Wives	One Wives
97. How many wives did (does) your father have at any one time?	4	3	2	1
98. How many wives do you expect to have at any one time? (For men only)	4	3	2	1
99. How many wives would you allow your husband have at one time? (For women)	4	3	2	1
100. How many wives would you expect your son to have at one time? (For both)	4	3	2	1

101. Using the numbers 1 to 5, 1 = most important, 5 = least important, please rank the order of importance in a job for each of the following.

-) Prestige
) Salary
) Creative job
) Service to Islam
) Service to society

102. Which of the following do you or the following persons have today or had at your age? Which do you expect your children to have at your age? (Check as many as apply.)

	You	Your Parent	Your Grand-parent	Your Children
Stereo				
Car				
T.V.				
Video				
Refrigerator				
Telephone				
House				
University Education				
Book collection (more than 50 books)				
Travel Abroad (for recreational purposes)				

103. If Saudi Arabia is moving toward development, is this happening: (please check one.)

- a. () too fast?
- b. () the right speed?
- c. () too slowly?

104. Where do you get most of your information on what happens? (Check one in each line.)

SOURCE	Family	Neighbor	Television	Saudi radio	Foreign Radio	Local Newspapers	Foreign Newspapers	Books	Other
In Saudi Arabia									

In Saudi
Arabia

In Muslim
World

In the
World

If other is checked, explain: _____

105. Please check the one which most resembles your opinion.

1. Saudi Arabia should strive to become more and more like the industrial nations of the west.
2. Saudi Arabia should develop by making sure that we do not abandon the way of Islam.
3. Saudi Arabia should not develop and return to the old ways.

106. (This question is for women only) After I graduate:
(Please check the one most close to express your
plan.)

- () I am not going to work at all
() I expect to work only until I get married
() I expect to work also after I am married, but
only until I have children
() I expect to work all the way
-

107. What is your grade average in your college? _____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. THE FOLLOWING PAGE IS FOR
YOUR COMMENTS AND FURTHER OPINIONS.

Comments

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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ibrahim or Abraham, IBN Mubarak Al Juwayer was born December 1, 1950, in Al-Kharj, 80 kilometers south of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He graduated from Riyadh Scientific Religious Institute in 1969. From 1969 to 1973 he attended the undergraduate program of the Arabic Language College, which in 1975 was incorporated into the University of Imam Muhamad Ibn Saud Colleges. After receiving his Bachelor of Art in June 1973, he worked as a teacher in the R. S. R. Institute for one year and a half. Then he took the position of public relations officer in the University of Imam Muhamad for six months. He then became a teaching assistant in the Department of Sociology of that University.

From January 1978 to December 1979, he attended the graduate program at Indiana State University where he received a Master of Science in sociology. In September 1980, he enrolled in the Ph.D. program in sociology at the University of Florida.

Ibrahim's parents live in Riyadh. He has two older brothers and two younger sisters all of whom are married. He and his wife Aljuharah, have two daughters, Iman and Asma, and one son, Ayman.


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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Philosophy in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Dean for Graduate Studies
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